The European Economic and Monetary Union and the theory of optimum currency areas by Bogdan, Adriana-Maria
  
 
 
 
 
 
MAGISTERARBEIT 
 
 
 
 
Titel der Magisterarbeit 
 
 
„The European Economic and Monetary Union and the 
Theory of Optimum Currency Areas“ 
 
 
 
 
Verfasserin / Verfasser 
 
Adriana-Maria Bogdan 
 
 
 
angestrebter akademischer Grad 
 
Magistra / Magister der Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften 
(Mag. rer. soc. oec.) 
 
 
 
 
Wien, im April 2009 
 
 
 
Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt:  A 066 915 
Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt:  Betriebswirtschaft   
Betreuer / Betreuerin:   em.-Prof. Dr. Erich W. Streissler 
 Table of Contents 
 
1. Introduction .................................................................................1 
2. A Brief History of the European Monetary Union ..................5 
2.1. Reasons for the Foundation of the EMU....................................................................5 
2.2. A Chronology of Events Leading to the EMU...........................................................6 
3. OCA Theory...............................................................................12 
3.1. The GG Schedule .....................................................................................................12 
3.2. The LL Schedule ......................................................................................................14 
3.3. The GG and LL Schedule Together .........................................................................16 
3.4. The Size of the OCA ................................................................................................17 
3.5. Shocks.......................................................................................................................19 
3.5.1. Adverse shocks.................................................................................................20 
3.5.2. Asymmetric shocks ..........................................................................................21 
3.5.3. Symmetric shocks with asymmetric effects .....................................................24 
3.6. The Theory of Mundell ............................................................................................24 
4. OCA Criteria .............................................................................29 
4.1. Labor and Capital Mobility (Mundell) .....................................................................29 
4.1.1. Labor Mobility..................................................................................................30 
4.1.2. The Graphical Illustration of Mundell’s Theory ..............................................35 
4.1.3. Immigration in Europe over Time....................................................................36 
4.1.4. The European Labor Market ............................................................................37 
4.1.5. European and US Labor Situation....................................................................40 
4.1.6. Increasing Labor Mobility ................................................................................43 
4.1.7. Free Movement of Capital................................................................................44 
4.2. Price and Wage Flexibility .......................................................................................46 
4.2.1. Price flexibility .................................................................................................47 
4.2.2. Wage Flexibility ...............................................................................................50 
4.2.2.1. Wage Rigidity in Europe ..........................................................................50 
4.2.2.2. Concepts of Nominal and Real Wage Flexibility.....................................51 
4.2.2.3. EMU Goals ...............................................................................................52 
4.2.2.4. Reasons for Wage Rigidity in EMU.........................................................53 
4.2.2.5. Wage Flexibility and Co-ordination of Wage Bargaining .......................54 
4.2.2.6. Further Possibilities to Increase Wage Flexibility....................................55 
4.3. Financial Market Integration ....................................................................................56 
4.3.1. The Concept of Financial Market Integration ..................................................57 
4.3.2. Advantages of Financial Integration ................................................................57 
4.3.3. The EMU and Payment Behaviors Convergence .............................................59 
4.3.4. The Money Market in the EMU .......................................................................60 
4.3.5. Corporate Bond Markets ..................................................................................62 
4.3.6. The Bank Credit Markets .................................................................................63 
4.3.7. The Euro Equity Markets .................................................................................64 
4.3.7.1. Consequences of the Integration ..............................................................65 
4.3.7.2. Further Integration (e. g. by a European Stock Exchange) ......................66 
4.3.8. The Government Bond Market.........................................................................67 
4.3.8.1. The Concept of Government Bond Markets and Their Advantages ........67 
 4.3.8.2. Changes in the Euro Area Government Bond Market..............................68 
4.4. Production Diversification (Kenen) .........................................................................70 
4.5. Economic Openness (Mc Kinnon) ...........................................................................71 
4.6. Similarities of Inflation Rates...................................................................................73 
4.7. Fiscal Integration (Fiscal Transfers).........................................................................74 
4.8. Political Integration ..................................................................................................75 
4.8.1. EMU Political Integration ................................................................................76 
4.8.2. Institutions and Governing ...............................................................................77 
4.8.3. The European Central Bank .............................................................................79 
4.8.3.1. Models of Central Banking ......................................................................79 
4.8.3.2. The ECB and other EMU Institutions ......................................................81 
4.8.3.3. The Optimal ECB Design.........................................................................85 
4.8.3.4. The ECB and the Euro Area Enlargement ...............................................88 
4.8.3.5. The Accountability of the ECB ................................................................89 
4.8.3.6. ECB Communication................................................................................89 
4.8.3.7. The supervision of the banking sector......................................................92 
4.8.4. The Reform Treaty (Treaty of Lisbon) and Further Possible Integration ........93 
4.8.5. Solidarity vs. Nationalism ................................................................................94 
4.9. Homogeneous Preferences .......................................................................................95 
5. The Maastricht Criteria ...........................................................97 
5.1. Inflation ....................................................................................................................99 
5.2. Interest Rates ..........................................................................................................103 
5.3. Exchange Rate ........................................................................................................104 
5.4. Deficit and Debt .....................................................................................................107 
5.5. Convergence ...........................................................................................................116 
5.5.1. Convergence after Maastricht.........................................................................116 
5.5.2. Convergence in EMU Candidate Countries ...................................................117 
5.5.3. The Maastricht Conditions for EMU Membership ........................................117 
5.6. Political Challenges ................................................................................................119 
5.7. EU External Relations ............................................................................................122 
5.7.1. European Economic Area (EEA) ...................................................................123 
5.7.2. European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) ..........................................................123 
5.7.3. EU Limits .......................................................................................................124 
5.7.4. Italy and Great Britain ....................................................................................124 
5.8. The Possibility of Euro Area Breakup....................................................................125 
5.9. Language ................................................................................................................129 
6. The Impact of the Crisis 2008 ................................................131 
6.1. General Definitions of Crises .................................................................................133 
6.2. The Emergence of the Financial Crisis of 2008 .....................................................134 
6.3. Reasons and Developments....................................................................................137 
6.4. The Effects on Maastricht Requirements ...............................................................143 
6.5. The Role of EMU Institutions ................................................................................145 
6.6. Measures for Overcoming the Crisis ......................................................................148 
6.6.1. Regulatory Design ..........................................................................................149 
6.6.2. European Reactions ........................................................................................150 
6.6.3. Fiscal and Financial Support ..........................................................................152 
6.6.4. Measures to Enhance EU Financial Market Integration.................................154 
 6.6.5. Economic and Financial Cooperation between the EU and the US ...............157 
6.6.6. G-20 Measures................................................................................................158 
6.6.7. Purposes of Measures .....................................................................................158 
6.7. Expectations of Further Developments ..................................................................160 
6.8. Conclusions ............................................................................................................162 
7. Opinions ...................................................................................165 
8. Summary and Concluding Remarks.....................................167 
9. References ................................................................................172 
 
 
 
 
Index of Tables 
 
Table 1: Labor Market Outlook – Euro Area and EU27 ..........................................................40 
Table 2: ECB Participation in Community Fora and Bodies ...................................................85 
Table 3: Inflation Outlook – Euro Area and EU27 ................................................................100 
Table 4: General Government Budgetary Position – Euro Area and EU27...........................108 
Table 5: General Government Structural Budget Balance .....................................................110 
Table 6: Overview of fiscal and financial support in G7 and BRIC countries.......................152 
 
 
Index of Figures 
 
Figure 1: The GG Schedule......................................................................................................13 
Figure 2: The LL Schedule.......................................................................................................15 
Figure 3: Deciding When to Peg the Exchange Rate ...............................................................16 
Figure 4: An Increase in Output Market Variability ................................................................17 
Figure 5: The Logic of the Optimum Currency Area Theory ..................................................18 
Figure 6: An Adverse Demand Shock......................................................................................21 
Figure 7: An Asymmetric Shock in a Currency Union ............................................................22 
 
 
 List of Abbreviations 
 
ABS          Asset backed security 
AIG          American International Group 
bn          billion 
BRIC          Brazil, Russia, India, China 
CEEC Central Eastern European Countries 
CBA 
CDO 
CDS 
CRA 
Currency Board Arrangement 
Collateralized debt obligation 
Credit default swap 
Credit rating agency 
DGT Directorate-General for Translation 
DM Deutsche Mark 
ECB European Central Bank 
ECOFIN Economics and Finance Ministers of EU Member States 
ECU European Currency Unit 
EEA European Economic Area 
EFC European Association of Independent Funders 
EFTA European Free Trade Association 
ELM European Labor Markets 
EMCF European Monetary Cooperation Fund 
EMI European Monetary Institute 
EMS European Monetary System 
EMU European Economic and Monetary Union; 
European Monetary Union 
EPC European Political Cooperation 
ERM Exchange Rate Mechanism 
ERM II Exchange Rate Mechanism II 
EONIA Euro Overnight Index Average 
ESCB European System of Central Banks 
EU European Union 
 EURIBOR 
FHLMC 
FNMA 
G-20 
G7 
Euro Inter Bank Offered Rate 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
Federal National Mortgage Association 
Group of Twenty 
Group of Seven 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
HIPC Harmonized Indices of Consumer Prices 
IMF 
Libor 
International Monetary Fund 
London inter-bank offered rate 
MEP 
MIFID 
Member of European Parliament 
Market in Financial Instruments Directive 
NAIRU 
NATO 
Non-accelarating Inflation Rate of Unemployment 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NBR National Bank of Romania 
OCA Optimum Currency Area 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OTC Over the Counter 
p. 
R&D 
page 
Research and development 
SEA 
SEPA 
Single European Act 
Single Euro Payment Area 
SGP 
S&P 
Stability and Growth Pact 
Standard and Poor 
SPA 
SPV 
UK 
UN 
US 
TEC 
Single Payment Area 
Special purpose vehicle 
United Kingdom 
United Nations 
United States 
Transatlantic Economic Council 
TEU Treaty of the European Union 
ToA Treaty of Amsterdam 
Introduction                                                                     1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In recent years the European Union (EU) has expanded by the joining of several new 
countries, most of them from Central and Eastern Europe. These countries include the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia as well as Cyprus 
and Malta, which joined in 2004. In the year 2007 Bulgaria and Romania were also accepted 
as EU members. These new member states have the obligation to enter the European 
Monetary Union some time after the admission, which is subject to satisfying the convergence 
criteria specified in the Treaty of Maastricht1. 
 
The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU – which is also referred to as “European 
Monetary Union” by some economists and throughout this paper) is a currency area that 
exists as a result of the adoption of the euro on January 1, 1999, by eleven EU countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain). Greece was the 12th EU country that adopted the euro on January 1, 
2001. New EMU members have been Slovenia since 1.1.2007 as well as Malta and Cyprus 
since 1.1.2008. Slovakia will join the third stage of EMU on January 1, 2009. All new 
European Union (EU) member states do not have an opt-out right (like the former members 
Denmark and the United Kingdom), meaning that EMU membership is obligatory for these 
countries. After all new EU countries will join the EMU the currency area will have a 
population of about 300 million2. 
 
The main issue analyzed in this paper regards the question whether EMU is an optimum 
currency area (OCA). An OCA can be defined as “the optimal geographic domain of a single 
currency, or of several currencies, whose exchange rates are irrevocably pegged and might be 
unified”3. This means that the common currency or the pegged currencies of the monetary 
union can float only together against the rest of the world. Whether a currency area is optimal 
or not can only be determined by examining certain OCA properties, like labor mobility, price 
and wage flexibility, economic openness, fiscal and political integration as well as other 
important factors. The fulfillment of these OCA criteria reduces the importance of nominal 
                                                 
1
 See Lipinska (2008), p.7 
2
 See Krugman/Obstfeld (2006), p. 548. 
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exchange rate adjustments. Naturally the members of a currency area expect that the benefits 
from joining such an agreement are higher than the costs incurred4.  
 
There are different views of economists about this aspect. Some economists that favor flexible 
exchange rates are: 
- J. E. Meade (1957), because of the lack of labor mobility between member states5; 
- De Grauwe (1994), because of the economic costs that are likely to be higher than the 
benefits6; 
- Martin Feldstein (1997), as a result of adverse economic effects and political 
disagreement7. 
Baldwin and Wyplosz come to the conclusion that EMU fulfills certain criteria but not all of 
them, e.g. there is low labor mobility8. Scitovski (1958) supports a common currency because 
of the greater degree of capital mobility, but he also considers that further steps have to be 
taken in order to increase the optimality of the EMU9. 
 
In order to explore these issues, the rest of this thesis is organized as follows: 
 
The second chapter describes the motives that led to the formation of EMU as well as a brief 
history of important steps in the development of this currency area. Knowing the main 
characteristics of EMU and its important economic and historic aspects can lead to 
understanding the factors that are optimal and those which should be improved in the euro 
zone.  
 
The third chapter deals with the OCA theory, possible shocks and their consequences for 
exchange rate areas. The purpose is to present the characteristics of an OCA theory and the 
derived economic lessons. The main OCA theory presented in detail in this chapter is that of 
                                                                                                                                                        
3
 See Mongelli (2002), p.7 
4
 See Mongelli (2002), p. 7 
5
 See Meade (1957), quoted in Mundell (1961), p. 661. 
6
 See De Grauwe (1994), quoted in Tomann (2007), p. 19. 
7
 See Feldstein (1997), quoted in Baldwin/Wyplosz (2006), p. 370. 
8
 See Baldwin/Wyplosz (2006), p. 370. 
9
 See Scitovski (1958), quoted in Mundell (1961), p. 661. 
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Mundell, who now advocates a single worldwide currency10. Understanding the OCA theories 
can help to answer the question whether EMU is an OCA.  
 
In the fourth chapter the different OCA criteria are discussed as well as their fulfillment in the 
EMU. The criteria described in detail are: 
- labor and capital mobility  
- price and wage flexibility 
- financial market integration 
- product diversification  
- economic openness  
- similarities of inflation rates 
- fiscal integration (fiscal transfers) 
- political integration (e.g. solidarity vs. nationalism) 
- homogeneous preferences. 
 
What can be observed during the analysis of these criteria is that, although progress is 
possible and recommended, the adoption of the euro determined an improvement of these 
criteria. Possible further measures regard a common European stock market11 and the 
complete establishment of a single debt market12 to increase the financial market integration, 
as well as an EMU wide supervision of the banking sector13 and institutional improvements14 
to determine a higher political integration.  
 
The fifth chapter presents an overview of the Maastricht criteria (inflation, interest rate, 
exchange rate, deficit and debt), which have to be fulfilled by EU countries that intend to join 
the EMU15. Advantages and disadvantages of the introduction of these criteria are described, 
as well as the convergence as a result of these criteria. This chapter also presents different 
opinions whether it is optimal to make EMU accession dependent on the fulfillment of these 
criteria. Further aspects regarding the convergence and the optimality of EMU are discussed, 
                                                 
10
 See Baldwin/Wyplosz (2006), p. 357. 
11
 See Aehling (2000), p. 27. 
12
 See Adjoute and Danthine (2003), p. 1. 
13
 See De Grauwe (2005), p. 191. 
14
 See Treaty of Lisbon. 
15
 See Maastricht Treaty (1991).  
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consisting in EU external relations as well as the challenge of having several different 
languages in the union. Political conditions for EU membership are also analyzed as well as 
the possibility of EMU breakup. 
 
The sixth chapter deals with the 2008 financial crisis and its possible effects on currency 
areas. Some definitions as well as elements of financial crises are given. Then, an overview of 
the present crisis shows the severity and the possible consequences for currency areas such as 
the US and EMU. The effects of the present crisis on the Maastricht criteria and on the 
fulfillment of the SGP are also detailed. The role of EMU institutions in the context of crisis 
shows the importance of the political integration. Measures to overcome the crisis and to also 
increase the fulfillment of the OCA criteria of financial market integration and political 
integration are described. The expectations of further developments are then analyzed. 
Finally, the significance of EMU for taking measures to overcome the crisis is stressed.    
 
 In the seventh chapter important opinions of economists regarding the question whether 
EMU is an optimum currency area are described. Like already mentioned, there are 
economists who favor flexible exchange rates and consider that EMU is not an optimum 
currency area, e.g. J. E. Meade, De Grauwe, M. Feldstein; economists who believe that 
certain OCA criteria are fulfilled by the EMU but not all; and economists who support a 
common currency because of the improvements made in the EMU regarding the OCA 
criteria. 
 
Finally, the last chapter presents a summary and conclusion of the topics discussed in this 
thesis. 
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2. A Brief History of the European Monetary Union 
 
The economic and monetary union (EMU) can be defined as “a European Union in which 
national currencies would be replaced by a single EU currency managed by a sole central 
bank operating on behalf of all EU members”16. 
 
This chapter covers the following topics: 
- the reasons why the EMU plays a significant role for the member states and in the 
world economy; 
- the motives for the economic and monetary cooperation; 
- the benefits and costs of a currency union. 
Then there will be given an overview of the chronology of the events leading to EMU. 
 
2.1. Reasons for the Foundation of the EMU 
 
The European Monetary Union plays a very important role for the member states and in the 
world economy by increasing Europe’s competitiveness especially in comparison with the 
United States and Asia, by leading to more stability and protection against international 
speculators, through lower exchange and transaction costs and through the elimination of the 
exchange rate risk between the member states17. 
 
There were different reasons for the economic and monetary cooperation. A reason was the 
fact that European leaders considered the integration a guarantee against future wars between 
member states, like the World War I and World War II. Another motive consisted in the 
intention to increase Europe’s importance in the world monetary system. The purpose was a 
more efficient capacity to represent the economic interests of European countries after the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system, and in the context of a reduced confidence that the 
United States would pursue international monetary purposes ahead of national interests. 
Thirdly, there was the determination to transform the European Union into a unified market 
based on the model of the United States without official trade barriers and exchange rate 
                                                 
16
 See Krugman/Obstfeld (2006), p. 554. 
17
 See Böhm, Lahoynsky (2006), p. 60. 
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uncertainty18. Countries also wanted to establish the German Bundesbank’s credibility as an 
inflation fighter by fixing the exchange rates against the Deutsche Mark (DM) in countries 
that were confronted with high inflation in the 1970s (this is known as the credibility theory 
of the EMS)19. 
 
However, there are benefits and costs of a currency union, as can be seen in the following 
overview. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Tomann, H. (2007), p. 19. 
 
2.2. A Chronology of Events Leading to the EMU 
 
The EMU came into being because of the convergence of widely different interests, e.g. the 
creation of a customs union, threats of exchange rate fluctuations, the intention to have a free 
trade area and the necessity to adopt a common policy vis-à-vis the United States20. 
                                                 
18
 See Krugman, Obstfeld (2006), p. 550. 
19
 See Krugman, Obstfeld (2006), p. 552. 
20
 See Tsoukalis, quoted in Arestis, McCauley, Sawyer (1999), p. 3. 
Benefits and costs of a currency union 
 
Benefits (dependent on the openness of the economy): 
• Transaction costs are reduced 
• Indirect effects: more transparent markets 
• Price discrimination is reduced 
• Monetary investment risks are diminished 
• Growth effects 
Costs: 
• Seignorage and inflation tax are not to the discretion of national governments 
• Exchange rate policy to compensate for intra-union asymmetrical shocks is abandoned 
• ‘Countries are different’ (particularly with respect to wage and price rigidity) 
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A very important step towards EMU was the foundation of the EU through the 1957 Treaty of 
Rome by Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Through this 
treaty there was also established customs union in Europe and the exchange rates were 
considered “a matter of common interest” between member states.  
 
The Committee of Central Bank Governors of EU was founded in 1964. In 1969 the heads of 
state and government of EU expressed the intention to found the European Economic and 
Monetary Union. In 1970 a commission worked out a plan for the introduction of the 
European Monetary Union that should have been founded in the year 1980, but international 
monetary turbulences hindered the purpose21. The Werner Report of 1971, like the subsequent 
Delors Report, proposed an EMU in three stages: stage one should have been “directed at 
getting economic underpinning right and preparing the ground for any institutional 
development in order to facilitate coordinated policy-making”; the second stage, when 
economic and institutional progress should have been consolidated; stage three of irrevocably 
fixed exchange rates and a community central bank with centralized monetary policy. The 
purposes of the stages one and two were higher “convergence, a common policy on 
government budgeting and a progressive narrowing of currency fluctuation bands”22. In 1972 
the EU countries introduced between their currencies and against the dollar the arrangement 
that the exchange rates were allowed to fluctuate up and down by as much as 2.5 percent 
relative to an assigned par value23.  
 
In 1979 the European Monetary System (EMS) was introduced and the eight original 
participants in the EMS’s exchange rate mechanism were France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, 
Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. In March 1979 the members of the EMS 
began to operate a formal network of mutually pegged exchange rates24. The ERM (Exchange 
Rate Mechanism) is a tool provided by the EMS to achieve some of its objectives and it has 
four components: the European Currency Unit (ECU), the parity grid, the divergence 
indicator, and credit financing25. Through policy cooperation and realignment the EMS 
                                                 
21
 See Greving (2005), p. 46. 
22
 See Arestis, McCauley, Sawyer (1999), p. 16. 
23
 See Greving (2005), p. 46. 
24
 See Krugman, Obstfeld (2006), p. 551. 
25
 See Arestis, McCauley, Sawyer (1999), p. 19. 
A Brief History of the European Monetary Union                                                                     8 
 
 
managed to extend and was joined by Spain in 1989, by Britain in 1990 and by Portugal in 
1992.  
 
Britain and Italy left the EMS exchange rate mechanism in September 1992 because of a 
European currency crisis, that had as a consequence the widening of most EMS bands to +-15 
percent because of speculative attacks (in August 1993).  
 
Between March 1979 and August 1993 the exchange rates were allowed to fluctuate up and 
down by as much as 2.25 percent relative to an assigned par value. Some members negotiated 
bands of +/-6 percent. In order to maintain the negotiated bands, several measures were taken, 
including: 
- provisions for credit from strong- to weak-currency members (if the currency in 
country A depreciated against the currency of country B, then the central bank from 
country B had to lend an amount of its own currency to the central bank of country A, 
that was sold for the currency of country A in the foreign exchange market); 
- capital controls in some countries like France and Italy in order to reduce speculative 
attacks by limiting domestic residents’ sales of home currencies for foreign currencies;  
- periodic currency realignments (between March 1979 and January 1987 11 
realignments took place).  
 
In the EU the freedom of payments and capital movements are very important principles, so 
the capital controls were removed over time and the monetary independence reduced by 
increasing the influence of the European governing bodies.  
 
In 1990 the reunification of eastern and western Germany took place. The consequences were 
economic shocks and asymmetric macroeconomic pressures in Germany and its major EMS 
partners in 1992. After the reunification of Germany a boom took place in that country and 
the Bundesbank increased interest rates as a measure against inflation. France, Italy and the 
United Kingdom were not booming like Germany, but they had to increase interest rates in 
order to be able to hold the currencies fixed against Germany’s, aspects that led to deep 
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recession in that countries and to speculative attacks, that resulted in a widening of the bands 
to +-15 percent, kept until the introduction of the euro in 199926.  
 
The measures adopted by EU countries in order to obtain higher internal economic unity are 
the fixing of the mutual exchange rates and direct measures to encourage the free flow of 
goods, services and factors of production. The preference for mutually fixed exchange rates 
on macroeconomic grounds was positively influenced by the measures to raise 
microeconomic efficiency through market liberalization (the most recent plan in this sense is 
the “1992” initiative and its purposes27, consisting in the free movements of goods, services 
and resources28, which had to be achieved by January 1, 1993; it was speeded up by the Single 
European Act, SEA)29. Through the Single European Act of 1986 the barriers to trade, capital 
and labor migration that existed even with the Treaty of Rome were widely eliminated, and 
the necessity of unanimous consent for measures related to market completion dropped. The 
measures were very effective especially concerning the free flow of financial capital30. 
 
In 1989 a committee headed by Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission, 
presented as a goal an economic and monetary union (EMU) with a single EU currency and a 
common central bank31. The Delors Report recommended that three stages should lead to a 
full monetary union: 
- the first stage began on July 1, 1990, when the liberalization of capital movements was 
introduced, being part of the Single Market Program; 
- the second stage started on January 1, 1994, when the European Monetary Institute 
(EMI) was created as a precursor to the ECB. Some of its purposes were to coordinate 
the monetary policies of member states, to monitor the functioning of the EMS, to 
facilitate the use of the ECU, to make recommendations on exchange rate policy and 
to monitor the economic convergence of member states; 
                                                 
26
 See Krugman, Obstfeld (2006), p. 551. 
27
 See Krugman, Obstfeld (2006), p. 552. 
28
 See Arestis, McCauley, Sawyer (1999), p. 26. 
29
 See Krugman, Obstfeld (2006), p. 552. 
30
 See Krugman, Obstfeld (2006), p. 553. 
31
 See Krugman, Obstfeld (2006), p. 554. 
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- the third stage began on January 1, 1999, when the euro was introduced instead of 
national currencies and when the ECB and national central banks, composing the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB), replaced the EMI32. 
The introduction of the single European currency and the European Central Bank were 
regulated through the Maastricht Treaty, ratified in the year 1993 by all 12 EU member 
countries. Austria, Finland and Sweden, which decided to join the EU in 1995, accepted the 
Treaty, too. 
 
The reasons for the introduction of the common currency euro instead of maintaining fixed 
exchange rates or even allowing the exchange rates to float are the higher market integration, 
the possibility to pursue the interests of all EMU member states by the European Central Bank 
and to give those countries the same chances to contribute to the decision process, the 
freedom of capital and the reduction of the risks of speculative attacks, as well as the 
expectancy of political stability of Europe33. The ECU (European Currency Unit) was at the 
beginning the factitious European Common Currency34. It can be defined as a “monetary unit 
based on a basket of EU currencies; a fixed quantity of each currency in the basket with the 
weights of the currencies vary over time as intra-European exchange rates fluctuate, and a 
reserve instrument issued by the EMCF (European Monetary Cooperation Fund) to the EMS 
central banks in exchange for 20% of gold and dollar reserves”35.  
 
On January 1, 1999, the common currency euro was introduced in 11 EU member states 
(Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Portugal and Spain). The exchange rates were fixed and the foreign exchange transactions of 
the European Central Bank took place in euro. The enlargement of the EMU continued with 
Greece becoming the 12th EMU member state in 2001, Slovenia being a member from the 
1.1.2007 and Cyprus and Malta from the 1.1.2008.  
 
                                                 
32
 See Arestis, McCauley, Sawyer (1999), p. 30. 
33
 See Krugman, Obstfeld (2006), p. 554. 
34
 See Greving (2005), p. 46. 
35
 See Arestis, McCauley, Sawyer (1999), p. 19. 
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On January 1, 2002, the European Central Bank put the euro bills and coins into circulation. 
The euro became the only legal means of payment in the EMU starting from July 1, 200236. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 See Greving (2005), p. 46. 
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3. OCA Theory 
 
The definition of the OCA theory will be presented in this chapter. Then, the decision to join a 
currency area will be explained and illustrated by diagrams: the GG schedule shows the 
monetary efficiency gain of a country, resulting from joining a fixed exchange rate area (as 
economic integration between the country and the area rises); the LL schedule illustrates the 
economic stability loss of the country becoming a member of an exchange rate area, which 
falls as the economic integration between the country and the area rises; finally, the critical 
level of the economic integration is depicted, above which the decision to join leads to 
positive net economic benefits for the joining country. This chapter also presents reasons why 
a large currency area is desirable. Then, the different kinds of shocks and their connections to 
the OCA theory are discussed. Finally, the theory of Mundell, who has pioneered the OCA 
theory, is discussed in detail. In his acclaimed article from 1961, he considers that the costs of 
a currency union would be eliminated with full mobility of labor and capital. Since labor 
mobility is problematic across European countries, this could represent an obstacle for an 
OCA. According to his present opinion, however, a worldwide currency is desirable.  
 
The theory of optimum currency areas is the analysis of the costs and benefits from joining a 
fixed exchange rate area such as the EMS. According to this theory, fixed exchange rates are 
most appropriate for areas closely integrated, e.g. through international trade and factor 
movements37. The decision of a country to join a currency area can be clarified through the 
use of diagrams, as can be seen in the following sections of this chapter. 
 
3.1. The GG Schedule 
 
The schedule called GG shows the potential gains from joining the currency zone. A very 
important benefit of fixed exchange rates is the simplification of economic calculations and 
the provision of a more predictable basis for decisions concerning international transactions. 
There are savings from the elimination of uncertainty as well as from the reduction of 
calculation and transaction costs that are characteristic for floating exchange rates. It is, 
however, very difficult to calculate the precise amount of efficiency gain resulting from 
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pegging to a currency, but this gain is higher the more the country trades with the currency 
zone. The returns on investments are more predictable and wages more stable for people who 
decide to work in another country if the currency is pegged to that of the monetary union. “A 
high degree of economic integration between a country and a fixed exchange rate area 
magnifies the monetary efficiency gain the country reaps when it fixes its exchange rate 
against the area’s currencies”38.  
 
 
Figure 1: The GG Schedule 
Source: Krugman/Obstfeld (2006), p. 560. 
 
The GG is an upward-sloping curve, which illustrates the relation between a country’s degree 
of economic integration with a fixed exchange rate area – measured by the horizontal axis –, 
and the monetary efficiency gain to the country from joining the area, – measured on the 
vertical axis. The positive slope indicates that the efficiency gains are higher with increasing 
economic integration. The assumptions made are that the price level of the currency area is 
stable and predictable and that the exchange rate commitment of the country is firm39. If these 
assumptions were not fulfilled the monetary efficiency gains would be smaller. A very 
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important consequence of economic integration is international price convergence and thus 
higher price stability if this is also a characteristic of the currency union40.  
 
3.2. The LL Schedule 
 
The schedule LL shows the potential costs from joining an exchange rate area. These costs 
occur because the country that joins a currency area gives up its ability to use exchange rate 
and monetary policy in order to stabilize output and employment41. 
 
If there is a change in output markets, different situations can be observed: 
1. floating exchange rates have the advantage of cushioning output and employment in 
the economy, because an immediate change in the relative price of domestic and 
foreign goods can take place; 
2. if the currency is pegged and the aggregate demand falls in all countries of the 
currency area as well as in the country with the pegged currency, the common 
currency of the zone will depreciate against outside currencies and lead to an 
automatic stabilization; 
3. if the currency is pegged and the aggregate demand falls only in the country with the 
pegged currency, than the currency of that state will remain stable against all foreign 
currencies; however, there will be at least for a certain period a reduction of prices of 
goods as well as a fall of wages in that country.  
 
When the integration between the country with the pegged currency and the area is higher, the 
costs of adjustment become lower. An important reason for this situation is that even small 
reductions in the prices of the country with the pegged currency determine a large increase in 
demand for its goods in the area, so that full employment can be restored in a short time. 
Another reason is that with a high integration, workers can migrate abroad, and domestic 
capital can be invested more profitable in other area countries, so that unemployment 
becomes lower and the rate of return is not significantly lower42. If an increase in demand for 
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the country’s output takes place and if the country is tightly integrated with the economies of 
the area, than even a small increase in price level and some movement of foreign capital and 
labor into the country helps to attain a situation of stability and decreased demand. A greater 
integration with countries outside the area increases economic stability loss from pegging to 
the currency of the area. “A high degree of economic integration between a country and the 
fixed exchange rate area that it joins reduces the resulting economic stability loss due to 
output market disturbances”43.  
 
The LL schedule illustrates the relation between the economic stability loss from joining and 
the country’s economic integration with the other currency area members. The LL slope is 
negative because the loss of economic stability as a result of pegging to the currencies of the 
area decreases while the degree of economic interdependence becomes higher44.  
 
 
Figure 2: The LL Schedule 
Source: Krugman/Obstfeld (2006), p. 563. 
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3.3. The GG and LL Schedule Together 
 
Putting the GG and LL schedules together helps decide whether it is optimal to fix a currency 
to that of the area. It should be done if the level of economic integration is at least like those 
determined by the intersection of GG and LL. If the level were lower, the output and 
employment instability after joining would be higher than the monetary efficiency gain. If the 
level were higher, the country would have a net gain from joining the currency area45.  
 
 
Figure 3: Deciding When to Peg the Exchange Rate 
Source: Krugman/Obstfeld (2006), p. 563. 
 
The second diagram shows the willingness of a country to peg its currency to a monetary 
union as a result of changes of economic factors. Let’s assume that the demand of the 
country’s exports increases, so that a move of LL1 to LL2 takes place. As a result, an increase 
of the economic integration which would be optimal for the country in order to join the 
currency area takes place, which is shown by the move from θ1 to θ2. The conclusion is that 
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the willingness of a country to take part in a fixed exchange rate area decreases when the 
variability of the product markets increase46. 
 
 
Figure 4: An Increase in Output Market Variability 
Source: Krugman/Obstfeld (2006), p. 564. 
 
3.4. The Size of the OCA 
 
A currency can be a symbol of statehood like the flag for example. The main role of money is, 
however, to avoid barter and to make commercial and financial transactions easier. The 
usefulness of a currency increases with the number of people that accept a currency. From this 
perspective it would be beneficial to have one currency accepted everywhere. Small currency 
areas are not optimal especially because of the exchange costs and the fluctuations of 
exchange rates47. 
 
The currency becomes more useful when the size of the area where it is used is larger, so that 
its marginal benefit is positive. The marginal benefit is declining because the benefit of a new 
country for a large currency area is smaller than when the initial area had a smaller size. 
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The question that arises is whether the optimum currency area is the world because of the 
marginal benefit that is always positive. The conclusion is that this would be the case if there 
were no costs. A reason for the costs can be the diversity, for example in the standard of 
living, and therefore these costs usually increase with the size of the area48. 
 
As a result, the optimum currency area is characterized by a situation where the marginal 
costs equal the benefits. However, the corresponding figure is highly symbolic, as can be seen 
in the next graph.  
 
 
Figure 5: The Logic of the Optimum Currency Area Theory 
Source: Baldwin/Wyplosz (2006), p. 352. 
 
The reason because of which diversity is costly is that it implicates asymmetric shocks and 
exchange rates have an important role in dealing with these shocks. The next section of this 
chapter provides an overview regarding the connection between different types of shocks and 
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the benefits and costs of an OCA. A common currency also necessitates a single central bank 
that cannot react to every local particularity49. 
 
3.5. Shocks 
 
Low interest rates are according to Hume a sign for the welfare of a nation. They usually also 
imply a high amount of money. However, when the amount of money increases, the prices of 
goods and labor become higher. Factors that lead to low interest rates are a reduced demand 
for loans, high wealth that can be used to satisfy this demands and low profit margins in 
commercial activities. Diligence determines the accumulation of high amounts of money and 
permits low interest rates50. 
 
Thus, reduced interest rates are an expression of hard work and developed commerce. They 
increase the incentives to invest money (especially with the development of capital markets) 
in order to stimulate economic growth, so that profit margins can be maintained at reduced 
levels. Thus, the economy can be positively influenced. The demand for loans increases and 
progress is possible. The impact on consumption can also be positive (e.g. loans for 
consumption can increase). With flexible exchange rates the value of the currency increases 
when the demand for it becomes higher, but at the same time with this increase the economy 
can redress as interest rates are still low. Devaluation can be the expression of a crisis when 
exchange rates are flexible. The currency’s value increases, however, when the economic 
situation improves. During the period of low interest rates and devaluated currency the 
demand for money and products becomes higher.  Thus, low interest rates can be an important 
instrument for dealing with shocks and crises.   
 
 
There are different kinds of shocks: 
1. Adverse shocks; 
2. Asymmetric shocks; 
3. Symmetric shocks with asymmetric effects. 
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Under the premises of competition the situations described below can occur. 
3.5.1. Adverse shocks 
 
There can occur situations when a country’s exports decrease because tastes change or as a 
result of cheaper alternatives. This leads to a hole in the balance of trade. In order to increase 
in competitiveness exports must become cheaper. This can be attained by lowering prices and 
wages or through a depreciation of the currency if possible. If the country is a member of a 
wide currency area the only alternative is to reduce prices through lower production costs or 
lower wages. 
 
The following figure shows the demand and supply of domestic goods (depicted by lines D 
and S) in relation with the real exchange rate. The real exchange rate λ can be defined as the 
relative price of domestic to foreign goods (λ = EP/P’, where E is the nominal exchange rate, 
P the price of domestic goods and P’ the price of foreign goods) or in terms of production 
costs (EW/W’), where W and W’ are production costs at home or abroad. An adverse shock is 
shown by the shift of world (domestic and foreign) demand for domestically produced goods, 
from D to D'.  
 
If depreciation is possible from λ0 to λ1 it will take place. There will also be a decrease in 
output and a shift from A to B51. With fixed exchange rates and rigid wage and price levels 
the output will decline even further, from point A to point C. The distance AC represents the 
goods that cannot be sold under the new situation. The consequences will be production 
cutbacks, increased unemployment, gradual price and wage cuts, so that the economy will 
shift to point B. 
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Figure 6: An Adverse Demand Shock 
Source: Baldwin/Wyplosz (2006), p. 353. 
 
In a monetary union, there is no possibility of nominal exchange rate adjustments so that real 
exchange rates must be changed through prices and wages modifications. If prices and wages 
are rigid, the adjustment process becomes more difficult and it takes longer.  
 
3.5.2. Asymmetric shocks 
 
Diversity means that in different countries there are different shocks. Let’s assume there are 
two countries A and B. Each country has two (nominal and real) exchange rates: one vis-à-vis 
country B or respectively A and one vis-à-vis the rest of the world. In both countries (A and 
B) a real depreciation vis-à-vis the rest of the world has to take place if they are hit by the 
same adverse shock. The bilateral (nominal and real) exchange rate does not have to change if 
the situation in A and B is similar.  
OCA Theory                                                                     22 
 
 
 
An asymmetric shock can mean that only country A is hit by an adverse shock, but not 
country B. As a result, a real depreciation in country A has to take place vis-à-vis country B 
and the rest of the world. If member states are confronted with the same shocks, the loss of 
the exchange rate has no consequences. With symmetric shocks, the country must adjust only 
the exchange rate vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
 
The situation with asymmetrical shocks is presented in the following figure: 
 
 
Figure 7: An Asymmetric Shock in a Currency Union 
Source: Baldwin/Wyplosz (2006), p. 355. 
 
The vertical axis measures each country’s real exchange rate vis-à-vis the rest of the world: 
EPA/P’ and EPB/P’.  
 
PA and PB = the price indices in country A and country B 
P’ = the price level in the rest of the world 
E = the common currency’s exchange rate, initially E0 
A = the initially balanced situation with a real exchange rate λ0 
λ0 = E0/PA/P‘= E0/PB/P‘   
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The assumption is of sticky prices.  
 
Assume that an adverse shock affects only country A; as a consequence, the demand schedule 
shifts from D to D'. If the country does not belong to a monetary union and can change its 
nominal exchange rate, there will be a depreciation to E1 and to λ1 = E1/PA/P*   (the real 
exchange rate), leading to new equilibrium to point B. The nominal and real exchange rates in 
country B, which are E0 and λ0, remain unchanged.  
 
If A and B are members of a monetary union, a possibility is that the common central bank 
depreciates the common exchange rate to E1, so that with sticky prices there will be the same 
real exchange rate λ1 in the countries A and B. The situation has a negative impact on country 
B, which is confronted with inflationary excess demand (the distance B'B''). With asymmetric 
shocks, the measures that are positive for one country have negative effects for the other, this 
being the fundamental cost in a monetary union52. 
 
If the external exchange rate of the currency union floats freely, there will be a depreciation to 
E2 and λ2 = E2/PA/P* = E2/PB/P*. The results are excess supply in A (CC') and excess demand 
in B (DD'). Both countries are in disequilibrium, with a too strong exchange rate level in 
county A (which is in recession) and too weak for country B (which is overheated), this being 
a cost of being part in a monetary union. 
 
The disequilibrium has to be eliminated through adjustments of prices and wages in both 
countries. Because of the recession (meaning that there is an excess supply of goods in A) 
unemployment increases and leads to a downward pressure on prices and wages. The price 
level in country A decreases because it cannot sell its entire production, so the new real 
exchange rate is λ1. The prices of goods in A are P'A. In country B there will be an increase in 
prices and an appreciation to λ0 because of the strong demand. 
 
The costs of a monetary union in the case of asymmetric shocks are therefore clearly 
illustrated in this example, with recession and disinflation in A and boom and inflation in B.  
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3.5.3. Symmetric shocks with asymmetric effects 
 
The situation of asymmetric shocks also applies to the case of symmetric shocks with 
asymmetric effects. The reasons why two countries could not react the same way to the same 
shock are different socio-economic structures, including labor market regulations and 
traditions, the relative importance of industrial sectors, the role of the financial and banking 
sectors, the external indebtedness, the ability to strike agreements between firms, trade unions 
and the government etc. An increase in oil and gas prices for example hurts oil- and gas-
importing countries but is positive for exporting countries (e.g. the Netherlands, Norway and 
the UK). This is an important reason why Norway and the UK have not become EMU 
members. 
 
The effects of a central bank reaction to symmetric shocks must not be the same for the entire 
currency union, for example because of different structures of the banking and financial 
markets53. 
 
3.6. The Theory of Mundell 
 
Mundell defines an optimum currency area as well as some very important criteria for an 
OCA (e.g. labor and capital mobility). Mundell studies the subject of flexible exchange rates 
by examining two distinct questions. He analyses whether flexible exchange rates can be 
effectively and efficiently used in the world economy. Furthermore, he discusses how the 
world should be divided into distinct currency areas. A significant conclusion of his theory is 
that an optimum currency area should be based on regions (determined by internal high factor 
mobility and factor immobility between them) and not on individual countries. This is 
however problematic because currency domains are an expression of national sovereignty54. 
 
A currency area can be defined “as a domain within which exchange rates are fixed”55. 
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With fixed exchange rates and rigid wage and price levels periodic balance-of-payments 
crises occur because the terms of trade cannot fulfill a natural role in the adjustment process. 
With flexible exchange rates depreciation can replace unemployment when there is a deficit 
of the external balance, and appreciation can replace inflation when there is a surplus56. 
 
There are two possible situations in a currency area: currency areas can have a single currency 
and there are currency areas with more than one currency. In a currency area with a single 
currency there has to be a single central bank with note-issuing powers and as a consequence 
a potentially elastic supply of interregional means of payments. In a currency area involving 
more than one currency the cooperation of many central banks determines the supply of 
international means of payment; if a central bank increases its liabilities much faster than 
other central banks it loses reserves and impairs convertibility. The conclusion is that there is 
an important difference between an interregional adjustment (this is an adjustment within a 
currency area which has a single currency) and an international adjustment (that is an 
adjustment within a currency area with more than one currency). 
 
In a currency area with many different currencies the policy of surplus countries to prevent 
inflation has the tendency to lead to recession. To illustrate this, Mundell provides an example 
of two countries or regions A and B, where equilibrium is affected by a shift in demand. The 
reason is that if there is a shift of demand from country B to A, the consequences are 
unemployment in B and inflationary pressure in A. The burden of adjustment will be split 
between A and B if an increase in prices is possible in A. If A acts to prevent increasing 
prices and tightens credit restrictions, the burden of adjustment has to be taken by B. If a 
reduction in B’s real income cannot be achieved by a change in the terms of trade (because B 
cannot lower and A will not raise prices), a reduction of B’s output and employment is 
necessary in order to attain a lower real income57.  
 
In a currency area with a common currency pursuing full employment leads to a tendency 
towards inflation. The reason is that a shift of demand from region B to region A has as a 
result unemployment in B and inflationary pressure and a surplus in the balance of payments 
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in A. If the authorities in B want to reduce unemployment they will increase the money 
supply, a situation that increases the inflationary pressure in A. The effective way to achieve 
full employment in the deficit region is by increasing prices in the surplus region. 
 
The conclusion is that there is no possibility to avoid both unemployment and inflation in a 
currency area. The reason is not the type of currency area, but the fact that the optimum 
currency area is not the world.  
 
Furthermore, Mundell analyses the characteristics of an optimum currency area by taking also 
into consideration the alternative of flexible exchange rates. Variable exchange rates mean 
“the existence of more than one currency area in the world”58. If A and B are two countries 
with flexible exchange rates, then a shift of demand from country B to country A would 
determine a depreciation, lower unemployment and a corrected external imbalance in country 
B, and an appreciation and a reduced inflation in country A59. 
 
It is assumed that in the world there are two countries with separate currencies and flexible 
exchange rates, Canada and the United States, and two regions that are not identical with the 
national boundaries, the East (where cars are produced) and the West (with lumber 
production). The assumption is made that a higher productivity in the automobile industry 
leads to an excess demand for lumber products and an excess supply of cars. The 
consequences are unemployment in the East and inflationary pressure in the West. Because of 
the balance of payments deficit in the East, bank reserves flow from the East to the West. It 
would be possible to avoid unemployment in the East by expanding the national money 
supply in both countries, thus at the expense of inflation in the West. Another possibility 
would be to reduce inflation in the West by contracting the national money supply, at the 
expense of unemployment in the East. The last possibility would be to allow some 
unemployment in the East and some inflation in the West. Both unemployment and inflation 
cannot be avoided at the same time under these circumstances.  
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Let’s assume that national currencies are replaced by regional currencies, so that Eastern and 
Western dollars are introduced instead of Canadian and United States dollars. With fixed 
exchange rates the authorities would have to choose between measures against unemployment 
or against inflation. If the exchange rate between Eastern and Western dollars were flexible, 
then the Western dollar would appreciate relative to the Eastern dollar as a result of the excess 
demand for lumber products. There would be a balance of payments equilibrium and stable 
employment and prices. 
 
Flexible exchange rates are more effective if they are based on regional currencies, not on 
national currencies. “The optimum currency area is the region.”60 The region is “defined in 
terms of internal factor mobility and external factor immobility”61. Currency reorganization 
on a regional basis requires important political changes, because currencies are usually the 
expression of national sovereignty.  
 
There are different views regarding the degree of factor mobility necessary to delimitate a 
region. J. E. Meade (1957) considered that flexible exchange rates would be more effective in 
order to achieve a balance of payments equilibrium and internal stability in Western Europe 
than a common currency because of the lack of labor mobility62. T. Scitovsky (1958) 
supported the idea of a common currency because this would result in a greater degree of 
capital mobility, but he argued that further steps would have to be taken to achieve higher 
labor mobility63. 
 
If the basic argument for flexible exchange rates is valid, the goals of internal stability can be 
achieved more successfully with an increasing number of currency areas in the world. But 
when the number of currency areas in the world is high, than there are also increasing costs of 
valuation and money-changing64. Another reason against an arbitrarily large number of 
currency areas is that “markets for foreign exchange should not be so thin that any single 
speculator (perhaps excepting central banks) can affect the market price”65. Furthermore, the 
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community usually does not accept variations in the real income as a result of changes in the 
money wage rate or price level, but it does accept changes through variations in the rate of 
exchange. This assumption becomes less probable the smaller the currency area, so that this is 
another reason for a reduced number of currency areas66. 
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4. OCA Criteria 
 
This chapter includes a description about the criteria a currency union must satisfy in order to 
be an optimum currency area. The main objective is to present the situation of the European 
Monetary Union and to show if the OCA criteria are fulfilled or whether at least significant 
progress has been made in this sense. 
 
The OCA criteria presented in detail in this chapter are: 
1. labor and capital mobility; 
2. price and wage flexibility; 
3. financial market integration; 
4. product diversification (Kenen); 
5. economic openness (Mc Kinnon); 
6. similarities of inflation rates; 
7. fiscal integration (fiscal transfers); 
8. political integration; 
9. homogeneous preferences. 
 
The analysis of these aspects leads to the conclusion that the OCA criteria are increasingly 
fulfilled in the European Monetary Union as “citizens and governments learn to live with a 
common currency”67. However, some economists like Krugman/Obstfeld consider that the 
EMU is not an optimum currency area, because criteria like significant labor mobility are not 
entirely fulfilled68. 
 
4.1. Labor and Capital Mobility (Mundell) 
 
According to the theory of Mundell, two very important criteria of the OCA are labor and 
capital mobility. The fulfillment of the labor criterion in the EMU is discussed by presenting 
the views of important economists like Krugman/Obstfeld, Eichengreen, Blanchard and Katz. 
Then, the reasons for the low labor mobility between and within EMU countries are described 
in this section. Factors and measures that could increase the labor mobility in the future are 
                                                 
67
 See Baldwin, Wyplosz (2006), p. 367. 
68
 See Krugman/Obstfeld (2006), p. 569. 
OCA Criteria                                                                     30 
 
 
also discussed. Mundell’s theory is illustrated graphically, showing how the equilibrium real 
exchange rate can be achieved in the case of fully mobile factors of production, labor and 
capital. An overview of the immigration in Europe over time is given. The analysis of the 
European labor market shows that the unemployment rate is expected to decrease as a result 
of GDP growth and increasing consumer confidence, and not so much because of labor 
flexibility. As a result, wage pressures are also expected. Concerning the free movement of 
capital, important provisions of the Treaties of the European Union are presented, showing the 
high degree of regulation regarding capital mobility.  
 
4.1.1. Labor Mobility 
 
According to Krugman/Obstfeld (2006) “Europe is not an optimum currency area”69. Some 
problems concern the labor mobility.  
 
The main reasons for the lower EMU labor mobility in comparison to that of the United States 
are language and culture. B. Eichengreen found that the regional unemployment rates are 
smaller and less persistent in the United States than between countries in the European 
Union70. The main aspect that reduces the regional unemployment in the United States is the 
migration of workers. Krugman/Obstfeld and other economists consider that this adjustment 
is unlikely possible in Europe in the near future71.  
 
The labor mobility is low even within European countries. In order to obtain unemployment 
benefits in some countries, persons must establish their residence in these countries72. Factors 
that contribute to low labor mobility in the EMU are the high number of unions and the high 
government employment taxes. Because of the reduced labor mobility there are high levels of 
unemployment in some EMU countries and adjustment problems to economic shocks. 
Pressures of workers for wage harmonization are possible, in order to prevent the migration of 
capital to countries with lower wages73. 
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However, legislative measures like the elimination of border controls have been taken in order 
to encourage labor mobility. Some factors that will probably increase the labor mobility in the 
years to come are: 
- globalization; 
- local growth. 
 
The globalization is “a process of increasing freedom for international movements of goods 
and factors”74. There are movements of goods, factors of production and individuals (acting as 
workers and consumers) among countries especially because of differences in prices and 
returns. The integration of goods markets reduces international disparities in the real returns 
of internationally immobile factors, with and without factor mobility. The integration of factor 
markets decreases the differences in the real returns of internationally immobile factors even 
with nontraded goods. Globalization is characterized by the tendency of diminishing 
international disparities in the real returns of factors75. The conclusion is that in the context of 
globalization, because of the increasing integration of goods and factor markets in the EMU, 
the differences between wages will be reduced, so that an important factor that hinders labor 
mobility towards some countries and regions, and which consists in the different wages 
between EMU countries, will be eliminated over time.   
 
The local economic growth can be measured by net migration, per capita income growth and 
housing price growth76. A higher net migration can be determined by or lead to increasing 
labor mobility. A population that used to live and work in different countries or regions shows 
flexibility and could increase labor mobility. The per capita income growth is seen as 
favorable by workers and can determine a higher migration of labor forces towards that 
country. It also can be the result of the necessity of higher labor migration, especially of the 
migration of skilled workers, who would not accept certain jobs without high incomes. The 
housing price growth implicates a population with increasing income like investors who 
expect further developments and increasing growth in that region. If investors become 
interested in a country or region then the labor mobility increases, because labor forces from 
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other regions or countries are usually sent there for working reasons, some of them for a 
limited time. The growth of housing price can also be the result of migration and labor 
mobility that increases the demand for houses. As a conclusion, there is a connection between 
local economic growth and labor mobility.  
 
There are several reasons why some localities grow quicker than others. A “good 
government”, the measures of rule of law and lack of government corruption are important77. 
Public investments in transportation and communication and budget surpluses determine 
higher incomes78. There are marginal benefits from higher levels of government services or 
government capital and marginal costs from higher taxes79. There exists a positive correlation 
between local growth and expenditures on elementary and secondary school education. A 
negative correlation is given between local growth and the percentage of local tax revenue 
from personal income and sales taxes. The economic growth is positively correlated with high 
levels of human capital and negatively correlated with medium levels of human capital, 
unemployment, violent crime and poverty80. 
 
Factors that have an important influence upon labor mobility are taxes, social transfers, 
moving costs, consumer price differences and the local supply of public goods81. 
 
Another important aspect that influenced the residence chosen by the population of the United 
States and that could increase in importance in Europe, too, concerns geographical aspects. 
The population moved towards ocean coastal areas and towards regions with moderate winter 
and summer temperatures and low levels of precipitations. There was an increasing 
productivity in localities near the Great Lakes and near navigable rivers82.  
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In Europe there is a relatively little migration within countries as well as cross-border 
migration. There are constrictions regarding the mobility especially for non-active citizens of 
the European Union and for nationals of third countries83.  
 
Some economists consider that the EU enlargement represents an opportunity to reduce the 
rigidity of labor market structures because of the higher external competition84. Other 
economists believe that there will be immigration in order to reap social benefits85. There are 
expectations that immigration will be high in Germany and Austria because of geographic 
aspects and because these countries have been preferred by immigrants in the past (two-third 
of immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe lived in Germany in 1993)86. According to 
some calculations, the immigration from the ten Central and Eastern European countries will 
represent about one percent of the population of the EU in the first years after accession87. In 
Germany immigrants will possibly represent 3.2% of the residential population in 2020. 
According to another projection there will be 80 percent more immigrants to Germany 
without taking into consideration Romania and Bulgaria88. 
 
According to economic theory, migration increases efficiency. There are also critical aspects 
regarding migration. Without mobility constraints overshooting migration is possible. There 
also can be fiscal distortions of choices concerning migration. Furthermore, because of 
immigration and as a consequence of higher competitive pressure, income losses of labor 
forces are possible. These losses are usually not large89. It was estimated that immigration of 
unskilled workers representing 1% of EU population would have led to an income loss of 
0.7% for the EU-population in 1993. If the labor force had increased by 1% and mainly 
skilled workers had immigrated, income gains and an increase of GDP by 6.9% could have 
been expected90.   
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An important aspect that hinders labor mobility in Europe is the fact that the competence for 
social security and the right to levy income tax lie with the country of employment concerning 
cross-border matters. The disadvantages resulting from this situation are the distortion of the 
choice of active persons concerning the place of work and the fact that employment-based 
regulation of state competencies cannot be applied to persons that are non-active. The 
Employment Principle should be replaced by the Principle of Delayed Integration in order to 
take cross-border matters into consideration91. “Delayed Integration means that migrants – 
active persons and non-active ones alike – remain assigned to their country of origin for tax 
and social security purposes for an agreed period of time after emigrating. Only after this 
period has elapsed does the country of immigration take over the fiscal competences for these 
particular persons92.” If this principle is introduced, all jurisdictions must agree to the same 
span of delay in order to avoid collision in international tax and social security. A period of 
transition of one to five years is discussed93. An advantage of this principle is that the free 
movement of citizens would be increased without discriminating between active and non-
active ones. The fiscal distortion of location choices could be reduced by a long delay, while 
the consequence of a short delay would be fiscal competition among Member States94.  
 
Other possible principles that could replace the Employment Principle, but which are not 
viable political options are: 
1. The Nationality Principle. “Treating Union Citizens differently according to their 
nationality would be interpreted as a form of discrimination which is expressly 
forbidden in Article 12 of the EU Treaty95.” 
2. The Origin Principle. “According to Sinn (1994), individuals should therefore only be 
free to choose between the competing redistributive systems ex ante when young and 
ignorant about career perspectives. The redistributive system they choose then defines 
the country of origin, or the home country, respectively. Switching the country of 
origin ex post should not be allowed”96. According to this opinion the primary 
function of the welfare state is to insure against income risks and uncertain life 
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careers. If individuals could change insurance ex post there would be a risk of adverse 
selection97. 
3. The Residence Principle. This principle exists in the Nordic countries where 
insufficient resources after three years of residence do not have expulsion as a 
consequence. The objections to this principle are that the negative allocation effects of 
the Employment Principle would hardly be reduced because migrant workers use to 
change the place of residence together with the place of work, and that the welfare 
support would be an important criterion for recipients of social assistance in their 
decision about choosing a residence98.  
 
Important measures adopted through the Maastricht Treaty, that were also intended to 
increase migration, were the introduction of the status of Union Citizenship, the right to vote 
and to candidate at municipal and European elections and the right to move and reside freely 
within Member States99. 
 
A significant reason for labor mobility is, according to Mundell, the elimination of the cost of 
sharing the same currency when the factors of production, capital and labor, are fully mobile. 
The assumption in his theory is that of mobile capital. 
 
4.1.2. The Graphical Illustration of Mundell’s Theory 
 
The theory of Mundell can be illustrated graphically (using the figure 7 described in detail 
also in the previous chapter on page 22). The graph is of importance because it presents the 
situation of two countries A and B, with unemployment in A and inflation in B, as it is 
described in Mundell’s theory. This figure illustrates the way in which it is possible to reach a 
real exchange rate equilibrium λ2 with mobile factors of production (labor and capital). 
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A possible assumption is that of unemployment in country A and inflationary pressure in 
country B. A solution is the shift of factors of production from country A to country B 
because in the latter country there is a short supply. The shift of the supply schedules to S’ 
shows the reallocation. When country A is at point C and country B is at point D’ then there is 
a new equilibrium exchange rate. Prices and wages do not have to change in either country. 
The nominal exchange rate E2 delivers the equilibrium real exchange rate λ2 if there is a 
movement of the factors of production.  
  
There are different aspects that should be taken into consideration: 
1. Currency areas usually do coincide with nation states because of the common culture 
and language. Important aspects that hinder labor migration are institutional barriers. 
Changes in legislation are recommended.  
2. Because the goods produced in country A can differ from those produced in country B 
it could take time until labor forces are able to produce the goods of country B. Shocks 
could also be temporary, while moving and retraining could take time.  
3. In order to make labor more productive, equipment is needed. Plants and equipment 
are not mobile100.  
Labor mobility depends on how easily people respond to economic incentives. Earnings must 
include: the cost of moving; the possibility of becoming unemployed; career opportunities; 
family career prospects; social benefits; taxation of earnings. There are also non-economic 
incentives like cultural differences that include language, relations, traditions, family and 
nationalism. 
 
4.1.3. Immigration in Europe over Time 
 
In Europe there is less immigration then in the United States and Canada because of the 
differences between European countries. Only a small proportion of foreign workers are 
Europeans. Even within European countries the labor mobility is low101. 38 percent of EU 
citizens changed residence in the 1990s: 68 percent of them moved within the same town or 
village and 30 percent moved to another town in the same region. In Europe 21 percent 
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moved to another region in the same Member State and 4.4 percent moved to another Member 
State. Moving is mainly determined by personal reasons and only 5 percent move because of 
professional reasons. The most important reasons are language and traditions. Housing is 
usually more expensive in Europe than in the USA. There are also difficulties concerning the 
health and retirement benefits102. 
 
Until 1968, when work permits were abolished and preferences for home country workers no 
longer permitted, there were significant restrictions of labor movements. In Germany there 
has been a small rise and in Luxembourg a small fall in the national work forces103. 
 
During the past 20 years significant labor market reforms have been introduced, e.g. 
reductions in traditional employment protections. The US is more open to immigrants than 
Europe104.  
 
In the period 1997-2002 13 percent of employment growth in Europe was due to third country 
nationals. Immigrants represented 20 percent of the employment growth if foreign-born 
citizens were included. In the US the net flows of highly-educated individuals are more 
significant than in Europe105. 
 
4.1.4. The European Labor Market 
 
The developments of the European Labor Markets (ELM) were favorable lately as a 
consequence of the measures taken in order to improve the labor market conditions (e.g. the 
permanent efforts to liberalize these markets).  
 
The expectations for 2008-2009 are of a deceleration in the employment dynamics. The 
unemployment rate will, however, become lower as a result of GDP growth and of the 
maturity cycle. 
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In Germany there was a significant increase of mainly regular jobs (e.g. full-time, paying 
social security contributions). There is an expectation of a positive employment growth in the 
EMU member countries, while a slower growth than the average is expected in France, Italy 
and Portugal. 
 
The employment rate is also expected to have a positive development outside the EMU (e.g. 
in Poland). This development will be seen in all sectors as well as for various types of work 
arrangements (e.g. part-time, full-time, permanent and fixed-term contracts). This is the result 
of structural reforms and increasing confidence of firms. The consumer confidence is also 
expected to increase106. A problematic aspect is, however, youth unemployment, especially in 
Poland, France and Spain.  
 
Employment increased in the service sector, while the data from the manufacturing sector 
were more mixed. The outlook for 2008-2009 indicates an employment growth of slightly 
below 1 percent per annum in the euro area and in the EU. There will probably be a 
decelerated employment growth in Germany, Spain and Italy as well as in the smaller 
Member States. Employment growth in the EU will decrease from 1.5 percent in 2007 to 0.9 
percent in 2008 and 0.8 percent in 2009. In Poland the employment growth is expected to 
drop from 4.4 percent in 2007 to 1.3 percent in 2009. In Sweden and Denmark there will be 
declines of around 2 percent points.  
 
In the euro area the unemployment rate was expected to be around 7.1 percent in 2008 and 
2009 and in the EU 6.8 percent in 2008 and 6.6 percent in 2009. In 2008 a significant decline 
of unemployment was expected in Germany and the Netherlands. In the UK and Estonia there 
was an expectation of a constant unemployment rate, while in Lithuania the unemployment 
rate was expected to increase. 
 
The structural unemployment rate (NAIRU - non accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) 
was also declining and was expected to be 7.1 percent in the euro area and 6.6 percent in the 
EU by 2009. However, because of these developments, wage pressures were expected (e.g. in 
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the Netherlands, Poland, Denmark and Bulgaria). In the manufacturing and service sectors 
more and more labor and equipment shortages were expected107. 
 
Real compensation of employees in the euro area were expected to increase from 0.7 percent 
in 2007 to 1.0 percent in 2008 and 0.8 percent in 2009 (especially because of the situation in 
Germany, Finland and Slovenia). The real compensation per employee in Spain will probably 
decrease. In the EU the compensation per employee will increase by 0.9 percent in 2007, 1.4 
percent in 2008 and 1.3 percent in 2009. These rates are above the long-term averages of the 
past ten years for the euro area and the EU. Moderate wage developments are expected 
(especially as a result of international competition). Unit labor costs should be of 1.8 percent 
in 2008 and 1.5 percent in 2009 in the euro area. Export should be supported by these 
developments. 
 
“It is expected that (i) employment growth will remain robust, (ii) the unemployment rate will 
keep declining, (iii) and compensation per employee will see a slight improvement over the 
forecast horizon. This should support rise in the overall wage bill which, in turn should feed 
into an improved outlook for private consumption”108.   
   
The expected labor productivity growth is of 1.2 percent in 2008 and 1.3 percent in 2009. The 
longer-term averages of productivity will be 1 ¼ percent in the euro area and 1 ½ percent in 
the EU. In the EU the labor productivity should increase faster because of the catching-up 
economies and the above-average labor productivity in Denmark and the UK. A relatively 
low productivity growth is expected in Italy and Spain in 2008-2009. 
 
Two significant developments can be observed in the EMU: 
- because of structural reforms, wage moderation and cyclical upswings, the 
employment and labor supply increased; 
- the slowdown in labor productivity that began in mid-1990s came to a halt in mid-
2000s109. 
 
                                                 
107
 See Economic Forecast, Autumn 2007, p. 38. 
108
 See Economic Forecast, Autumn 2007, p. 39. 
109
 See Economic Forecast, Autumn 2007, p. 40. 
OCA Criteria                                                                     40 
 
 
               
Labour market outlook – euro area and EU27        
(Annual percentage change) 
Euro area 
      Difference vs 
      spring 2007                       EU27 
    Difference vs 
  spring 2007 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008
Population in working age (15 - 64) 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.1     0.0 
Labour force : 0.7 0.8 0.8 -0.2 0.0 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.0     0.0 
Employment 1.3 1.5 1.0 0.8 0.1 -0.2 1.5 1.5 0.9 0.8 0.1    -0.2 
Employment (change in million) 2.1 2.3 1.7 1.5 2.4 1.8 3.5 3.5 2.3 2.1 0.5    -0.2 
Unemployment (levels in millions) 12.6 11.2 11.0 11.0 0.2 0.6 19.2 16.8 16.1 15.9 -0.2     0.2 
Unemployment rate (% of labour force) 8.3 7.3 7.1 7.1 0.1 0.3 8.2 7.1 6.8 6.6 -0.1     0.1 
Labour productivity, whole economy 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.3 -0.1 0.0 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.6 -0.2     0.0 
Employment rate (a) 66.0 66.9 67.5 67.9 : : 64.4 65.3 65.8 66.2 0.3     0.2 
 
(a) As a percentage of population of working age. Definition according to structural indicators. 
Table 1: Labor Market Outlook – Euro Area and EU27 
Source: Economic Forecast, autumn 2007, p. 40. 
 
The previous table shows that the yearly increase of the population in the working ages is 
expected to remain relatively constant between 2007 and 2009. A further conclusion of these 
data is that the employment will increase and the unemployment rate will become lower, but 
with a decreasing dynamic. The lower unemployment rate is especially due to the GDP 
growth and not so much the consequence of labor mobility. Wage pressures are expected 
because of these developments. The labor flexibility could also increase especially towards 
countries where the compensations per employee become higher and unemployment rates 
lower. The presented data must be viewed, however, with caution because of the current 
crisis. 
 
4.1.5. European and US Labor Situation 
 
Analyzing the situation of the US economy, which fulfills the OCA criteria to a large extent, 
can be useful for the European economy. Measures can be taken after the differences and 
common aspects of the two economies are understood, in order to improve the 
competitiveness and to increase the fulfillment of the OCA criteria in EMU. The conclusion 
that can be derived is that although the US and the European economy resemble one another 
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more than they differ, regarding labor mobility significant measures for labor markets are 
necessary in EMU in order to increase the optimality. 
 
In Europe the income inequality is not as high as in the US, but the social mobility that 
permits individuals to move between less- and better-paying jobs is also lower. This leads to 
an increased incentive for well trained labor forces to work in the US. The unemployment 
rates are higher in Europe than in the US, the work weeks shorter and there are more holiday 
weeks. Other important characteristics of European labor markets compared to those in the 
US are: 
- more difficulties to terminate redundant workers; 
- bigger problems in reorganizing production with the purpose of reducing labor costs; 
- more heavy unionization; 
- the existence of industry-wide wage agreements that reduce the possibility of wage 
differentials between more- and less- productive firms and regions. 
 
However, the output per hour worked (a measure of productivity) is higher in most advanced 
European economies than in the US. In Europe the number of skilled technicians is also very 
high.  
 
The European and US economies also have a high number of aspects in common (e.g. both 
economies are well managed and have skilled workers and entrepreneurs). The conclusion is 
that “from the perspective of the rest of the world, the U.S. and European economies resemble 
one another more than they differ”110. 
 
The US and European economies are confronted with external pressures resulting for example 
from competition from lower-wage emerging markets like China and the interests of 
corporations to make investments in lower-cost economies111.  
 
The convergence of the income per capita between Europe and the US stopped in the 1970s. 
Since the 1990s the European-U.S. productivity (meaning GDP per hour worked or total 
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factor productivity) gap has widened. According to the Single Market Program, EMU and 
Lisbon Agenda, the purpose is to make Europe the most productive economy of the world by 
2010112.  
 
In 2004 the EU-15 productivity represented 90 percent of US productivity, while the 
European income per capita was only 69 percent of that of the US. The reason for this 
situation consists in the difference of hours worked per capita, being possible consequences of 
a stronger taste for leisure and especially of differences in participation rates (which represent 
“the share of the population of working age that is counted as part of the employed or 
unemployed labor force”113). The employment and participation rates in Europe have 
improved since 1995 especially because of market and pension reforms as well as due to 
measures towards lower youth unemployment114.  
 
“While incorporation into the European Union encourages catching-up, such processes can 
take a long time. Given the diversity of developmental starting points, wider Europe 
comprises a region with a very wide range of Standortfaktoren (wage and productivity levels, 
skill endowments, quality of institutions, etc.), which poses political problems. From a more 
narrowly economic standpoint, it opens up an unprecedented range of location options for 
firms and facilitates their efforts to develop cross-European production networks as a way of 
enhancing productivity and profitability”115. 
 
In Europe, in the past 20 years, important labor market reforms have been undertaken (e.g. the 
reduction of traditional employment protections)116. Measures which are possible in order to 
increase employment and participation rates, could lead in the short run to higher labor/capital 
ratio and thus reduce productivity. This could also be an explanation for the slow European 
growth recently117.  
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An important characteristic of Europe is that social protection is significant and represents a 
fundamental right, determining lower poverty rates, better health provisions, a higher life 
expectancy and lower crime rates than in the US118. Unemployment compensation in Europe 
can have some negative effects on labor utilization. Certain social transfers have, however, 
pro-growth effects (e.g. investments in career continuity and skill accumulation as well as 
public health expenditure)119. 
 
The European economy is, however, also confronted with some problems like lagging 
productivity growth, population ageing and difficult adjustments in the context of 
enlargement and globalization120. 
 
4.1.6. Increasing Labor Mobility 
 
The analysis of the US and European labor markets shows that in EMU significant measures 
should be taken, especially in the context of enlargement. Some additional solutions to 
European labor market challenges that could be adopted, as well as steps that have already 
been taken, are described in this chapter. They can contribute to an increasing acceptance of 
EMU and higher optimality of the euro currency area. 
 
This is important in order to decrease the probability of EMU breakup.  In this context, the 
recognition of technical credentials, the portability of pensions and the receipt of social 
services in the new labor market are important to be adopted121. 
 
Some of the important measures, which already have been taken, are: more transparent and 
transferable qualifications by introducing a standard portfolio of documents (“the Europass”); 
the elimination of many administrative and legal barriers; as well as the European health 
insurance card and more portable occupational pension rights. 
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However, higher labor mobility within EMU leads to the necessity to reinforce barriers to 
immigration from outside the euro zone, disregarding whether it is legal or illegal. This aspect 
could result in strains with different governments and is not very useful for promoting 
democratic values and market-oriented economic development122. 
 
A measure that could be taken into consideration would be a different treatment of workers 
from EU member countries that have introduced the euro and workers from EU states that are 
not EMU members. As a result, a possibility would be to allow workers to relocate freely only 
within EMU member states, especially in the context of concerns regarding for example a 
future EMU membership for Turkey123.  
 
4.1.7. Free Movement of Capital 
 
The free movement of capital is one of the four freedoms comprised in the original Treaty of 
Rome. The articles were altered by the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) and renumbered 
by the Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA)124.  
 
By Article 67(1) of the Treaty of Rome the obligation to abolish restrictions on capital 
movements was introduced, which was an important aspect for the proper functioning of the 
common market. Article 68(1) of this Treaty imposed the obligation for Member States to act 
as liberally as possible in granting exchange authorizations. Article 71 required from Member 
States not to introduce new exchange restrictions on capital movements. 
 
The TEU, with effect from 1 January 1994, contains important provisions concerning the free 
movement of capital. Article 56 of the TEU requires that: 
1. Within the framework of provisions set out in this chapter, all restrictions on the 
movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and third 
countries shall be prohibited. 
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2. Within the framework of the provisions set out in this chapter, all restrictions on 
payments between Member States and between Member States and third countries 
shall be prohibited. 
 
Some examples of aspects prohibited by Article 56 of the TEU are: a national prohibition on 
the creation of a mortgage in a foreign currency, discriminatory restrictions concerning the 
acquisition and disposal of movable property, measures to dissuade the residents of a Member 
State not to obtain loans or make investments in other Member States125. 
 
Some restrictions between Member States and non-member countries are still possible. 
Article 59 of the TEU for example provides that:  
Where, in exceptional circumstances, movements of capital to or from third countries 
cause, or threaten to cause, serious difficulties for the operation of economic and 
monetary union, the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the ECB, may take safeguard measures with regard 
to third countries for a period not exceeding six months if such measures are strictly 
necessary. 
 
Article 58 of the TEU represents an exception to Article 56. It contains the disposals that: 
1. The provisions of Article 56 shall be without prejudice to the right of Member States: 
(a) to apply the relevant provisions of their tax law which distinguish between taxpayers 
who are not in the same situation with regard to their place of residence or with 
regard to the place where their capital is invested; 
(b) to take all requisite measures to prevent infringements of national law and 
regulations, in particular in the field of taxation and the prudential supervision of 
financial institutions, or to lay down procedures for the declaration of capital 
movements for purposes of administrative and statistical information, or to take 
measures which are justified on grounds of public policy or public security. 
2. The provisions of this chapter shall be without prejudice to the applicability of 
restrictions on the right of establishment which are compatible with this Treaty. 
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3. The measures and procedures referred to in paragraph 1 and 2 shall not constitute a 
means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on the free movement of 
capital and payments as defined in Article 56. 
 
Article 119 and 120 of the TEU contain a qualification to Article 56 and deal with balance of 
payments crises. If a Member State has a difficulty with its balance of payments or as a result 
of the type of currency at its disposal that could lead to problems regarding the proper 
functioning of the common market or the implementation of the common commercial policy, 
the Commission must suggest measures to the State. If this is insufficient to overcome the 
difficulties, the Commission can authorize the State to take protective measures. Article 
120(1) of the TEU provides that:  
Where a sudden crisis in the balance of payments occurs and a decision within the 
meaning of Article 119(2) is not immediately taken, the Member States concerned 
may, as a precaution, take the necessary protective measures. Such measures must 
cause the least possible disturbance in the functioning of the common market and must 
not be wider in scope than is strictly necessary to remedy the sudden difficulties which 
have arisen. 
 
The conclusion of the analysis of the criteria of labor and capital mobility is that while the 
criterion of labor flexibility is not fulfilled (e.g. also according to the opinions of 
Krugman/Obstfeld, Eichengreen and Blanchard and Katz), the criterion of the capital mobility 
is satisfied. 
 
4.2. Price and Wage Flexibility 
 
The need for nominal exchange rate adjustment is reduced if nominal prices and wages are 
flexible between and within countries having a single currency126. The reason is that the 
probability of sustained unemployment in one country and/or inflation in another is not so 
high during the transition towards adjustment following a shock if prices and wages are 
flexible. The loss of direct control over nominal exchange rates is a cost if nominal prices and 
wages are downward rigid because measures of real flexibility by exchange rate adjustments 
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are not possible127. Price and wage flexibility are important in the short run during the 
adjustment process after a disturbance128. 
 
4.2.1. Price flexibility 
 
The reasons for the low price flexibility consist in trade barriers, state aid and the low market 
competition in sectors with state owned enterprises as well as in a reduced elasticity of 
demand. Studies show that especially the existence of a high degree of competition leads to 
price flexibility; it makes companies take into consideration the prices of competitors, review 
prices more often and to change them. Prices are also modified more often in sectors with a 
high elasticity of demand. In companies where labor costs are significant for price setting, 
prices are not changed so often as in sectors where raw materials are more important, because 
changes of wages do not occur that often as the changes in prices of raw materials. 
 
Price flexibility is low across European countries. Some reasons are the slow implementation 
of the Single Market Programme (which highlighted the need for institutional and 
constitutional reform of the Community; the 1992 goal consisted in the creation of a 
homogeneous frontier-free internal market129), a slow elimination of some non-tariff internal 
and external trade barriers and state aid to several sectors. There is usually a low market 
competition in sectors with state owned or previously state owned enterprises130.  
 
The firms pricing behavior depends on the degree of market competition. The responsiveness 
to current shocks is higher in firms acting in more competitive industries. The reason is that 
these companies face higher uncertainty about their future position in the market and are more 
concerned with their short-run returns131. In firms from industries characterized by less 
competition, long-term returns are important in the decision making process and fluctuations 
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in costs and demand are smoothed out. Oligopolists usually do not adjust prices immediately 
because of tacit pricing understandings132.  
 
The price adjustment is faster when the elasticity of demand and competition are higher133. In 
competitive industries responses of prices to supply and demand shocks are faster134, and cost 
changes are transmitted more into prices135. Several studies show that there is a positive link 
between price flexibility and the degree of market competition136. 
 
The degree of competition faced by a firm can be inferred “from the importance it attaches to 
changes in competitors’ prices in explaining its own price decreases”137. This definition can 
be explained by the fact that if the environment of a firm is more competitive, it is more likely 
that the pricing strategy is influenced by the behavior of competitors. 
 
Around 60% of firms are confronted with intense competition in the euro area. The share of 
companies that face intense competition is the lowest in Spain with 54% and the highest in the 
Netherlands with 71%138.  
 
There are different ways how firms set prices: “markup over costs”, “price set according to 
competitors’ prices” and “others”139. Setting prices as a markup over marginal costs is 
characteristic for firms with an important degree of market power. 64% of firms with low 
competition and 50% of firms in industries with intense competition use markup rules. 15% of 
firms facing low competition and 35% of companies facing high competition set prices 
according to competitors’ prices. A highly competitive environment determines a forward 
looking decision making process. In Spain for example 37% of firms operating in a 
competitive environment and 18% of firms operating in an environment characterized by low 
competition adopt forward looking strategies when setting the prices.  
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Firms facing more competition review prices more frequently in the euro area. Firms that 
review prices at least twelve times per year represent 23% of those for whom competitors’ 
prices are unimportant and 34% of those for whom competitors’ prices are very important. 
68% of firms for whom competitors’ prices are unimportant and 45% of companies for whom 
competitors’ prices are very important review prices at most three times per year140. 
 
10% of firms reporting that competitors’ prices are unimportant for their decisions concerning 
price setting and 26% of companies stating that competitors’ prices are very important for 
their price setting policies change prices at least four times a year. 73% of firms that consider 
competitors’ prices unimportant and 50% of companies for whom competitors’ prices are 
very important change prices at most once a year in the euro area. Prices are unchanged on 
average for 9 months for very competitive firms and for 14 months in more sheltered markets 
of the euro area141. 
 
Price flexibility, “measured by the fraction of firms that change prices at least four times a 
year”142, is determined by the market competition. The companies for whom labor costs are 
very relevant do not change prices so often, because wages usually change once a year. The 
firms where raw materials are very relevant change prices more often, because the raw 
material prices typically change often. Important demand conditions (e.g. a high elasticity of 
demand) usually determine higher price flexibility. The sectors where prices are less flexible 
are the transport and communication sector143. 
 
The overall conclusion of the aforementioned data is that price flexibility is low in the EMU, 
especially in sectors with state owned enterprises. A significant example in this sense is 
represented by the high number of companies belonging to the transportation sector. The 
studies presented show that in EMU 60 percent of firms are confronted with intense 
competition, but only 35 percent of companies facing high competition set prices according to 
competitors’ prices (50 percent use markup rules). Furthermore, just 34 percent of firms for 
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whom competitors’ prices are very important review prices at least twelve times per year and 
45 percent of them at most three times per year. In firms with high competition prices are 
unchanged on average for 9 months. 
 
4.2.2. Wage Flexibility 
 
The reasons for the wage rigidity in the EMU are described in this section. The concepts of 
nominal and real wage flexibility are presented as well as their significance for the 
achievement of real exchange rate equilibrium, current account equilibrium and low 
equilibrium unemployment. The developments of nominal wages should be in accordance 
with EMU goals (e.g. price stability and the structural competitiveness at country level). 
Possibilities in order to increase wage flexibility are presented, e.g. a transnational co-
ordination of wage bargaining at EU level, but also a weakening of trade union power and 
labor market regulation. Factors that also have to be taken into consideration are the desire of 
workers for security and higher employment.  
 
4.2.2.1. Wage Rigidity in Europe 
 
Real wages are characterized by rigidity across most European countries. The adjustment of 
real wages to economic shocks is slow in continental Europe144. Reasons for the low wage 
flexibility are: wage bargaining arrangements, employment protection, unemployment 
insurance systems, and minimum wage provisions145. Important labor market asymmetries146 
and a wide heterogeneity of labor market institutions are specific for EU countries147. Pressure 
on real wages has been due to unemployment in Europe in the 1990s. The reduced wage 
flexibility leads to low price flexibility148. 
 
The dynamics of wage and labor costs has been benign during the last years in the euro area, 
but there still are cross-country differences in the developments of wage and labor costs that 
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do not always reflect warranted adjustment needs and that show an insufficient degree of 
nominal and real flexibility149. The improvement in labor market performance like the rising 
employment rates, the trend increase in participation and the reduction in structural 
unemployment are only in a small degree the result of wage flexibility. 
 
4.2.2.2. Concepts of Nominal and Real Wage Flexibility 
 
“Real or nominal wage flexibility can be seen as the speed with which real or nominal wages 
adjust to real or nominal shocks”150. Concepts of nominal and real wage flexibility are “the 
response of nominal wages to changes in the price level of inflation”151, “the response of real 
wages to labor market conditions (i.e. either to changes in unemployment or in productivity) 
due to the presence of labor market frictions”152 and “the response of wages to changes in the 
composition of labor demand or labor supply”153.  
 
It has been proved that nominal wages are usually downward rigid when an adjustment is 
required. On the other hand, a higher inflation rate usually leads to stronger wage increases 
than lower inflation (in order to compensate for the reduction of the purchasing power)154.  
 
A longer period for the elimination of labor market disequilibrium indicates low real wage 
flexibility. The reaction to demand pressures is small when wage rigidity is high.  
 
It is possible that relative wages do not express correctly individual skills, individual 
productivity or geographical conditions because of wage compression. When there is a shock 
because of the shift in consumers’ preferences from domestic to foreign produced goods, an 
adjustment in relative prices and wages is necessary in order to balance labor demand and 
labor supply. 
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There are two different dimensions of wage adjustment mechanisms. The first refers to the 
fact that nominal wage and price flexibility are important as a reaction to country-specific 
aggregate demand shocks. Flexible money wages and flexible prices can have an influence 
upon output and employment and thus lead to necessary real effective exchange rate and 
current account equilibrium. The second is the possibility that real wage flexibility leads to 
real wages that are in line with regional, sectoral and occupational productivity developments. 
Equilibrium unemployment could be lower if wages were more flexible because a reallocation 
of labor resources across economic activities would be possible in the situation of industry-
specific or supply-side shocks155. 
 
4.2.2.3. EMU Goals 
 
The goals that are important to be achieved in EMU are developments of nominal wages 
consistent with the goal of price stability and the avoidance of the loss of structural 
competitiveness at country level. Excessive nominal wages could increase the inflationary 
risk, reduce the competitiveness and lead to higher unemployment. The aggregate wage 
growth should be given by the sum of trend productivity growth and price stability target of 
the ECB of below 2%. In the EMU the growth of nominal wage per worker has been stable156. 
Over the period 1999-2006 the increase of nominal wage per worker was low and represented 
2.5%, without Germany, where the increase was 3%157. 
The differences that exist between wage and labor cost developments in countries belonging 
to the EMU do not necessarily need to be a cause for concern, but they could reflect the 
growth or the cyclical situation of that country. The inflation and as a consequence the wage 
increases could be higher in countries that grow faster, while the inflation and wage growth 
are usually lower in countries confronted with depression. 
 
The changes in relative wages and prices of different sectors are important for the absorption 
of sectoral shocks. When there is a demand shift from traded to non-tradable goods in a 
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certain country, changes of wages and prices of the tradable relative to the non-tradable goods 
could lead to a new equilibrium and reduce trade imbalances158. 
 
4.2.2.4. Reasons for Wage Rigidity in EMU 
 
Nominal wages have a high degree of rigidity in EMU. The downward wage adjustment is 
about 0.3% when unemployment increases by 1%159. 
 
A reason for nominal wage rigidity is given by “the long contract periods”160. An incentive 
for long contract periods are lower negotiation costs like the risk of labor-market conflicts, 
while an incentive for short contract periods is the possible reaction to unforeseen events. 
Longer contract periods also have as a result lower inflation rates because nominal wages are 
not revised so often161. 
 
Other aspects that result in downward nominal wage rigidity are “social norms about fairness: 
firms do not want to cut money wages because this would have a negative impact on 
workforce morale and reduce productivity162.” Reductions of nominal wages are usually 
accepted only in extreme situations, for example when the survival of the firm is problematic.  
 
Furthermore, the nominal wage rigidity has to do with the “bargaining game between 
employers and employees”163. “The common practice is almost everywhere that production 
continues with the same money wage as in the old contract until a new one is concluded. The 
consequence may be nominal wage rigidity: if there is only a moderate change in nominal 
demand, it will pay for neither employers nor unions to initiate a labor-market conflict to 
change the wage. The upshot is again that, even if the EMU implies larger demand 
fluctuations, these may not be sufficiently large to change wage-setting behavior”164. 
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4.2.2.5. Wage Flexibility and Co-ordination of Wage Bargaining 
 
A national co-ordination of wage bargaining will probably be introduced in the EMU, because 
nominal wage flexibility could become an important substitute for domestic monetary policy 
if social actors see the need for such a development165. There are incentives for a transnational 
co-ordination of wage bargaining at EU level because of the Europeanization of monetary 
policy and in order to increase welfare. The framework for this development is given by the 
Macroeconomic Dialogue within the framework of the Employment Pact, established by the 
EU in 1999. According to this, European-level unions and representatives of employers meet 
regularly with the ECB, the Commission and EU ministers of Finance and discuss 
macroeconomic issues. Another incentive consists in the increased competition among firms 
from different European countries, because a transnational co-ordination would result in 
smaller job losses than wage increases within the sector of one country only166. Cross-border 
bargaining co-ordination would also increase the bargaining power within large multinational 
firms that threaten to reallocate production to other countries because of wage and labor cost 
increases167.  
 
Reasons that could impede transnational bargaining co-ordination are a very country-specific 
knowledge about labor-market relations, the insufficient knowledge of foreign languages 
especially among blue-collar union representatives, the opposition from employers who favor 
decentralization and the reduction of union gains because of competition from outside the 
EU168. If there will be a transnational coordination of wage bargaining the probability for this 
development will be the highest within multinational firms because of similarities in 
production that determine similar systems of pay and other benefits, and because of the 
regular interaction of employees from different countries. Multinational firms in the EU with 
at least 1000 employees in total and a minimum of 150 employees in at least two countries 
must establish European Works Councils according to the Commission directive from 1994. 
“They represent institutionalized networks of employees across borders, where local union 
representatives will meet regularly, and could provide a basis for co-ordination of 
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bargaining169.” Factors that reduce the co-ordination costs are the common currency and the 
possibility to increase the influence of unions in Brussels170. 
 
4.2.2.6. Further Possibilities to Increase Wage Flexibility 
 
It is thought that the poor performance of European countries in comparison with that of the 
United States is the result of labor market rigidities. By weakening trade union power and 
labor market regulations, the flexibility of the labor market could be increased. 
 
However, when decisions concerning the labor market are taken, the workers welfare, aspects 
of social security, but also budgetary constraints and the danger of long-term unemployment 
because of high wages and labor costs have to be taken into consideration171. In the decision 
making process about labor markets the interests of employers for more flexibility and the 
need of workers for security and higher employment should be taken into consideration172.  
 
Through the Employment Guidelines the EU Council recommended in 2002 to EU Member 
States to continue the implementation of further structural reforms, innovation, and 
competitiveness and to analyze the possibility of introducing more flexible labor contract 
types into the national laws. According to the EU Council, IMF, OECD and the European 
Central Bank, there is a necessity to increase labor market flexibility, in order to solve the 
unemployment problem by increasing the reaction to production shocks, and to lower 
inflation variability because of the reduction of the need for stabilization policy by the 
common central bank. Important reasons for the low labor mobility in the EMU are cultural 
differences and language barriers173.  
 
As a consequence of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, labor market policy coordination 
intensified, because employment is considered “as a matter of common concern”174 and 
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Member States “shall co-ordinate their action”175. The coordination “refers to a situation 
where the flexibility parameters of the member states are chosen so as to minimize joint losses 
of the national governments”176. The decisions and the implementation of labor market policy 
still are main attributions of the member states177.  
 
A study of full-time employees, working in the same firm, for twelve European countries 
during 1994-96 contains evidence about nominal wage rigidity. In Germany and Ireland the 
percentage of employees with no wage changes is the highest. Nominal wage cuts can be 
observed178.   
 
Possibilities to improve the employment situation in the EMU would be through higher 
flexibility, deregulation and incentives of households to work (for example because of lower 
unemployment benefits and benefit duration)179.  
 
Two important developments that will probably take place and that will increase the necessity 
for labor flexibility are a higher immigration of individuals and the emigration of jobs from 
Europe to other regions through off-shoring. The maintenance of productivity advantages, 
high wages and increased competitiveness in the context of globalization will be possible 
through increased flexibility and high skills of European workers and by incentives for 
jobseekers to find and accept jobs that are available180.  
 
The overall conclusion is that the EMU is characterized by high wage rigidity and this 
criterion needs to be further improved in order to meet OCA requirements.  
 
4.3. Financial Market Integration 
 
This section presents the concept of financial market integration and its advantages. Then, the 
impact of EMU on financial market integration and on the convergence of payment behaviors 
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is described. The markets presented in detail and which show a high degree of integration in 
the EMU are: the money market, the corporate bond markets, the bank credit markets, the 
euro equity markets and the government bond market. 
 
4.3.1. The Concept of Financial Market Integration 
 
The necessity for exchange rate adjustments can be reduced by financial market integration 
because adverse shocks can be temporarily cushioned by capital inflows, for example “by 
borrowing from surplus areas or de-cumulating net foreign assets that can be reverted when 
the shock is over”181. Changes in the interest rates can equilibrate capital movements across 
partner countries even when they are not very high, if there is an important degree of financial 
integration. Differences between long-term interest rates could thus be reduced, with positive 
effects for the financing of external imbalances and for the efficient allocation of resources182. 
 
“The market for a given set of financial instruments and/or services is fully integrated if all 
potential market participants with the same relevant characteristics 
(1) face a single set of rules when they decide to deal with those financial instruments 
and/or services; 
(2) have equal access to the above-mentioned set of financial instruments and/or services; 
and 
(3) are treated equally when they are active in the market”183. 
 
4.3.2. Advantages of Financial Integration 
 
Benefits of financial integration are increased possibilities for risk sharing and diversification, 
a better capital allocation and the potential for higher growth. 
 
According to an empirical study risk sharing across regions enhances the specialization in 
production184. The financial integration also leads to an increased set of financial instruments 
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and of cross-ownership of assets. In the euro area the agents do not fully share risk. “When 
agents in an area fully share risk, the consumption of agents located in one region co-moves 
with that of agents located in other regions of that area, while consumption does not co-move 
with region-specific shocks”185. In the Euro zone the correlation between GDP growth rates is 
higher than that of consumption growth rates, which means that there are further possibilities 
of risk sharing186.  
 
Financial integration also means the elimination of barriers to trading, clearing and settlement 
platforms, so that firms can choose trading, clearing and/or settlement platforms with the 
highest efficiency. Investors will have the possibility to choose between more productive 
investments and reallocate funds according to these opportunities. 
 
Furthermore, financial integration leads to a higher flow of investment funds in some regions, 
if these investment possibilities are more productive relative to foreign ones. There will be 
higher competition in less developed regions and this situation could lead to lower 
intermediation costs, a higher efficiency of their financial system, an increase of local and 
foreign agents, and thus to further development of these financial systems187. In the new EU 
member states there is a high amount of foreign involvement in almost all financial market 
segments. However, the process of financial market integration should be monitored in order 
to avoid the creation of monopolies188.  
 
There is a relation between financial developments and economic growth. The basic purposes 
of the financial systems are: “1) lower uncertainty by facilitating the trading, hedging, 
diversifying and pooling of risk; 2) allocate resources; and 3) mobilize savings”189. These 
aspects can have an influence upon economic growth because of the capital and technological 
accumulation.  
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4.3.3. The EMU and Payment Behaviors Convergence 
 
A study of the five payment instruments, which are the credit card, cash, cheque, credit 
transfer and direct debit, shows convergence on demand for all payment methods in the EMU 
except for the cheque190. Cards and cash take in volume the place of cheques and credit 
transfers, while the credit transfer increases and cheques decrease in value191. Important 
aspects that influenced the payment behaviors are technological innovation192, legislative 
environment and banking integration193. In the EMU, the payment behavior is determined by 
the unification of national markets for retail payments through the Single Payment Area 
(SPA), by technological and socio-macroeconomic factors194.  
 
“The SPA is one domestic euro payment area grouping together the” ”existing national areas, 
and in which payments are carried out with identical time and costs”195. The purpose is to 
permit customers to complete payment transactions as they now do at national level, while at 
present, retail payments across borders take longer and are more costly than domestic 
payments. The reasons for these differences consist in the specific laws and the different 
speeds that are characteristic for the EMU member states. Today, the only integration refers to 
card payments, which have international functionality. Important measures that have been 
taken in order to eliminate these barriers were the creation of the European Payment Council, 
whose purpose is to provide guidance to the banking industry in order to accelerate the setting 
up of the SPA, and the common legal framework for payments established by the European 
Commission. Factors that impede the developments towards a SPA are the fact that 
consumers usually do not switch banks, so that there is a little incentive to reduce prices, and 
the fact that competition is not very high in this sector196. 
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4.3.4. The Money Market in the EMU 
 
Definition of the Money Market 
“The money market is commonly defined as the market for short-term debt, where “short-
term” means a maturity of up to one year”197. Segments of the money market are: unsecured 
debt, secured debt (e.g. the repo market), and derivatives of short-term debt (e.g. the interest 
rate swap market).  
 
It is important to monitor the integration of euro area money markets for the following 
reasons: the market is very important for the implementation of the single monetary policy of 
the area, for the distribution of liquidity by the Euro system, for the efficient allocation of 
resources in the euro area and for assuring a more efficient pricing of short-term debt in the 
Euro zone.  
 
The Unsecured Market Segment  
“The unsecured deposit market is where credit institutions exchange short-term liquidity 
without any collateral as guarantee”198. Between mid-1998 and mid-1999 this market grew 
especially because of a 40% increase of the overnight segment, which now represents a little 
less than 70% of the turnover of the total market. The second largest turnover is given by 
transactions with maturities up to one month199.  
 
EONIA (euro overnight index average) and EURIBOR (euro inter bank offered rate) are daily 
benchmark indices for unsecured lending rates in the Euro zone, which were used after the 
adoption of the euro in 1999, and which contributed to an increase of the market, because they 
were used as underlying or reference indices in the derivative markets. EONIA “is the 
reference rate for the euro area overnight rate, and it is calculated by the ECB as a weighted 
average of all overnight unsecured lending transactions undertaken in the interbank market by 
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a number of contributing panel banks”200. EURIBOR “is the benchmark rate of the euro 
money market for a number of standardized maturities up to one year201.”  
 
The Repo Market Segment 
“In the repo market, financial agents exchange securities for liquidity, with a simultaneous 
agreement to reverse the transaction at some pre-specified future date and at a pre-set 
price”202. After the adoption of the common currency, the euro area repo market has 
registered an important growth, because more euro area securities are available and new 
players have entered the market. The size of the euro area repo market is higher than that of 
the unsecured deposit market, and most transactions are based on sovereign bonds, and have a 
short maturity203. An important aspect that contributed to an increased integration of the euro 
area repo market was the introduction of the EUREPO index in 2002. The percentage of 
trades with a non-domestic euro area counterpart increased from 33% in 1998 and 1999 to 
40% in 2000204. 
 
The Interest Rate Swap Market Segment 
“In the interest rate swap market, financial agents agree to exchange periodic payments of 
interest rates according to some pre-specified formula, based on an underlying principal, 
which itself is not exchanged”205. The operations in the interest rate swap market usually 
involve banks, and there is a concentration among a few large market players. The reason for 
this development consists in the fact that individual transactions on the order of several 
billions of euros are usually made. The adoption of the euro determined a high growth of the 
euro area interest swap market, because the single euro area swap curve was used by a large 
number of market participants as a reference, and because the growth itself increased the 
market liquidity and made the market more attractive. There is a concentration of the market 
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at shorter maturities206. The percentage of the average daily transactions in the euro area 
represented 34% in 1998 and increased to 52% by the second quarter of 1999207.   
 
4.3.5. Corporate Bond Markets 
 
A characteristic of the corporate bond markets is the rapid growth during the last years. While 
before 1998 corporate bonds were issued by highly-rated financial corporations, the number 
of lower-rated A and BBB corporations in these markets increased. The corporate bond yield 
spreads are determined especially by the credit rating208. 
 
Benefits of a further integration of the corporate bond markets are the larger choice of assets 
for investors, the increased possibility of investors to spread the risk because of the 
elimination of barriers to international investments, the lower risk premium that has to be paid 
by companies, the reduced dependence on domestic credit decision-makers, the lower 
sensitivity of corporate financing to business cycle downturns and to crises in the banking and 
securities market and the higher incentive to increase shareholder value and improve 
information in order to reduce the cost of capital209.  
 
There have been significant changes at the supply and at the demand side of the market. On 
the supply side for example, an increase of the total outstanding value from 180 billion euro in 
1998 to about 680 billion euro in 2003 could be observed. The A-rated segment increased 
from 30 billion euro in 1998 to 220 billion euro in 2003, and the BBB-rated segment from 3 
billion euro in 1998 to 182 billion euro in 2003, especially because of the increased 
participation of non-financial corporations210. On the demand side, an increase could be 
observed because of the higher diversity in the supply and the increased liquidity of corporate 
bonds. The low levels of government bonds because of the restrictions of the Treaty and the 
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Stability and Growth Pact and an ageing population also increased the demand for long-term 
savings211. 
 
The euro area corporate bond markets show a reasonable degree of integration; the home bias 
of bond portfolios decreased and European-wide bond funds registered a significant growth.  
 
4.3.6. The Bank Credit Markets 
 
“Banks are crucial to the transmission of monetary policy impulses to the economy since they 
are the counterparts for central bank monetary policy operations and since they grant credit to 
households and firms, inter alia, on the basis of credit received from the central bank”212. In 
the euro zone, banks are the most important intermediaries.  
 
The integration after the adoption of the common currency euro differs between banking 
activities and has been relatively slow on the retail banking market. The regulators made 
efforts in order to increase the integration, for example through the First (1977) and Second 
(1988) Banking Directives and the publication of the Financial Service Action Plan in 1999, 
which contains measures to eliminate price differences across the EU and enhance consumer 
protection in the retail markets213. 
 
There is a tendency towards consolidation of credit institutions, especially because of 
technological developments, deregulation, liberalization and globalization. Asymmetries in 
the banking sector become lower as a result of mergers and acquisitions that take place mainly 
in countries were the bank concentration is low214. 
 
In spite of these developments, there still are some important differences concerning banking 
activities in the euro zone. The short-term lending is more segmented than medium- and long-
term lending in the corporate lending market. The consumer credit segment shows a high 
degree of fragmentation, while mortgage loans are not characterized by large differences 
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across countries. The cross-border activities in the retail banking segment are still home 
biased, so that further developments and measures towards integration are necessary215. 
 
4.3.7. The Euro Equity Markets 
 
The reform of European equity markets began in the mid ‘80s and was determined by 
increased capital mobility, progress in telecommunication and cross-border trading in order to 
enhance portfolio diversification.  
 
“Until 1985, the stock exchange of each European country was a closed membership 
organization protected from competition by national regulation, restriction to capital mobility 
and high costs of telecommunication216.” Today, important developments of the equity market 
concern mergers among national stock markets (for example the merger of the stock 
exchanges of Paris, Brussels and Amsterdam in September 2000 resulting in the Euronext 
stock exchange), the increased concentration of equity brokerage and the expansion of trading 
hours217.  
 
A study of the equity markets in Germany, France, Italy and Spain for the period January 
1994 to June 2004 shows an increased integration (measured by the return correlations across 
the equity markets of the euro zone), because of the elimination of restrictions concerning the 
capital mobility and of institutional barriers. Another conclusion of the study is that the 
informational market efficiency increased. Because of these developments a better allocation 
of capital and economic growth in Europe could be expected. Investors from the euro zone 
increased their investments in equities and there is a tendency to move from a bank-oriented 
European financial system to a more market-oriented one. However, the euro equity markets 
are not fully integrated, so that a further harmonization of rules and increased cooperation are 
necessary218.  
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The European equity market can be considered as highly integrated only since 1996 and its 
importance in the world financial markets has increased significantly since then. This 
development is mainly due to the transition towards EMU, and in this context through the 
elimination of the exchange rate volatility and uncertainty, as well as through the monetary 
policy convergence of interest rates and inflation rates219.  
 
The integration is important for investors and policy-makers. From the investors’ perspective, 
the integration made the Euro area a more attractive place for investment and increased the 
incentives to diversify more across sectors or across regions. Policy makers have to adopt 
further supervisory measures in the context of the increasing interdependence of Euro area 
markets220. 
 
4.3.7.1. Consequences of the Integration 
 
There is a convergence of macroeconomic influences on company profits as a result of a 
single monetary policy, closely aligned interest rates and fiscal policy discipline. Lower trade 
barriers to trade goods and financial assets lead to a higher degree of specialization in national 
industries221. 
 
For European firms the consequence of increasing integration could consist in lower costs of 
equity capital, because the equity risk premium declines222. There still is a fragmentation of 
stock exchanges in Europe resulting in different prices for equity capital for firms with similar 
characteristics. 
 
For investments the lower cost of capital implies that riskier, high expected return projects can 
be financed more advantageously. This aspect is favorable for investments, output and 
economic growth. 
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Private investors can profit from better diversification opportunities at lower costs as a result 
of financial integration223. 
 
4.3.7.2. Further Integration (e. g. by a European Stock Exchange) 
 
A stock exchange, share market or bourse is a formal organization “made up of members who 
use the facilities to exchange certain common stocks”224. 
 
The euro area financial integration could be significantly increased by the existence of a 
common Euro Area Stock Exchange. Current developments that could lead to a common 
stock exchange in the euro zone are the increasing international competition on the capital 
markets as well as the technological progress and the computerization of trade.  Important 
benefits of a common stock exchange would relate to costs, efficiency, speed, liquidity and 
price advantages. 
 
There has been an attempt to build an alliance between the Deutsche Börse AG and the 
London Stock Exchange in 1998. The development of a common European trade platform 
was discussed, as well as the possibility that the other European stock exchanges should join 
it later. However, there have been different points of view regarding the harmonization of the 
stock markets which hindered the fulfillment. An agreement could not be reached regarding 
for example the ownership and the electronic trade system to be chosen225.  
 
A solution could consist in establishing different trading places, e.g. in London, Frankfurt, 
Paris, Mailand, Madrid, Zurich, Amsterdam and Brussels, a possibility that has already been 
taken into consideration226. The trade for specific market segments could be concentrated on a 
single trading place. Some very important questions that would have to be solved, however, 
regard the listing requirements, the supervision of the stock exchange activities, the 
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harmonization of the legislation, the technical platform for the trade, the ownership and the 
trading segments for the euro area stock exchange227. 
 
4.3.8. The Government Bond Market 
 
4.3.8.1. The Concept of Government Bond Markets and Their 
Advantages 
 
The government bond markets in the Euro zone play a very important role because they are 
the main source of financing for central and local governments; they help the financial system 
function, and government bonds are benchmark assets when pricing other securities as well as 
collaterals in some financial transactions. After the introduction of the euro, the integration of 
the euro area government bond market increased. Bond portfolios became more diversified, 
especially in the smaller euro area countries, and the competition increased. 
 
A benefit of further government bond market integration is the reduction of the cost of serving 
government debt. Because of the market integration, investors can diversify geographically 
easier, so that the required yield is lower and there are reduced interest payments for 
governments. If governments also manage to improve the liquidity of the outstanding bonds, 
the liquidity premium required by investors will be lower. The debt servicing costs for the 
euro area could be reduced by 5 billion euro because of a further integration228. 
 
Another advantage of further integration is a higher transparency and a more homogeneous 
pricing of bonds. Government bonds of similar maturity are closer substitutes, and because of 
that the functioning of the euro area collateral-backed asset market is improved. 
 
Furthermore, the integration can determine a more symmetric impact of monetary policy in 
the bond markets, increased liquidity, efficiency and convergence229.   
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4.3.8.2. Changes in the Euro Area Government Bond Market 
 
The holdings of non-domestic bonds have become higher after the introduction of the euro 
because investors wanted to benefit from improved diversification and liquidity. The changes 
can be categorized into those which are mainly supply-driven, the demand-driven changes and 
developments in the financial infrastructure. 
 
The supply-driven changes refer to modifications concerning the issuance of sovereign bonds. 
The competition has increased and has led to higher liquidity of government bonds and larger 
volumes of outstanding issues. Small countries are increasingly starting to create benchmark 
issues, and some governments initiated buy-back programs for instruments that were illiquid 
and/or short-dated. Pre-announced auction calendars were introduced in order to make the 
issuance activity more regular, predictable and transparent. The number of primary dealers 
increased, trading systems for the secondary market were started to increase the liquidity, and 
there were sustained efforts in order to meet particular investor needs (e.g. in Spain and 
France constant-maturity bonds were introduced). Some reasons for the remaining 
fragmentation are the decentralized management of the public debt market and the different 
credit risk of the countries. 
 
The demand-driven changes concern the fact that investors started to take a euro area-wide 
perspective rather than a national one on issues referring to portfolio allocations. The motives 
behind this development are the elimination of the exchange rate risk between the currencies 
of EMU member states and the concern of debtors for more liquidity. The portfolio 
diversification increased especially in smaller countries, mainly because of the smaller choice 
of domestic assets230. 
 
The trading in bond markets usually took place over the counter (OTC) and between 
relatively small groups of counterparts. Now, there are several structured trading platforms in 
the euro area as a result of technological innovation and the increased demand for efficiency 
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which is the consequence of higher competition between debt managers, intermediaries and 
investors. The liquidity of the market increased, especially in smaller countries231.   
 
Concerning the public debt market, the risk free interest rates became less volatile in the euro 
zone after the adoption of the common currency. The single public debt market is still not 
completely established, and the fragmentation leads to costs for Treasuries and taxpayers232. 
Full integration of the financial area would mean that there is a single risk free rate. An 
important aspect which led to higher integration was the elimination of the currency risk after 
the adoption of the euro. Other important facts for the integration are the low inflation target 
of the ECB and the restrictions on fiscal policies (the latter is very important for the 
convergence of the credit risk)233. However, there still are deviations from the law of one 
price, which means that public bonds with the same credit rating have yield differences and 
correlations between the yields smaller than unity. For the Treasuries of the euro area this 
situation leads to unnecessary costs of about 5 billion euro annually. In this context, the 
establishment of a multilateral agency in charge of issuing debt on behalf of the euro-area 
governments could be a solution234. 
 
The conclusion is that EMU is characterized by a high financial market integration of the 
markets described. Equity and bond home biases have decreased across European countries 
while a large shift in holdings towards other euro area countries took place, a situation which 
proves that euro area financial markets became more integrated235. A reason for the higher 
financial integration in the euro area was the easier access to equity and bonds markets236.  
However, some further improvements are possible, e.g. a common European Stock 
Exchange237 and the complete establishment of a single debt market238.  
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4.4. Production Diversification (Kenen) 
 
This criterion can be formulated in the following way: “Countries whose production and 
exports are widely diversified and of similar structure form an optimum currency area”239.  
 
In order to represent a problem for a monetary union, a shock has to be large and asymmetric. 
The most likely sources of shocks are shifts in spending patterns, e.g. because of changing 
tastes or of new technology that leads to new products. This problem can occur especially in 
countries that are specialized in a narrow range of goods240. 
 
Asymmetric shocks are not so likely among countries with similar production patterns and 
diversified trade. An analysis of European countries leads to the conclusion that the 
dissimilarity between Germany and Austria for example is very low, that Norway did not 
accede to EMU because of its dissimilarity with other EU countries (its trade is dominated by 
fish and oil) and that dissimilarity is high between the EU and the UK. An exception to other 
European countries is the Netherlands which joined the EU in spite of its dissimilarity, 
because of economic and political advantages241. 
 
A question arises as to the effect of trade integration on diversification. According to one 
opinion trade leads to more specialization because each country or region concentrates on its 
comparative advantage. If this situation occurs, the diversification will decrease and the 
monetary union will become more costly (trade takes the inter-industry form). According to 
another point of view, every country produces different brands of the same goods, offers more 
choice and trade becomes more diversified (there is intra-industry trade). An analysis of the 
situation so far supports the view that diversification increases with trade integration, so that 
“the EMU with regard to that criterion stands to improve further”242.  
 
However, this OCA criterion is satisfied in EMU (e.g. according to Petreski), in spite of the 
fact that its optimality could increase243. The reason consists in the fact that the tendency in 
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EMU is towards a more diversified production and trade of different brands of the same 
goods. Production and exports are thus diversified and of the same structure. 
 
4.5. Economic Openness (Mc Kinnon) 
 
The Mc Kinnon criterion states that: “Countries which are very open to trade and trade 
heavily with each other form an optimum currency area”244.  
 
The question that arises is whether the exchange rate is useful in the situation of asymmetric 
shocks. Standard products, which are produced in different countries and are virtually 
identical, have similar prices at home and abroad. Their prices are nearly the same under the 
premises of competition. In this situation prices are not important and giving up the exchange 
rate does not represent a significant loss. 
 
Let’s consider a situation where two countries that do not share the same currency have their 
own exchange rate vis-à-vis the rest of the world, e.g. EA and EB. If in both countries there is 
an intensive competition then the prices will equalize when they are expressed in the same 
currency. If PA = the price of country A’s domestic goods in domestic currency, then EAPA = 
the price of domestic goods expressed in the rest of the world’s currency for country A, and 
EBPB = the price of domestic goods expressed in the rest of the world’s currency for country 
B. With competition, the “world price levels” tend to be equal (EAPA = EBPB). A’s change in 
the exchange rate EA must be followed by a change in local currency prices PA in order to 
keep EAPA unchanged. The result is that PA and PB are not sticky anymore and the real 
exchange rates of both countries vis-à-vis the rest of the world are also equal EA/PA/P* = 
EB/PB/P* (P* = the price level in the rest of the world). With flexible prices no significant loss 
results from giving up the exchange rate in a currency union245. As a consequence, in 
countries that are open to trade and trade heavily, prices tend to equalize and the real 
exchange rates vis-à-vis the rest of the world are also equal. Giving up the exchange rate does 
not represent a significant loss.   
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The international prices of tradable goods influence the domestic cost of living as a result of 
economic openness. Higher openness reduces the probability of money and/or exchange rate 
illusion by wage earners, because changes in international prices have an increasing direct and 
indirect impact on domestic prices. As a consequence, the importance of the nominal 
exchange rate as an adjustment instrument decreases. Dimensions of the economic openness 
are “the degree of trade integration (i.e., the ratio of reciprocal exports plus imports over 
GDP) with the partner countries, the share of tradable versus non-tradable goods and services 
in production and consumption, the marginal propensity to import, and international capital 
mobility246.” 
 
The economic openness calculated as the ratio of export plus import of goods and services to 
GDP is relatively high in Europe, reaching an average of about 40 percent of GDP. The prices 
of tradable goods tend to equalize across European countries as a result of liberalization and 
increasing industry trade247. 
 
This criterion is important in the OCA theory also because most goods from a small open 
economy are traded on international markets. As a result, local conditions do not play a very 
important role for their prices, and changes in the currency value are passed into domestic 
prices. The consequence is that exchange rate changes do not have a significant effect on the 
competitiveness of the country.  
 
“Openness is defined as the share of economic activity devoted to international trade. The 
ratio of exports to GDP measures the proportion of domestic production that is exported. The 
ratio of imports to GDP measures the proportion of domestic spending that falls on 
imports”248.  
 
Smaller European countries are more open. This is a reason why smaller countries usually 
support the European Union more than the others. The ten new member countries (that will 
probably be members of the euro zone by the end of the decade) are like the candidate 
countries very open. The EU as a whole is by contrast largely closed. 
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“A second way to look at openness is to measure how domestic prices respond to exchange 
rate changes, the pass-through effect. If all prices respond one for one to exchange rate 
changes, the pass-through is complete and the exchange rate only affects inflation, not 
competitiveness…for instance, a 0.6 pass-through coefficient means that a 10 per cent 
depreciation is followed within three month by a 6 percent increase in import prices…The 
more open the economy the larger is the pass-through” 249.  
 
In most European countries there is a significant openness and a large pass-through 
coefficient. This criterion is fulfilled in most EU economies, especially for smaller countries, 
where domestic prices tend to be dominated by the exchange rate250. 
 
4.6. Similarities of Inflation Rates 
 
The expectation is of similar or closely related inflation rates in countries that are members of 
a currency union. According to Fleming (1971)251, the terms of trade converge if the inflation 
rates of the member countries in a currency area also converge. This situation reduces the 
need for exchange rate adjustment as a result of current account equilibrium252. 
 
Persistent differences in national inflation rates can cause external imbalances. Reasons for 
the different national inflation rates can be: disparities in structural developments, diversities 
in labor market institutions, differences in economic policies, and diverse social preferences 
such as the inflation aversion253. If inflation rates between countries are low and similar, than 
the trade will be stable and the need for nominal exchange rate adjustments will decrease254.  
 
The inflation rates decreased over the 15-20 years in euro area countries. There are variations 
in the national inflation rates of euro area member countries because of the following factors: 
statistical and erratic factors (noise); the completion of the single market and higher cross-
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border transparency, which reduce the differences in the prices of traded goods; the Balassa-
Samuelson effect (this effect refers to the observation that consumer price levels in wealthier 
countries are systematically higher than in poorer ones; it is an economic model predicting the 
above, based on the assumption that productivity or productivity growth-rates vary more by 
country in traded goods sectors than in other sectors); different cyclical conditions and 
demand policies255. Some differences in national inflation rates in euro area countries should 
not be viewed as negative, if they reflect a “catching-up” process256 (e.g. in the new member 
countries).  
 
However, the cross border volatility of relative prices has decreased significantly in euro area 
member countries since the adoption of the euro in January 1999257. The criterion of similar 
inflation rates can be seen as fulfilled in EMU (e.g. according to Petreski)258.  
 
4.7. Fiscal Integration (Fiscal Transfers) 
 
This criterion can be formulated in the following way: “Countries that agree to compensate 
each other for adverse shocks form an optimum currency area”259.  
 
If in country A there is an adverse shock, there are also negative consequences in country B. 
A possibility would be help from country B to country A, e.g. financial compensation in order 
to reduce the asymmetric shifts. If this strategy is adopted, the recession in country A and the 
boom in country B could be reduced, and the shock could disappear over time through longer 
lasting prices. Countries that do offer help are beneficiaries in the future. 
 
The transfer schemes can be explicit or implicit, as can be seen in different countries. In the 
situation of an asymmetric shock income declines and welfare support like unemployment 
benefits rise. Transfers are received from the rest of the country. Transfers can be implicit and 
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a result of the redistributive mechanism in the country. Explicit transfer systems are in place 
in some federal countries such as Germany and Switzerland260.  
 
In the situation of temporary adverse shocks, countries can receive transfers from better-off 
countries in a currency area (without the exchange rate mechanism). Under these 
circumstances, the income of the region declines relatively to the rest of the currency area, 
and tax payments are lower, while welfare payments (unemployment benefits, subsidies) 
increase. 
 
In the USA federal transfers amount to between 10 and 40 percent of the loss while in the EU 
they represent about 1 percent of the GDP. In Europe it is usually spent on the Commission’s 
operating expenses, the common Agricultural Policy and Structural Funds for poorer regions. 
“On this criterion, Europe is definitely not an optimum monetary union261.”  
 
The necessity of nominal exchange rate adjustments is smaller if countries share a supra-
national fiscal transfer system, so that a redistribution of funds to a member country that is 
affected by an adverse asymmetric shock takes place. The premise for this is an advanced 
degree of political integration and the acceptance of such risk sharing by member countries262. 
The conclusion is that in EMU the criterion of fiscal integration is not fulfilled263. 
 
4.8. Political Integration 
 
The reasons why political integration is very important are shown in this section. Then, the 
significant institutions for the functioning of the EMU, especially the ECB and EU bodies 
related to it, are presented in detail, by describing aspects that are optimal and possible 
improvements in their organization. Some problematic aspects for example are the lack of 
accountability of the ECB and the fact that the supervision of the banking sector is not 
centralized at the level of the currency union. Some other important institutions for the 
political integration, where reform would be optimal, are the Council of the EU and the 
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Commission of the European Communities. The creation of a Representative for Foreign 
Affairs through the Lisbon Treaty would also represent progress towards increasing political 
integration. 
 
Some economists view the will for political integration as the single most important condition 
for a currency union264. It allows the adoption of joint commitments, co-operation on 
economic policies and more institutional linkages265. The political will was and is crucial for 
the adoption and maintenance of a single currency. Haberler (1970) thought that it is 
significant for joint economic policies, common fiscal policy and strong institutional linkage. 
Tower and Willet (1976) affirmed that compatibility in preferences toward growth, inflation 
and unemployment are essential for the proper functioning of EMU266.  
 
4.8.1. EMU Political Integration 
 
In EMU there is a strong political will to increase European integration. Monetary unification 
is aimed at, which is shown by the common targets concerning the stabilization of inflation, 
budget deficits and exchange rates in euro area member countries. However, the euro area is 
not a state and it is also not likely to become one267. 
 
Concerning the increasing functional political integration, it can be observed that there are 
different areas of government that have come closer together. The supranational legislators 
that play an important role in the harmonization are the EU Council – which is the 
intergovernmental body - and the European Parliament. Common policies are initiated by the 
European Commission, which also observes the implementation of supranational laws and 
regulations. Another important institution is the European Court of Justice. In the European 
Union there is no absolute economic power of the nation state. However, the state still is 
responsible for aspects like income redistribution, growth promotion and employment. It is 
probable that political integration will increase over time. 
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A transfer has taken place of sovereignty over some elements of economic policy. The 
competences regarding the monetary policy have been transferred to the European System of 
Central Banks. The ESCB and the EU Council decide on the exchange rate policy, while the 
ECB is responsible for holding and managing foreign exchange reserves and conducting 
foreign exchange operations. The EU is also responsible for decisions about the single market, 
competition and trade policies. The fiscal policy is still a national competence but the 
provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact impose some restrictions268. 
 
There is, however, an increased necessity for policy co-ordination in EMU, determined for 
example by the increasing policy spillovers between countries and by economies of scale. At 
present, there are frequent exchanges of views about national and euro area developments and 
policies in forums like the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN; composed of 
the Economics and Finance Ministers of the EU member states), the European Foundation 
Center (EFC; a European association of independent funders) and the European Political 
Cooperation (EPC; a form of EU foreign policy coordination).  
 
Areas where a further political integration could take place are for example internal and 
external security and the budget of the European Union269. It is probable that the common 
foreign and security policy will be strengthened in the context of security issues regarding 
migration and relations with countries from different other regions such as the Middle East270.  
 
4.8.2. Institutions and Governing 
 
An analysis of the European economy shows that its institutions are often characterized by 
inertia and that decision taking could become more efficient. Although some further 
improvements may be recommendable, significant measures towards increasing the 
optimality of EMU have already been taken. Trade liberalization and the creation of the 
Common Market represent very important progresses. One issue regarding the effective EMU 
                                                 
268
 See Mongelli (2002), p. 24. 
269
 See Mongelli (2002), p. 25. 
270
 See Gehler (2008), quoted in Eichengreen and Landesmann (2008), p. 1. 
OCA Criteria                                                                     78 
 
 
organization consists in the decision whether EU should be organized federally (which means 
that decision taking is collective) or confederally. 
 
The European integration leads to pressures for convergence while the institutions and 
ideologies are at the same time significant sources of inertia and resistance (e.g. the price 
stability objective of the ECB and the excessive deficit procedure)271.  
 
The European economic reforms adopted by decision makers could be characterized by 
“progressive liberalism”, defined “as the effort to fuse a liberal concern for efficiency with a 
Rawlesian commitment to support the disadvantaged”272. Examples of European liberalizing 
reforms are deficit reduction in Italy and Sweden; tax relief in France, the Netherlands and 
Britain; as well as efforts to increase market participation in the Netherlands and Sweden. 
Inefficient social spending in Europe could be reduced by more efficient administrative 
procedures such as the reduction of disability pay, early retirement and of protections for 
well-situated self-employed or public sector workers. 
 
Despite some inertia and inefficiencies of European institutions, they fulfill some very 
important tasks. Regarding debtor friendliness the European system is not so debtor friendly 
as the American system, where restructuring insolvent enterprises is encouraged (e.g. 
significant in the context of crisis)273. Another important issue of the European integration 
refers to the development of a transnational competition policy in accordance with the 
principle of trade liberalization and the creation of the Common Market274.  
 
The question arises whether it would be better if the EU were organized federally (meaning 
that decision making is collective) or confederally. A federal organization – meaning a 
collective decision taking - could become more difficult with larger EU growth when the 
heterogeneity increases and when citizens have more homogeneous preferences275.  
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4.8.3. The European Central Bank 
 
4.8.3.1. Models of Central Banking 
 
There were two models of central banking in the post-war period: the Anglo-French model 
and the German model.  
 
Central banks designed according to the Anglo-French model pursue several objectives, e.g. 
price stability, stabilization of the business cycle, high employment and financial stability. 
There also exists a political dependence of central banks, because the minister’s of finance 
have to approve decisions concerning monetary policy.  
 
In the design of the ECB the German model prevailed. According to this model the price 
stability is the primary objective of the central bank. Article 105 of the Maastricht Treaty 
provides:  
1. The primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. Without 
prejudice to the price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies 
in the Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of 
the Community as laid down in Article 2. 
 
Article 2 of the Maastricht Treaty states that: 
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an 
economic and monetary union and by implementing common policies or activities 
referred to in Articles 3 and 4, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious, 
balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of 
employment and of social protection, equality between men and women, sustainable 
and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of 
economic performance, a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of 
the environment, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic 
and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States. 
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Another characteristic of the German model is the political independence, which means that 
decisions about interest rates are taken by the central bank alone, without the involvement of 
political authorities. Article 108 of the Maastricht Treaty provides: 
When exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon 
them by this Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, neither the ECB, nor a national 
central bank, nor any member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or take 
instructions from Community institutions or bodies, from any government of a 
Member State or from any other body. The Community institutions and bodies and the 
governments of the Member States undertake to respect this principle and not to seek 
to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB or of the national 
central banks in the performance of their tasks276. 
 
An important reason for choosing the German model was that econometric studies during the 
1980s and early 1990s showed that the economies of countries with politically independent 
central banks performed better and were characterized by lower inflation without having 
higher unemployment or lower economic growth. The political independence of the central 
bank is, however, not a sufficient condition for price stability, but it is necessary along with 
social and political consensus in order to achieve this277. 
 
The fact that the ECB is a ‘conservative’ central bank – that is an institution which pursues 
especially price stability and puts less weight on output and employment – is sometimes also 
criticized. Usually there are gains consisting in lower inflation without the loss of 
employment, but this may, however, not be the case during a recession. The ECB does usually 
avoid expansionary policies that could reduce unemployment, a situation that can lead to 
conflicts with elected politicians278. 
 
A problem in the euro area is given by hysteresis in unemployment, which means that a 
temporary shock to unemployment, for example because of a recession, is transformed into a 
permanent one. Due to rigidities in the labor markets workers who lost their jobs during a 
recession do not find a new job when economic performance improves. The temporary 
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increase in unemployment is very large, because the ECB takes little stabilization measures. 
This can also lead to a high level of permanent unemployment279.  
 
The ECB reacts to output gap movements because they can influence future inflation. 
Increasing output and accelerating economic activity are likely to lead to higher inflation. The 
ECB reduces interest rates when the output is low in order to boost the economy and vice 
versa280. 
 
The ECB managed to prove that it has systematically pursued the goal of price stability – that 
means an inflation rate of below or approximately two percent - since its foundation281. An 
inflation rate that would exceed this target would also lead to a higher inflation uncertainty282.  
 
It would be very difficult to make changes to the statutes of the ECB regarding the inflation 
target and the political independence. A revision of the Maastricht Treaty, requiring 
unanimity among all EU member states, would be necessary283. 
 
4.8.3.2. The ECB and other EMU Institutions 
 
On January 1, 1994, the European Monetary Institute was founded. Its role was the 
determination of the organization and logistics for the European System of Central Banks, 
which became operational on January 1, 1999. The European System of Central Banks 
consists of the European Central Bank and the national central banks of euro area member 
countries. It is administered by the decision-making bodies of the ECB, e. g. the Governing 
Council and the Executive Board. The Executive Board consists of a president, a vice 
president and four directors, chosen by the heads of state and governments of the euro area 
member countries. The Governing Council includes the members of the Executive Board and 
the governors of the central banks of euro area member countries284.  
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The most important decision-making body of the euro area is the Governing Council. Its main 
tasks are the formulation of monetary policies, the adoption of decisions about interest rates 
and reserve requirements as well as the provision of liquidity into the system. Its members 
meet every two weeks in Frankfurt285. Each member has one vote. The reason why there is no 
qualified voting in the Governing Council is that, according to the Maastricht Treaty, its 
members must take into consideration the interest of the entire euro area. 
 
The main tasks of the Executive Board are to implement the decisions concerning the 
monetary policy adopted by the Governing Council and to set the agenda for the meetings of 
the members of the Governing Council286. 
 
Sometimes criticism arises regarding the high degree of decentralization of the system, 
meaning that the influence of the national central banks in the Governing Council could 
determine the prevalence of national interests at the expense of euro area wide interests. 
National central banks are fully taking part in the decision-making process of the Governing 
Council and carry out the ECB instructions in their national money market287.  
 
In order to assure the proper functioning of the euro area and to improve the decision-taking 
process concerning the common currency, the euro, the ECB collaborates with other bodies of 
the EU. The relations between the ECB and the other EU bodies are shown in the following 
table288. 
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Table 1 
 
ECB participation in Community fora and bodies 
Body/ 
forum 
Main tasks Membership 
European 
Parliament 
(established 1958) 
• Co-legislator with the EU Council on a   
  wide range of EU laws. 
 
• Conducts confirmation hearings of    
  persons nominated to manage   
  Community institutions and bodies, 
  including the ECB. 
• Currently 626 Members of the European 
   Parliament. 
 
• Organised in eight political groups, along   
   the lines of ideological orientations. 
 
EU Council 
(ECOFIN) 
(established 1958) 
 
• To take decisions on issues related to    
   Title III, Chapter 4 of the Treaty (Capital  
   and payments), and Title VII (Economic  
   and monetary policy). 
 
• To co-ordinate the general economic     
   policies of the Member States. 
 
• Economics or Finance Minister from 
   each Member State (or a representative  
   authorized to bind the government of  
   that Member State). 
 
• The European Commission shall be  
   invited. 
 
• The ECB shall be invited in cases where  
   it exercises its right of initiative, or when  
   the EU Council is discussing matters  
   relating to the objectives and tasks of the  
   ESCB. 
 
Eurogroup 
(established 1998) 
 
•To provide a forum for discussion among 
  Ministers on issues connected with “their 
  shared specific responsibilities for the  
  single currency”. 
 
• Economics or Finance Ministers of the 
  Member States participating in the euro  
  area. 
 
• The European Commission, and the ECB 
   when appropriate, are invited to take part  
   in the meetings. 
Economic and 
Financial 
Committee 
(established 1999) 
  
• To keep under review the economic and 
   financial situation of the Member States  
   and of the European Community and to  
   report regularly thereon to the EU  
   Council and to the European  
   Commission, in particular on 
   financial relations with third countries  
   and international institutions. 
 
• To deliver opinions at the request of the  
   EU Council or of the European  
   Commission, or on its own initiative for  
   submission to those institutions. 
 
• To contribute to the work of the ECOFIN 
   Council and to carry out other advisory  
   tasks assigned to it by the EU Council. 
 
• To examine, at least once every year, the 
   situation regarding the movement of  
   capital and the freedom of payments. 
 
• The Member States, the European 
   Commission and the ECB are each 
   represented by two members. 
 
• The two members appointed by the  
   Member States shall be selected  
   respectively from among senior officials  
   from the administration and the national  
   central bank. 
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Economic Policy 
Committee 
(established 1974) 
 
• To contribute to the preparation of the  
   work of the EU Council by providing  
   analyses, opinions on methodologies  
   and draft formulations for policy  
   recommendations, particularly on  
   policies for improving growth potential  
   and employment. 
 
• To provide advice to the European 
   Commission and the EU Council. 
 
• To provide a framework for  
   Macroeconomic Dialogue at the  
   technical leve. 
 
• The Member States, the European 
   Commission and the ECB are each  
   represented by no more than four  
   members. 
 
Macroeconomic 
Dialogue 
(established 1999) 
 
• To exchange information and opinions  
   on how to design a macroeconomic  
   policy in order to contribute towards  
   higher levels of employment on the  
   basis of strong, noninflationary, growth. 
 
• The Member States are represented by a 
   ministerial “Troika” from the current, 
   subsequent and preceding presidencies, 
   selected from the ECOFIN and Social  
   Affairs Council. 
 
• The European Commission, the ECB and  
   a non-euro area national central bank  
   also participate. 
 
• The social partners are represented by  
   EU level federations of employers and  
   trade unions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Level of ECB 
participation 
Frequency of meetings/ 
subgroups 
Other observations Body/ 
forum 
President or Vice- 
President; other 
members of the 
Executive Board report 
on specific topics 
 
•  Hearings of the ECB before the 
   Economic and Monetary Affairs 
   Committee in principle four times 
   a year. 
 
•  Presentation of the ECB’s Annual 
   Report to a plenary session. 
 
•  ECB officials can be invited     
   before a parliamentary committee 
   whenever a need arises. 
 
Monetary dialogue between the  
ECB and the European Parliament  
is a core element in the process of 
holding the ECB accountable. 
 
European 
Parliament 
 
President/Vice- 
President, or, 
exceptionally, other 
members of the 
Executive Board of 
the ECB 
 
• Usually once a month. 
 
• Twice-yearly informal meetings, 
   national central banks, the ECB  
   and the European Commission are 
   invited. 
 
• Various sub-structures,   
  Committee of Permanent    
  Representatives  (COREPER) and  
  working groups. 
The ECOFIN Council is one of the 
compositions of the EU Council. 
Generally, the EU Council is the 
main legislator at the European level, in 
many cases in co-decision with the 
European Parliament. 
 
EU Council 
(ECOFIN) 
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President and Vice- 
President, or, 
exceptionally, other 
Executive Board 
members 
 
• Usually once a month, before the 
   ECOFIN meetings. 
 
The Eurogroup is an informal entity 
which was established on the basis 
of a Resolution of the 1997 
Luxembourg European Council. 
The Eurogroup has no legal basis 
in the Treaty and has, as such, no 
legislative powers. 
 
Eurogroup 
 
Vice-President, and 
a member of the 
Executive Board; two 
senior staff members 
act as alternates. 
 
• Usually once a month. 
 
• Sub-structures include committee  
   of alternates and various working 
   groups (e.g. Financial Experts 
   Group; Working Group on EU 
   Government Bonds and Bills; 
   Working Group on Statistics; 
   Euro-Coins Subcommittee) which 
   meet to prepare EFC meetings. 
 
Successor to the Monetary 
Committee (established 1958). 
Provides the main framework within 
which the dialogue between the EU 
Council and the ECB can be 
prepared and continued at the level 
of senior officials from ministries, 
national central banks, the European 
Commission and the ECB. 
 
Economic and 
Financial 
Committee 
 
3 ECB staff members 
 
• Usually once a month. 
 
• Various subgroups (e.g. a working 
   group on structural reform 
   indicators) meet to prepare EPC 
   meetings. 
 
Work focuses mainly on structural 
issues. 
 
Organises an annual in-depth review of 
structural reforms in the Member 
States; the resulting Annual Report on 
Structural Reforms feeds into the 
elaboration of the Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines. 
 
Economic Policy 
Committee 
 
President or Vice- 
President and one 
accompanying person 
 
• Twice a year (spring and autumn). 
 
• The Macroeconomic Dialogue at 
   the technical level prepares 
   meetings at the political level. 
 
• A steering committee provides 
   support. 
 
The Macroeconomic Dialogue is 
otherwise known as the “Cologne 
process”. It forms part of the 
European Employment Pact and 
is intended to complement the 
“Luxembourg process” (employment 
policy strategy) and the “Cardiff 
process” (reform of capital and product 
markets). 
 
Macroeconomic 
Dialogue 
 
Table 2: ECB Participation in Community Fora and Bodies 
Source: ECB Monthly Bulletin, October 2000. 
 
The monetary policy is a competence of the Community, while the Member States are 
responsible for the economic policy289. 
 
4.8.3.3. The Optimal ECB Design 
 
Some important aspects to be taken into consideration when designing a central bank are the 
number of people that should be responsible for monetary policy decisions, the weight given 
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to central vs. regional (or sectoral) representation in decision-making and whether regions (or 
sectors) should be represented according to their economic weight290. 
 
Regarding the size, some economists think that the decision-making process is best when 
taking place in groups, because information is better processed291. 
 
Concerning centralization, there are different opinions. Some economists think that the 
consequences of a strong representation of regional interests are inefficiencies in policy 
making292. Others view the regional representation within the Council as being positive, 
because economic information is mostly regional and as a result the precision with which 
economic data is analyzed can be increased293. 
 
Another significant aspect is central vs. regional representation and how to deal with shocks 
to national preferences. Some economists suggest flexible majority rules for committee 
decisions, and majority requirements for policy proposals determined by national shocks294. 
Other economists propose a higher transparency of committee decisions with the consequence 
of decreasing incentives for regionally biased policies295. Another opinion is that rotation 
schemes would reduce the impact of regional preference shocks and would contribute to the 
stabilization of output and inflation in the currency union296. 
 
There was a reform of the ECB statute in 2003, according to which the number of voting seats 
of national representatives will be maximal 15 and the number of voting members of the 
Executive Board will be limited to 6. In spite of this aspect the size of the ECB Governing 
Council will remain problematic297 (because the decision making process is difficult when the 
number of members remains high). 
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A benefit of centralization is a less volatile monetary policy, because of the fewer members 
appointed at regional level and due to the fewer changes of the committee’s median voter. 
Another benefit consists in the absence of a regional bias in the decision-making process298. 
However, there are also costs as a result of decreasing the voting rights of regional 
representatives. One cost is the disadvantage of a lower number of veto players for the 
institutional independence of the ECB, because a higher regional representation reduces the 
possibility of political influences by governments. A second cost is related to the loss of 
information, because much of it comes from the regional level and regional representatives 
can provide a good understanding of regional developments299.  
 
If the assumptions are that regions differ as to the economic and preference perspective and 
that their representatives show signs of “home bias”, a misrepresentation of economic size 
will lead to decisions that are not first-best. An example could be a small region which is 
overrepresented and has inflation below the weighted inflation average of the area. In this 
situation, the majority of members could vote for a more expansionary policy. If the regional 
representation is exactly according to the region’s economic weight, regional bias can be 
avoided. About the accountability and credibility, some economists argue that: “considerable 
loss of current EMU-members’ influence power especially in favor of joining Central Eastern 
European Countries (CEECs) results in a loss of monetary credibility of the ECB: As 
transparency of the decision-making process within the ECB is lacking, markets may consider 
the ECB to be too much inclined to the economic performances of the CEECs300.” There are, 
however, also benefits of misrepresentation, e. g. the principle “one region, one vote” that 
favors political stability301.  
 
According to the 2003 reform of the ECB statute, the number of national central bank 
governors with voting rights in the Governing Council will be limited to 15. There will also 
be an asymmetric rotation scheme concerning the exercise of voting rights by governors, once 
EMU membership exceeds the number of votes. Two or three groups, according to the size of 
the countries, will be formed - out of which governors will rotate into a limited number of 
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voting seats. Larger countries will have more voting rights302. All representatives of national 
central banks will participate in the Governing Board meetings. The regional representation in 
the Governing Council will be about 70 percent of voting rights303. 
 
The situation concerning the centralization and representation in the ECB could, however, be 
further improved. Some economists argue that the optimal size of the ECB Governing Board 
would be of maximum around 20 members. Concerning the regional representation in the 
Bundesbank and Fed, it is about 40-50 percent, which is considerably lower than expected for 
the ECB after the reform of its statute. The optimal degree of representation in the euro area 
would be according to GDP shares of the member countries304. 
 
4.8.3.4. The ECB and the Euro Area Enlargement 
 
A study of euro zone member countries for the period 1999 to 2005 shows that there is no 
convincing evidence that country-specific economic developments influence the decisions of 
the ECB Governing Council. However, some factors that seem to have an effect on these 
decisions are the maximum inflation rate and the minimum economic sentiment305 (meaning 
the investor confidence or economic expectations). This leads to the conclusion that new euro 
area member countries could influence ECB decisions if they provide the minimum or 
maximum inflation rate and economic sentiment306. 
 
Potential members from new EU countries also do not have a long history of central bank 
independence. A possibility is that central bankers of these countries will behave tough in 
order to prove their capability of conservative central banking. It is also possible that they will 
pursue a loose monetary policy and support fiscal policy307. 
 
Many officials and part of the economists think that a nominal and real convergence of new 
members to present member countries would be necessary in order to have successful 
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integration. With diverse members, it will be difficult for the ECB to pursue its goals, and the 
monetary policy will be unable to react to national idiosyncratic shocks. 
 
Another possible consequence of an EMU enlargement is that ECB decisions become less 
predictable as a result of the larger ECB council, in spite of the reform of the ECB statute308. 
 
4.8.3.5. The Accountability of the ECB 
 
The accountability of the ECB is weak because of the absence of strong European political 
institutions that could control the performance of the ECB and as a result of the vagueness of 
the Maastricht Treaty in defining the objectives of the ECB (except for the price stability). 
 
This lack of formal accountability could be compensated by informal accountability, this 
means by greater transparency. An important measure that has been taken in this direction is 
the publication of policies of the ECB, explained in detail, in a Monthly Bulletin. The ECB 
President also explains the reasons for decisions taken during each monthly meeting of the 
Governing Council concerning monetary policy309. The minutes of the meetings of the 
Governing Council and the voting record of the members of the Board are not published 
because it is forbidden by the Treaty310. 
 
4.8.3.6. ECB Communication 
 
There are different reasons why communication is useful for central banks. Firstly, it 
influences expectations and thus it improves the effectiveness of policy and the overall 
performance of the economy311. Secondly, as a result of communication the noise in financial 
markets could be reduced and the predictability of central bank actions increased312. Thirdly, 
the communication is important from the perspective of the accountability of the central bank. 
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The independence of the central bank has increased over time as well as the necessity to 
explain its decisions313.  
 
There are, however, various difficulties in ECB communication. A reason is that the ECB is 
relatively young and has a culturally heterogeneous staff and Council which often make 
contradictory statements314. Another reason is that economists sometimes do not have a good 
understanding of the policy of the ECB, as its monetary policy strategy differs from that of 
other central banks, as it pursues monetary and inflation goals315. Finally, there are different 
cultures, languages, traditions and motives that influence the ways ECB messages are 
interpreted by the media316. 
 
As a result of the multi-country, multicultural and multilingual context as well as of the 
multiple central banking traditions in the euro area, there are important differences in the 
accuracy of economic agents in forecasting monetary policy decisions of the ECB317. A 
reason for these differences is related to geography. Thus, the accuracy tends to improve for 
financial institutions headquartered in Frankfurt or having a subsidiary there, because of the 
fact that the ECB and the Bundesbank (which was the model of the ECB) have their 
headquarters in Frankfurt and as a result of the close informational hub. Analysts based in 
London/United Kingdom also show good performances318. A second reason for these 
differences consists of macroeconomic conditions, as predictions are less accurate in countries 
where inflation and unemployment levels are not according to the euro area average. A third 
aspect that determines these differences is history, meaning that countries with high central 
bank independence make better forecasts. Some geographic differences, however, tend to 
become lower over time, as an effect of learning319.  
 
Communication is very important for conducting the monetary policy by the ECB. Central 
banks usually do have control only over the overnight interest rate, but they intend to 
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influence asset prices and interest rates at all maturities. In order to achieve these goals, 
effective communication has a significant role. In this sense, important aspects are the media 
coverage and thus the audience reached by the central bank, as well as the favorableness of 
the discussions of ECB monetary policy with an influence upon the credibility and the 
effectiveness of the bank. Usually, press discussions are critical if ECB decisions are poorly 
understood, if they come as a surprise for markets and if the inflation rate exceeds 2%320. A 
factor that determines more favorable media reports is that the ECB makes inflation and 
output projections public on a quarterly basis instead of once per year, as it was the situation 
between 1999 and 2002. The fact that the meetings of the ECB Governing Council and the 
press conference afterwards are held outside Frankfurt twice a year is also viewed as positive. 
National biases, however, do not influence the discussions in national media coverage321.  
 
The ECB communication has an influence upon the term structure of interest rates in the 
medium run over a horizon between five month and one year. Financial agents expect to be 
informed in advance about changes in ECB interest rates, although the exact timing is less 
foreseeable322. Communication by ECB officials also influences the level and the volatility of 
the exchange rate323 and the short-term money interest rates324. As a consequence, improving 
the credibility and transparency of the central bank can enhance monetary policy and 
welfare325. A higher credibility also leads to lower interest rates in the euro area326. Too much 
transparency, however, could have negative effects for the monetary policy in the case of 
deviations from the target327. 
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4.8.3.7. The supervision of the banking sector 
 
Article 105 of the Maastricht Treaty provides: 
5. The ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the 
competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and 
the stability of the financial system. 
 
A potential problem in the euro area is that the supervision of the banking system was not 
centralized at the level of the currency union. This could cause difficulties in preventing and 
managing financial crises328.  
 
In the euro area there is the principle of home country control, which means that 
responsibility for the supervision of banks is entrusted to the authorities of the country where 
the banks have their head office. Another principle is the host country responsibility, which 
states that the host country is responsible for financial stability in its own market. As a 
conclusion, the monetary policy is a competence of European institutions, while the banking 
supervision is a competence of nation-states329.   
 
A negative consequence of this situation could occur during a crisis, characterized by the 
failure of a bank with bad loans and a run on other banks by deposit-holders. Under these 
circumstances the central bank should lend to sound but illiquid banks (lender of last resort 
principle) and allow insolvent banks to fail or be restructured. The problem of the central 
bank could be to distinguish between illiquid and insolvent banks, especially if they do not 
obtain the necessary information from other EU countries’ authorities quickly. 
 
The solution would be to entrust the responsibility as the lender of last resort to the ECB. The 
supervision may be assigned to the ECB or to another European authority created for this 
purpose330.    
 
 
 
                                                 
328
 See De Grauwe (2005), p. 193. 
329
 See De Grauwe (2005), p. 190. 
330
 See De Grauwe (2005), p. 191. 
OCA Criteria                                                                     93 
 
 
4.8.4. The Reform Treaty (Treaty of Lisbon) and Further Possible 
Integration 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon or the Reform Treaty was signed on 13 December 2007 in Lisbon, 
Portugal. It provides a series of amendments to the Treaty of the European Union (or the 
Maastricht Treaty) and the Treaty establishing the European Community (Treaty of Rome), 
the latter being renamed Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. These two treaties 
will be the basis of the Union. It is planed that the Treaty of Lisbon will be ratified by all 
Member States by the end of 2008. 
 
There are measures included in the Reform Treaty in order to improve the functioning of the 
EU and EMU and that will probably increase the political integration and the capacity to react 
to foreign challenges. Thus, the European Central Bank will become an official institution331. 
There will be a President of the European Council, elected for a two and a half year term by a 
qualified majority among the members of the body332, instead of the President-in-office, who 
is the head of government or state of the country that holds the presidency of the EU and 
rotates every six months333. The Council of the European Union will be split in two separate 
institutions, e.g. the European Council which is a body of heads of Member States’ 
governments (the president or the prime minister), and the Council of Ministers which 
consists of the national ministers of specific departments334. A very important measure will be 
the creation of the position of a Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy335. The 
co-decision procedure between the Parliament and the Council will be extended to new areas 
of policy, but the number of MEPs will be permanently reduced to 750 plus the president336. 
The Court of Justice of the European Communities will be named ‘Court of Justice of the 
European Union’337. The Commission of the European Communities will be called ‘European 
Commission’ and the number of Commissioners will be reduced from 27 to 18338. The ‘High 
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Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’ will also be the Vice-
President of the Commission339.  
 
Some consider that the changes in foreign relations are the core changes in the treaty. The 
post of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the post of the 
European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy will 
merge. The ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’ will 
also be the Vice-President of the Commission and the administrator of the European Defense 
Agency and get a diplomatic corps. There will be a common defense for the EU when the 
European Council unanimously takes a decision in this sense340. 
 
The enlargement criteria will be stronger and countries that intend to join the EU will also 
have to adhere to its values. There will be an exit clause for member states that want to 
withdraw from the Union341. 
 
4.8.5. Solidarity vs. Nationalism 
 
The solidarity criterion states: “When the common monetary policy gives rise to conflicts of 
national interests, the countries that form a currency area need to accept the costs in the name 
of a common destiny”342.  
 
Political aspects are taken into consideration through this criterion. “Since none of the 
previous criteria is likely to be fully satisfied, no currency area is ever optimum. This is even 
true for individual countries which casually operate as currency areas”343. The results of the 
fact that the OCA criteria are not fully satisfied are political disagreements about the proper 
response even with symmetric shocks. The disagreements are more significant across regional 
areas with asymmetric or symmetric effects. The solidarity of people that form a union must 
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be increased in order to be able to tolerate such disagreements. Nationalism can lead to 
intransigent reactions344. 
 
The question that occurs is whether or how far citizens are willing to give up parts of their 
national sovereignties in pursuit of the common interest. In May and June 2005 (the time of 
negative referenda in France and the Netherlands) there was a public opinion pool for the 
whole union, where the following question was put: ”Are you, yourself, for the development 
towards a European political union”345? 58 percent of the answers were positive and 28 
percent negative while 11 percent of the respondents refused to state their opinion. Especially 
new member countries from the Baltic area are important opponents346.  
 
The conclusion is that the criterion of political integration is not fulfilled in EMU, although 
significant steps are planned and taken regarding the ECB and the other EU institutions347. An 
overall conclusion can be that “Europe may not be scoring very highly on this criterion, but 
nor is it badly failing”348. 
 
4.9. Homogeneous Preferences 
 
The homogeneity of preferences criterion states the following: “Currency union member 
countries must share a wide consensus on the way to deal with shocks”349.  
 
If there are symmetric shocks political conditions are important. A premise in order to have 
symmetric shocks that do not represent a problem is an agreement between all countries about 
how to act in case of shocks. Problems can be the choice between inflation and 
unemployment, or between weak exchange rates (favored by exporters) and strong exchange 
rates (preferred by consumers). Political parties, trade unions and lobbies deal with these 
tradeoffs. Sometimes the decisions across countries are not the same because of national 
preferences that are not always homogeneous.  
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There are redistributive effects of a shock because some groups lose and others may benefit. 
The political response depends on collective preferences. In a currency area the differences of 
domestic politics should not be too wide350. 
 
In Europe there are significant differences between countries, e.g. low-inflation in Germany 
and high-inflation in Italy or Greece, as well as different policy-making institutions (the 
executive and the parliament), and ideologies of political parties and trade unions. Important 
steps have been the development of common institutions, the discipline of monetary policy, 
the guarantee of macroeconomic stability, a European Central Bank strongly committed to 
price stability, and a not too high national deficit. However, sometimes there are frictions 
among the institutions.  
 
“We can conclude that there remains some heterogeneity among national preferences. This 
criterion is only partly fulfilled”351. 
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5. The Maastricht Criteria 
 
This chapter contains an overview of the Maastricht criteria, e.g. about inflation, the interest 
rate, the exchange rate, the deficit and the debt. These are obligatory conditions for the 
membership in the currency area EMU. The advantages and disadvantages of these criteria 
will be discussed. A significant issue, which is described in a section of this chapter, concerns 
the convergence between the economies of the original and the new EMU members, as a 
result of these imposed criteria. Different points of view are also presented regarding whether 
it is optimal to impose the fulfillment of the Maastricht criteria before the accession to the 
currency area EMU or afterwards. Finally, other aspects and possibilities of EU external 
cooperation and the particular situation of Italy and the UK are discussed. Some suggested 
measures that would probably increase the convergence and make EMU a more optimal 
currency area refer to an increasing economic and monetary cooperation and the improvement 
of the communication in the EU (e.g. dealing with challenges regarding the languages).  
 
Before becoming members of the European Monetary Union, EU member countries must 
satisfy certain convergence criteria, e.g.: 
1. The country’s inflation rate in the year before admission must be no more than 1.5 
percent above the average rate of the three EU member states with lowest 
inflation. 
2. The country must have maintained a stable exchange rate within the ERM without 
devaluing on its own initiative. 
3. The country must have a public-sector deficit no higher than 3 percent of its GDP 
(excepting temporary and exceptional circumstances). 
4. The country must have a public debt that is below or approaching a reference level 
of 60 percent of its GDP. 
 
The convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 can be divided into: 
1. monetary convergence criteria and 
2. fiscal convergence criteria. 
 
The monetary convergence criteria concern: 
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1. price stability; 
2. the exchange rate; 
3. the long-term interest rates. 
 
The fiscal convergence criteria concern: 
1. the avoidance of an excessive deficit; 
2. the avoidance of an excessive debt. 
 
There is an ongoing monitoring of the deficit and debt criteria by the European Commission 
even after the country becomes an EMU member. Countries that do not manage to respect 
these rules regarding the deficit and debt are confronted with penalties352. 
 
In addition to the Maastricht Treaty, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was negotiated in 
1997 by European leaders in order to achieve tighter fiscal conditions, and to convince voters 
in EU countries that the new system would provide low inflation. It sets out “the medium-
term budgetary objective of positions close to balance or in surplus”353. However, because 
some EU countries did violate the provisions of the SGP, it has not been put into practice, and 
it was also weakened in 2005354.  
 
The Maastricht criteria were introduced in order to achieve nominal convergence and to 
reduce asymmetric shocks and disparities between EMU countries. As a result, the countries 
lost some flexibility of economic policy and the control over exchange rate and monetary 
policy (to the ECB). The fiscal policy is the only independent policy of EMU member states, 
but even this is restricted by the SGP. The purpose of this pact is to achieve balanced public 
finances, to avoid inflationary pressure and to have a significant economic growth in the euro 
zone. The medium-term scope is to achieve higher budget flexibility in order to be able to 
deal with asymmetric shocks and recession355. 
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“The public sector has played a critical role in the development of employment and 
competitiveness”356. Two perspectives on fiscal policy can be differentiated: according to the 
Musgrave public-finance view, the state corrects market failures, while the Buchanan public-
choice view considers that the state operates in the interest of specific groups. The European 
fiscal policy is characterized by three phases: 
(1) the postwar “golden age”; high growth and low unemployment supported 
complementary state-economy relations; 
(2) the phase of slower GDP growth, lower unemployment rates and thus rising public 
expenditure that led to higher social insurance contributions and taxes and with 
negative impact on investments. The solution under these circumstances are according 
to Buchanan fiscal discipline and limiting policy-makers’ discretions; 
(3) fiscal rules in the Maastricht Treaty and SGP357.  
 
The opt-out is the right to remain for an undetermined time outside the EMU. Great Britain 
and Denmark have this right, new EU member states do not. 
 
5.1. Inflation 
 
According to the Maastricht convergence criteria, “the country’s inflation rate in the year 
before admission must be no more than 1.5 percent above the average rate of the three EU 
member states with the lowest inflation”358.  
 
The fact that inflation was included in the Maastricht criteria shows its significance. It is 
relevant for the OCA theory because an OCA criterion consists in the similarity of inflation 
rates, something that must be already achieved when the countries become EMU members, as 
a result of this Maastricht criterion imposed for EMU membership. Some economists consider 
that if the inflation criterion were the only required Maastricht convergence criterion and if 
candidate countries satisfied this criterion, they automatically would have met the other 
four359. Price stability (an inflation rate below or about 2 percent) is the main target of the 
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ECB, so that countries must take measures in order to make the maintenance of a low 
inflation rate possible, even after they become EMU members. Price stability leads to 
economic growth, while inflation determines “uncertainty, arbitrary redistribution of wealth, 
distortionary effects in resource allocation away from most productive activities” 360. Low 
inflation can, however, have positive effects by increasing output and reducing 
unemployment361. 
 
The following table shows that the measures of inflation presented, which are the private 
consumption deflator, the GDP deflator and the HIPC (harmonized indices of consumer 
prices, which measures the changes over time in the prices of consumer goods and services 
acquired by households), indicate that price stability (an inflation rate of below or about 2 
percent) can be expected to be achieved until 2009 in the euro area. Countries in the EU make 
permanent efforts to fulfill this goal, and thus to satisfy the OCA criterion of similarities of 
inflation rates, resulting in the relatively low level of inflation of the EU27. Factors that have 
an important role for the inflation target (e.g. the compensation per employee, the unit labor 
costs and the import prices of goods) also show levels that permit the maintenance and the 
achievement of a low inflation in the euro area and in the EU respectively.  
 
                
Inflation outlook – euro area and EU27         
(Annual percentage change) 
Euro area 
      Difference vs 
      spring 2007 EU27 
    Difference vs 
    spring 2007 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008
Private consumption deflator 2.2 1.9 2.0 2.0
 
0.1 0.2 2.2 2.4 1.7 2.1  0.2 -0.3
GDP deflator 1.9 2.2 2.1 2.0 0.1 0.2 2.1 2.8 1.9 2.2  0.2 -0.2
HICP 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.0 0.1 0.2 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.2  0.1  0.3
Compensation per employee 2.4 2.6 3.1 2.8 0.2 0.3 2.7 3.0 3.6 3.4 -0.1  0.3
Unit labour costs 1.0 1.4 1.8 1.5 0.2 0.2 1.2 1.7 2.1 1.8  0.2  0.3
Import prices of goods 4.5 1.3 1.3 1.1 0.6 0.0 4.1 1.5 1.2 1.2  0.5 -0.1
Table 3: Inflation Outlook – Euro Area and EU27  
Source: Economic Forecast, Autumn 2007. 
 
                                                 
360
 See Zestos (2006), p.58. 
361
 See Zestos (2006), p.58. 
The Maastricht Criteria                                                                     101 
 
 
In August 2007 there was the first time after 1999 when inflation rates (the HICP inflation) 
were below 2% in the EMU for a period of twelve consecutive months. Especially oil and 
commodity prices have increased. There is also an upward pressure on prices of agricultural 
and food products. Significant attenuating factors are the strong euro, the small share of 
imported agricultural goods and protection of domestic agricultural markets. The prices for 
processed food and services also increased. The reasons for these developments were 
adverse weather conditions, the increasing world switch to bio-fuels and the higher incomes 
in emerging economies. The services inflation also increased because this sector is more 
sheltered from foreign competition362. Inflation for non-energy industrial goods has been 
mostly steady. However, this can be explained by aggressive seasonal discounting in July 
especially in clothing and footwear. Inflation for imported consumer goods has declined as a 
result of the appreciation of the euro. This offsets the effects of inflationary pressure caused 
by the historically high levels of capacity utilization rates in manufacturing. Inflation for 
intermediate goods remains at an elevated level, while inflation in industrial consumer goods 
increased because of an upward pressure on producer prices for consumer food items. 
 
Wages are at moderate levels. Unemployment declines at levels not seen for the last 20 years. 
Labor productivity increased, but at a decelerated level363. 
 
The consumer inflation perception rose, especially because of the increase of oil prices and 
of the prices for bread, cereals, milk and fruits. 
 
The expectations for 2008 and 2009 are of an inflation of about 2 percent in EMU (the annual 
HICP inflation), and at 2.4 percent in 2008 and 2.2 percent in 2009 in the EU. Especially the 
oil price is very high. The expected annual rate of increase of import prices is below 1 ½ 
percent in 2007-08 and about 1 percent in 2009.  
 
The inflation expectations for different European countries in 2008 and 2009 are: 
- in Germany and France (the lowest inflation rates in the euro area): 1 ½ percent; 
- in Greece, Spain and Slovenia (the highest rate): around 3 percent; 
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- in Baltic countries, and Bulgaria (the highest in the EU): 5-6 percent364. 
 
The situation in some new EU states (e.g. Romania and Bulgaria) and in EU candidate 
countries (e.g. Croatia and Turkey) concerning inflation is presented in the following 
paragraphs: 
 
Romania 
In 2006 there was a steady disinflation process. The disinflation stagnated in the first two 
quarters of 2007 and reversed in August and September because of increasing food prices 
after the higher world food prices and the depreciation of the RON (Romanian currency) since 
August 2007. The projected inflation for 2008 is 5 ½ percent because of rising international 
fuel and commodity prices. In 2009 the inflation will probably be around 4 ½ percent. 
Aspects that will put upward pressure on inflation will be a fiscal stimulus, credit growth and 
increasing wages365. 
 
Bulgaria 
Inflation was around 4 ½ percent in the first half of 2007 and is expected to be at around 6-7 
percent in 2008 and 2009. Excise duties increased and contributed to lower inflation (because 
demand for import products decreased). Reasons for inflation pressures are increases in food 
prices, higher demand and wages366. 
 
Croatia 
The general index of consumer prices is estimated to decrease from 3.2 percent in 2006 to 3 
percent in 2008 and 2009, despite the higher agricultural and food prices367. 
 
Turkey 
The inflationary pressure will decline because of fiscal discipline and the increasing 
credibility of the Central Bank’s disinflation targets. The 12-months consumer price inflation 
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is estimated at below 6 percent by the end of 2008 and 4 ½ percent at the end of 2009. The 
disinflation could be slower as a result of high oil and food prices368. 
 
The aforementioned data represent estimations that have not taken into consideration the 
possibility of a crisis. The current developments suggest that these numbers should be viewed 
with caution. 
 
The overall conclusion is that the obligation of EU countries to adhere to EMU (an exception 
being the UK and Denmark), and to satisfy the Maastricht inflation criterion, determine a 
tendency towards convergence between present and future EMU member countries and the 
fulfillment of the OCA criterion regarding similar inflation rates. A permanent preoccupation 
with factors that influence the inflation level as well as with measures to maintain price 
stability can be observed in euro area countries. EMU candidates make efforts to reduce 
inflation and to attain price stability. 
5.2. Interest Rates  
 
According to the Maastricht convergence criteria the long-term interest rate must be no more 
than 2 percentage points above the average interest rate of the three EU countries with the 
lowest inflation rates in the year prior to the examination. The measure for the long-term 
interest rate is given by the 10-year government bond yield369.  
 
It is very important that interest rates are set by also taking into consideration the goal of low 
inflation in the EMU. Only in this way the fulfillment of the OCA criteria of similar inflation 
rates and homogeneous preferences is possible in the euro zone.  
 
The long-term interest rate is related to expected inflation. The Irving Fisher equation is:  
i = r + πe; i = long-term interest rate; r = real interest rate, depends on personal saving and 
productivity of capital and is relatively stable; πe = expected inflation, related to present and 
past inflation. Low expected inflation results in low long-term interest rate370. 
                                                 
368
 European Commission Economic Forecast (2007), p. 118. 
369
 See Zestos (2006), p.209 f. 
370
 See Zestos (2006), p. 67. 
The Maastricht Criteria                                                                     104 
 
 
 
In Bulgaria the interest rates were 74.2 percent in 1997, 3.9 percent in 2000, 4.0 percent in 
2002 and 2.6 percent in 2004371. In August 2007 the overnight interest rate was 4.04 percent 
and in August 2008 5.04 percent372. In Romania the interest rates were 47.2 percent in 1997, 
35.0 percent in 2000, 20.4 percent in 2002 and 20.2 percent in 2004373. Now, in 2008, the 
NBR’s policy rate is 10.25 percent, the lending facility is at 14.25 percent and the deposit 
facility at 6.25 percent374. In Croatia, in 2008, the interest rates for overnight loans in direct 
interbank trading are 3.90 percent, for long-term corporate loans 6.83 percent, for long-term 
loans to households 7.79 percent and for short-term loans to households 12.16 percent375. In 
Turkey, in 2008, the borrowing rate represents 16.75 percent and the lending rate 20.25 
percent. A rate cut in the overnight interest rate is projected in Turkey if the favorable outlook 
in inflation and commodity prices continues376. 
  
In Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Turkey the tendency was and is of decreasing and 
maintaining sustainable low interest rates, as well as of higher predictability and of an 
improving investment climate. Lower interest rates lead to more investments and imports and 
the economy is recovering. The lower interest rates are the result of an increasing market 
confidence and a prudential fiscal policy. 
 
5.3. Exchange Rate 
 
The Maastricht exchange rate criterion provides that all EMU candidate countries must 
maintain their currencies within the +-2.25 percent ERM normal band for at least two years 
without devaluing their currencies377. A reason for this criterion is to determine countries to 
pursue price stability. In high inflation countries there is a depreciation of their currencies vis-
à-vis currencies of low inflation countries. Only by also satisfying this provision of the 
Maastricht Treaty, the OCA criteria of similar (and low) inflation rates and homogenous 
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preferences can be achieved. Another reason is the avoidance of devaluations during the 
transitional period to EMU in order to gain a competitive advantage378.  
 
There are several requirements to be fulfilled before EU countries become EMU member 
states. They must adopt measures and policies to transform their economies into efficient 
market economies and achieve nominal convergence through the Maastricht criteria. All new 
EU member states must join the ERM II (meaning that exchange rate agreements subsequent 
to the ERM were and are made with countries wishing to join the euro area) and be members 
for at least two years before being allowed to adopt the euro. The central exchange rate versus 
the euro must be agreed upon by all parties to the agreement before the country joins ERM II. 
Countries can adopt different types of exchange rate strategies before becoming ERM II 
members, but there are also some restrictions. Thus, a country cannot peg the currency to any 
currency other than the euro and it cannot adopt the euro as the national currency on its own 
(by euroization) before being first ERM II members for at least two years. After becoming 
ERM II members, periodical realignments of its currency and the use of short-term financing 
facilities of the ECB to stabilize their currencies are allowed379.  
 
The Governing Council recommends that countries should join ERMII only after having 
achieved significant convergence and flexibility of their economies (e. g. by structural and 
institutional changes, market and trade liberalization). The purpose is to avoid exchange rate 
crises380. 
 
A fluctuation of the exchange rate outside the normal ERM fluctuation band of +-2.25% is not 
always evaluated as failure to fulfill the exchange rate criterion. A deviation in excess of the 
normal fluctuation band towards a stronger exchange rate is not inconsistent with the 
fulfillment of the exchange rate criterion381. Thus, aspects that are taken into consideration 
when analyzing whether a country fulfills this criterion are the duration of the deviation, its 
amplitude and its direction (whether it is on the weak or strong side of the band)382. 
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The exchange rate regimes chosen by some countries are: 
1. in Bulgaria: fixed exchange rate, fixed peg to the euro (currency board); 
2. in Romania, Croatia and Turkey: managed floating, i.e. the countries do not fix their 
currencies against another foreign currency or basket of currencies, and the value is 
determined on the foreign exchange market freely383. 
 
“A currency board arrangement may be defined as a monetary regime based on an explicit 
legislative commitment to exchange domestic currency for a specified foreign currency at a 
fixed exchange rate”384. A main benefit of the currency board arrangement (CBA) consists in 
the enhanced credibility and policy transparency. Domestic currency must remain fully 
backed by foreign assets. The policy discretion of the central bank is limited and changes in 
the money demand are accommodated by changes in foreign exchange reserves. Interest rate 
movements show the adjustment of the local market to monetary conditions prevailing in the 
reserve currency country. If the level of the fixed nominal exchange rate is appropriate, it can 
contribute to solid economic growth and an improved quality of bank loans. The CBA is 
operationally and administratively simple and transparent385. CBAs can help overcome 
economic and financial turmoil and lead to lower inflation. They can also lead to stability 
gains. A sustainable debt level and fiscal discipline are conditions for success386. With a CBA, 
the risk of currency devaluation is eliminated387. According to Wyplosz (2004), the 
advantages of currency boards are: they are robust, credible and inflation becomes 
endogenous. Disadvantages consist in: the elimination of the ability of lender of last resort 
operations, the fact that the central bank cannot conduct counter cyclical policies and that it is 
only a temporary arrangement in need for an exit strategy388. A significant condition required 
for a proper functioning of the CBA in Europe is the support of the ECB and the European 
Council. Another important aspect is that the economic policy is not entirely shielded from 
external and internal shocks389. 
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With managed floating, the “central banks simultaneously control the interest rate and the 
exchange rate in a way that guarantees both the achievement of domestic macroeconomic 
objectives and an equilibrium on the international financial markets”390. Different opinions 
about the advantages and disadvantages of the managed floating regime exist among 
economists. Haberler showed that floating rates protect against the transmission of monetary 
shocks. He later renounced advocating floating exchange rates and worked with Nurkse, who 
thought that a managed fixed rate system would reduce the probability of speculative 
attacks391. 
 
Usually “Big Bang” countries in Europe (according to whom “front-loading”, thus taking 
measures as soon as possible, was highly desirable) chose limited exchange rate flexibility. In 
countries with flexible exchange rates the inflation was often high and an absence of 
macroeconomic stabilization as well as a low credibility could be observed392. 
 
States that intend to adhere to the EMU make, however, permanent efforts to reduce high 
currency fluctuations independently from the exchange rate regime chosen and move towards 
more economic stability. 
 
5.4. Deficit and Debt 
 
The requirements regarding deficit and debt are: “The country must have a public-sector 
deficit no higher than 3 percent of its GDP (except in exceptional and temporary 
circumstances). The country must have a public debt that is below or approaching a reference 
level of 60 percent of GDP”393. 
 
Fiscal discipline is significant (also from the perspective of the OCA theories) for preserving 
similar and low inflation rates in the EMU. The fact that these criteria must be satisfied also 
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after the countries become EMU members could determine a higher fulfillment of the OCA 
criterion of homogeneous preferences. 
 
The next table shows the situation of gross debt as a percentage of GDP in the euro area as 
well as for the EU 27. Important factors analyzed that are significant for the gross debt are for 
example the total expenditure and the interest expenditure. These figures show a slight 
decrease in the euro area. The conclusion is that the gross debt as a percentage of GDP is 
expected to decrease in the euro area and represent 63.4 percent in 2009, while the gross debt 
for the EU 27 is projected to be even lower and reach 57 percent by the end of 2009. 
According to the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact, member countries as 
well as candidates to EMU must have a public debt below or approaching 60 percent of the 
GDP.  
 
               
General government budgetary position – euro area and EU27        
(% of GDP) 
Euro area 
      Difference vs 
      spring 2007                       EU27 
    Difference vs 
  spring 2007 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008
Total revenue (1) 45.6 45.6 45.3 45.1  0.1 -0.1 44.9 44.9 44.6 44.5  0.0    -0.2 
Total expenditure (2) 47.1 46.4 46.2 46.0 -0.1  0.0 46.5 45.9 45.8 45.6 -0.2    -0.1 
Actual balance (3) = (1) - (2) -1.5 -0.8 -0.9 -0.8  0.2 -0.1 -1.6 -1.1 -1.2 -1.1  0.1    -0.2 
Interest expenditure (4)  2.9  2.9  2.8  2.8  0.0  0.0   2.6   2.5   2.6  2.5 -0.1     0.0 
Primary balance (5) = (3) + (4)  1.3  2.1  2.0  2.0  0.2  0.0   1.0   1.5   1.4  1.4  0.1    -0.2 
Cyclically adjusted budget balance -1.2 -0.7 -0.8 -0.7  0.1 -0.1 -1.4 -1.0 -1.1 -1.0  0.1    -0.2 
Cyclically adjusted primary balance  1.6  2.2  2.1  2.1  0.1 -0.1   1.2   1.5   1.5   1.6 -0.1    -0.2 
Structural budget balance -1.1 -0.7 -0.8 -0.7  0.1 -0.1 -1.4 -1.0 -1.1 -1.0  0.1    -0.2 
Change in structural budget balance  0.9  0.4 -0.1  0.1  0.1 -0.2   0.7   0.4 -0.1   0.1   0.2.    -0.3 
Gross debt 68.6 66.5 66.5 63.4 -0.3  0.0 61.4 59.5 58.3 57.0 -0.4     0.0 
 
The structural budget balance is the cyclically-adjusted budget balance net of one-off and other temporary measures estimated by 
the Commission services. 
Table 4: General Government Budgetary Position – Euro Area and EU27 
Source: Economic Forecast, Autumn 2007. 
 
The budgetary consolidation in the euro area will come to a halt in 2008-2009. The estimated 
general budget deficit represents 0.8 percent of GDP in the euro area (from 1.5 percent in 
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2006) and 1.1 percent of GDP in the EU (from 1.6 percent in 2006) in 2007. For 2008 
deterioration is expected because of no further fiscal and budgetary consolidation. In 2009 the 
deficit is expected to stabilize. 
 
The revenue-to-GDP ratio is expected to decrease gradually from 45.6 percent in 2007 to 45.1 
percent in 2009 in the euro area and from 44.9 percent in 2007 to 44.5 percent in 2009 in the 
EU, because taxes will increase less than nominal GDP. For the year 2008 tax reductions were 
projected for countries like Germany, France, Sweden and Poland. The expectations are of a 
lower expenditure ratio of 46.2 percent of GDP in 2008 and 46.0 percent in 2009 in the EMU, 
and of 45.8 percent in 2008 and 45.6 percent in 2009 in the EU394.  
 
The output gap (the difference between the actual output of an economy and the output it 
could achieve when it is most efficient or at full capacity) will stabilize from 2008 at around  
-¼ percent of potential GDP. The structural deficit will be of around ¾ percent of GDP in the 
euro area and of 1 percent in the EU in 2008 and 2009395. 
 
An analysis of the general government structural budget balance, which is presented in the 
following table, shows further improvement or at least efforts towards stabilization in most 
countries of the euro area as well as in countries outside the EMU. This situation can also 
contribute to maintaining low and similar inflation rates by EMU members as well as by 
countries who take measures in order to adhere to the euro zone. 
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General government structural budget balance 
(% of GDP) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Belgium 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0
Germany -2.4 -1.3 0.0 -0.4 -0.2
Ireland 1.0 3.1 1.2 0.3 0.0
Greece -5.5 -3.5 -3.1 -2.4 -2.3
Spain 1.4 2.1 2.0 1.6 1.4
France -3.5 -2.8 -2.5 -2.6 -2.4
Cyprus -2.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4
Italy -4.0 -2.7 -2.0 -2.0 -1.9
Luxembourg 0.6 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.7
Malta -3.1 -2.7 -2.3 -1.7 -1.2
The Netherlands 0.8 1.1 -0.2 0.5 0.7
Austria -0.9 -1.2 -1.0 -1.0 -0.8
Portugal -5.1 -2.9 -2.3 -2.1 -2.1
Slovenia -0.8 -1.1 -1.1 -1.4 -1.0
Finland 3.7 4.1 4.4 3.9 4.0
Euro area -2.1 -1.1 -0.7 -0.8 -0.7
Bulgaria 1.4 2.7 2.5 3.1 3.4
Czech Republic -2.2 -3.3 -4.1 -3.6 -3.2
Denmark 4.5 3.6 3.2 3.4 3.0
Estonia 1.7 2.7 2.4 1.9 1.5
Latvia -0.4 -0.8 0.2 0.5 1.0
Lithuania -0.8 -0.8 -1.2 -1.5 -0.6
Hungary -8.4 -9.4 -5.5 -4.2 -3.9
Poland -4.1 -3.9 -3.0 -3.4 -2.8
Romania -1.6 -2.6 -3.3 -3.6 -4.0
Slovakia -1.1 -3.4 -3.0 -2.7 -2.6
Sweden 2.1 2.1 2.7 2.3 2.6
United Kingdom -3.2 -2.8 -2.7 -2.8 -2.6
EU27 -2.1 -1.4 -1.0 -1.1 -1.0
Table 5: General Government Structural Budget Balance 
Source: Economic Forecast, Autumn 2007. 
 
“Debt maintains its downward path”396. In the year 2005 there was a peak of the debt ratio in 
EMU countries. The expectations between 2006 and 2009 are of a declining debt ratio by 
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more than 5 pps., to 63.4 percent of GDP. The situation of the developments of the debt ratios 
in the EU 27 is broadly similar. An exception from the decreasing trend can be observed in 
Ireland (between 2005 and 2006), while in France and Portugal only a small debt reduction is 
expected between 2006 and 2009. In Cyprus, Malta and Austria, the debt ratio should be 
lower than 60 percent of GDP by 2009, and in Germany the debt ratio will be of about 60.3 
percent of GDP also in 2009. Countries outside the EMU that are exceptions from a declining 
debt ratio are the Czech Republic, Romania and the UK, as well as Poland (between 2007 and 
2008). A peak of the debt ratio for the year 2008 has been expected in Hungary397.  
 
Fiscal Criteria in the EMU  
Very important aspects leading to fiscal convergence (and that could have a significance for 
increasing the fulfillment of the OCA criterion of homogenous preferences) are that all 
countries that want to become euro area members have to fulfill the fiscal criteria of the 
Maastricht Treaty, and that after they become euro area member states they have to comply 
with the Stability and Growth Pact. The economic integration in the euro area requires a 
harmonization in some areas of taxation, spending and fiscal legislation. However, there still 
are some significant differences between euro area countries, especially concerning the public 
indebtedness and the fiscal structures. 
 
Regarding fiscal stabilization, the medium-term targets of the Stability and Growth Pact are a 
balanced budget or even a budget surplus, in order to be able to react to adverse shocks and to 
reduce the necessity of supranational transfers, international risk sharing, changes in prices 
and wages and/or changes in real exchange rates398. 
 
The situation in the new EU member states (Romania and Bulgaria) and in two EU candidate 
countries (Croatia and Turkey) regarding fiscal convergence is the following: 
 
Romania 
The budget deficit which was 1.9 percent of GDP in 2006, is expected to increase to 3.2 
percent in 2008 and 3.9 percent in 2009, as a result of higher government consumption (e.g. 
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with public wages and social transfers). The pensions will almost double in 2008 and 2009 
compared with those in 2007. The pension reform is projected to cost 0.2 percent of GDP in 
2008 and 0.3 percent of GDP in 2009. The debt-to-GDP ratio is estimated to increase by 1 pp. 
between 2007 and 2009 to around 13 ½ percent, especially as a result of the higher deficits399. 
 
Bulgaria 
There was a budget surplus in 2007 due to a strong economic activity, high revenues because 
of the domestic demand, high inflation, improved tax compliance and a reduction of the 
informal economy. For 2008 and 2009 there is also an expectation of government surplus. 
The projected government gross debt will be lower than 15 percent of GDP400. 
 
Croatia 
There was a merchandise trade deficit of 24.7 percent of GDP and a surplus of trade in 
services of 16.9 percent of GDP in 2007. Net inflows of FDI (foreign direct investments) 
increased from 7.4 percent in 2006 to 9.1 percent of GDP in the twelve month to June 2007 
mainly because of privatization and recapitalization of banks. The government debt was 38 
percent of GDP at the end of June 2007. The expectations are of continuing growth in 2008 
and 2009 because of strong domestic demand. Factors that will lead to a significant private 
consumption growth are the strong credit growth, consumer confidence, higher wages and 
social transfers. The public consumption will also increase because of increases in public 
sector wages and pre-election spending. The strong private investor confidence will determine 
further investment growth. The gap between higher imports and lower exports will become 
smaller as a result of increased competitiveness and stronger tourism. The GDP growth is 
estimated to be lower in 2008 and to represent about 5 percent because of decelerated public 
consumption after the election. There are also central bank measures in order to restrict credit 
growth. The estimated trade deficit represents 24.5 percent of GDP. The current account 
deficit will be a little lower to 8 percent of GDP because of the better performance of 
tourism401. 
 
 
                                                 
399
 European Commission Economic Forecast (2007), p. 101. 
400
 European Commission Economic Forecast (2007), p. 55. 
The Maastricht Criteria                                                                     113 
 
 
 
Turkey 
There was a significant surplus of GDP in 2006 that led to a reduction of the debt ratio from 
60 ½ percent of GDP at the end of 2006 to 54 percent at the end of 2007. The government 
interest payments were 17 percent of GDP in 2003 and 7 percent of GDP in 2007. The 
efficiency of tax collection should be increased. In 2006 there was a surplus of the 
government balance of ½ percent of GDP, and the estimations for 2008 and 2009 are of a 
budgetary surplus of ¼ percent of GDP and 1 ¼ percent of GDP respectively. The 
government debt is expected to decrease to less than 50 percent in 2009. Turkey has a high 
vulnerability to interest and exchange volatility and risk, so it pays high interest rates. The 
average maturity of domestic debt is relatively short402. 
 
The overall conclusion is that the countries of the EMU make permanent efforts in order to 
fulfill the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty and of the Stability and Growth Pact, 
which are important in order to preserve low and similar inflation rates. The EMU and EU 
candidate countries also make efforts regarding the fulfillment of the fiscal convergence 
criteria. In the countries described that already belong to the EU, which are Romania and 
Bulgaria, the debt level is significantly lower than in the EU candidate countries Croatia and 
Turkey. Regarding the budget, a surplus can be observed in Bulgaria and Turkey, a relatively 
low budget deficit in Romania and a higher budget deficit in Croatia. 
 
All the projections presented in this chapter were formulated prior to the crisis 2008 and will 
probably be reconsidered to some extent following the current economic developments. 
 
The fiscal criteria must be fulfilled for countries which are EMU members or else there are 
penalties up to 0.5 percent of GDP. The SGP has been revised in order to allow more flexible 
rules and procedures, e.g. the deduction of a list of long-run growth-promoting expenses, a 
longer time span for correction of excess deficits, and a less stringent definition of recession 
that permits an exemption from excess deficit procedures403. A significant reason for the 
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weakening of the SGP is that important countries like Germany, Italy and France were 
confronted with excessive deficits. 
 
There have been mixed reactions to the reform of the SGP, because some measures do 
represent a risk for weakening the pact (according to the ECB point of view), while negative 
consequences for the expectations regarding fiscal discipline and macroeconomic stability are 
possible. There are also positive aspects of the reform of the SGP: the medium-term 
objectives reflect more the country-specific situations regarding debt and economic growth 
(preventive arm) and a higher flexibility of the rules (corrective arm)404. 
 
Factors that can explain the different deficits across countries are: 
- the real growth 
- the unemployment rate 
- political forces (partisan approach) 
- institutional structure (veto player approach). 
 
Research has shown that with a low number of veto players, meaning a high market 
concentration, there is a higher probability that left oriented governments will take long-term 
saving measures. In a system with a high number of veto players, which means that the 
political power is divided among a high number of actors, the right is more committed to the 
budget consolidation than the left405. However, when the right is expected to lose votes, it can 
accumulate debt in order to put the future government in the situation of paying back debt 
rather than increase social spending406. Hibbs showed that inflation is beneficial for groups 
with low income because it has an equalizing effect upon income distribution407. The income 
of poor people decreases when unemployment is higher. Groups with low and middle 
incomes (who are usually left oriented) prefer low unemployment and accept a higher 
inflation, while investors and persons with higher incomes (who are usually right oriented) 
favor the opposite situation408.   
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However, governments try to use fiscal policy in order to increase their chances before 
votes409, even if this means to increase the deficit and the debt of the country.  
 
Fiscal policy can be used in order to manage the economy under the premises of fixed 
exchange rates. Monetary policy is very important with flexible exchange rates410. As a 
consequence, the restrictions regarding the fiscal policy can be costly for the countries that 
also have to preserve exchange rate stability in the time before their accession to EMU.  
 
The 3 percent deficit criterion had positive consequences upon the economic growth which 
became higher than prior to the Maastricht criterion. A further reduction of the deficit and 
debt in the EMU could be reached through increasing public investments, lower expenditures 
and direct taxes411. 
 
Some of the most important reasons for excessive deficits in EU countries were the low 
economic growth, the timing of parliamentary elections and the majority of left oriented 
governments. Excessive deficits, however, could be reduced after the adoption of the 
Maastricht criteria. Important aspects that led to a reduction of excessive deficits were 
supranational fiscal restrictions, national measures in order to reduce public debt, policy 
decisions that encourage economic growth, mechanisms to reduce the political opportunism 
and the organizing of elections at the beginning or the end of the year in order to avoid 
political opportunism412.  
 
There are several factors that do influence the debt to GDP ratio of countries, e.g. the debt 
level, the economic growth rate and the willingness of governments to favor surplus. 
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The debt criterion is also very important in order to avoid the situation where countries 
generate inflation to reduce the real value of their debt and interest payments. Such a situation 
would determine higher interest rates for that state because of the higher risk413.  
 
5.5. Convergence 
 
The question of convergence in countries that have already fulfilled the Maastricht criteria 
and are EMU members as well as in countries that will adhere to the EMU is presented in this 
section. Then arguments in favor and against the imposed Maastricht criteria as optimal 
conditions for the accession to the EMU are detailed. As already mentioned, the fulfillment of 
the Maastricht convergence criteria is significant, especially for the satisfaction of the OCA 
properties of similar inflation rates and homogenous preferences. 
 
5.5.1. Convergence after Maastricht 
 
According to Bibow, some macroeconomic divergence occurred across the euro zone in 
recent years. The OCA theory assumes that the reasons are asymmetric shocks and structural 
factors. Another view is that the Maastricht regime determines divergence and fragility414. A 
reason for the last opinion is the reliance on the competitiveness channel as a substitute for the 
design of appropriate policies in order to deal with common shocks and/or asymmetric shocks 
and divergence415.  
 
Some differentials, however, are not necessarily viewed as undesirable. For instance, an ECB 
study shows why inflation differentials across countries may be beneficial: “Inflation 
differentials can be an integral part of the adjustment mechanism resulting from dispersion of 
economic developments across the participating countries, a mechanism which in turn reflects 
the impact of various economic shocks as well as the fact that the economic structures in 
place vary from country to country. Inflation differentials are, then, the product of an 
equilibrating adjustment process within a monetary union and, as such, are not only 
unavoidable, but also desirable. At the same time, lasting inflation differentials in the euro 
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area are to some extent, also a product of misaligned fiscal policies, diverging wage 
developments and deep-seated structural inefficiencies such as nominal and real rigidities in 
product and factor markets”416.  
 
Some test results show that countries which joined the ERM from the beginning and never 
defected from the narrow band are characterized by strong convergence with each other. The 
inflation is higher than the average euro zone inflation rates in countries that joined at a later 
stage (Spain, Portugal and Greece)417. 
 
5.5.2. Convergence in EMU Candidate Countries 
 
In order to achieve a price and output convergence between old and new EU member states, 
an inflation and growth divergence will be necessary during the following years. 
 
A study regarding the recent ten EU members, shows a slow but steady per-capita real income 
convergence towards EU standards. There is evidence for significant inflation and interest rate 
convergence. Concerning the public finances, the results indicate a lack of fiscal 
sustainability. As a consequence, the current fiscal situation could be a reason for the delay of 
new EU countries from joining ERM II and thus for a later adoption of the euro. The 
recommendations made were to improve the budget institutions in these countries, to 
introduce further reforms in order to reduce government expenditures and to analyze the 
possibilities for adopting fiscal rules. Countries with fiscal problems should, however, not try 
to join the euro zone too soon418.  
 
5.5.3. The Maastricht Conditions for EMU Membership 
 
According to traditional Keynesian macro-economy and OCA theory, there is the view that 
higher flexibility is required and that the convergence criteria and the Stability and Growth 
Pact are too strict. The reason is that restrictive fiscal policy is very expensive. 
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For representatives of economic policy and public choice the credibility is important. The 
strict convergence criteria also reduce the spill-over effects between different countries419. 
 
Fiscal policies of euro area member states can have an impact upon other member countries 
for several reasons. Fiscal policy effects include macroeconomic spill-over on other countries; 
e. g. expansionary fiscal policy determines higher interest rates and thus a higher credit risk 
for the entire area. Secondly, increasing interest rates as a result of fiscal policy could lead to 
pressure on the ECB to loosen monetary policy, in order to reduce interest rates. Thirdly, it is 
not sure that other countries will be ready to help if a state has very high debts and delays 
payments. As a consequence, it is very important that countries fulfill the Maastricht criteria 
before becoming EMU members in order to avoid negative effects upon other EMU member 
countries420.  
 
Some economists express the view that it would be better if the fiscal criteria had to be 
fulfilled during the first year of membership or when the membership is sure, and were not a 
condition for joining the EMU. The reason is that even with the provisions of the Stability and 
Growth Pact the fiscal criteria are very expensive. However, the EMU membership is of 
advantage for countries even if they must fulfill the fiscal criteria421.    
 
According to another opinion, the condition of a deficit below 3% before EMU membership is 
useful, because for countries that did not fulfill this criterion before the accession it will be 
more difficult to achieve it afterwards. A reason is that the country could have insufficient 
incentives to reduce the deficit later. A second motive is that by fulfilling this criterion a 
country proves that it has the necessary fiscal discipline in order to be an EMU member422. 
Thirdly, the possibilities of the central bank to keep inflation targets without permanent 
interventions are higher in a country than in a monetary union. Previous reduction of public 
deficits and inflation thus contributes to facilitate price stability423.     
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Other important reasons against a fast adoption of the euro are the low nominal and real 
interest rates within the ERM II systems that could increase demand and lead to high 
inflation424. 
 
5.6. Political Challenges 
 
The Maastricht criteria represent conditions for EMU membership. However, before countries 
become EMU members they have to belong to the EU. Political conditions for EU 
membership (like the guarantee of democracy) have to be fulfilled. Political requirements for 
EU membership can contribute to the improvement of the OCA criterion of political 
integration. Regarding the political aspects, efforts have to be made before and after EU 
membership, this being in the interest of the population and in order to avoid sanctions. A 
certain degree of economic progress, like the existence of a functioning market economy, is 
also essential. In this chapter, some of the important political and economic conditions for EU 
membership as well as reasons for different countries that adhere to the union will be 
presented. Then, the situation in some countries (e.g. Turkey and Croatia) that intend to 
become EU members as well as political challenges regarding these countries will be 
described. 
 
Through enlargement the prosperity, stability and good governance of the EU are extended to 
other countries by means of its membership criteria. The principle of conditionality means 
“that accession is conditional on fulfilling the criteria for membership”425. This principle was 
developed in the 1990s for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, because these states 
needed an external assistance during the transition from communism to western models and in 
order to avoid a situation in which the new countries could impair the EU because of a lack of 
adequate preparation. 
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The membership requirements are known as the Copenhagen criteria426. According to the 
conclusions of the European Council at Copenhagen (1993), “membership requires: 
1. that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human right and respect for and protection of minorities 
2. the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union 
3. the presupposition of the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership 
including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union”427. 
 
The decision for enlargement requires unanimity. The Accession Treaty has to be signed and 
ratified by all EU member states unanimously. The role of the European Parliament is to vote 
the Accession Treaty on a yes/no basis and to be informed about the accession negotiations428. 
A very important role in the enlargement process is played by the Commission. Its reports on 
the progress of applicant countries are significant for the decisions leading to the enlargement. 
In spite of the fact that the EU enlargement is an inter-governmental process, the Commission 
plays an important role as an interlocutor and intermediary with applicant countries and by 
presenting to the Council proposals for “common positions”429.  
 
The reason for joining the EU is that countries consider that this is in their political and 
economic interest. The UK for example considered that advantages existed for its trade and 
economic growth. In Ireland and Denmark traditions of exports of agricultural products to the 
UK and the Six (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) are 
given. Greece, Portugal and Spain joined the EU after the end of totalitarian regimes as a 
guarantee for the return to democracy. They also wanted to have access to the European 
market and European budget. Austria, Sweden and Finland, which had full access to the 
common market through the EEA, considered it as an economic benefit to be in the position 
of accepting rules from Brussels and not having to decide them. They also realized that their 
traditional neutrality could be less appropriate after the end of the Soviet bloc. 
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In the ten Central and Eastern European countries, EU membership was viewed as a guarantee 
for democracy and economic development430. After the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989 a 
risk of instability in Europe was given, but countries in Central and Eastern Europe chose to 
make economic, social and political reforms, especially because of their determination and 
prospect to join the EU. In ex-Yugoslavia, however, political problems and civil war could 
not be avoided. 
 
The main problems during the negotiations concerned the free movement of labor, 
agricultural policy and money. Some of the measures taken by the EU were to permit old EU 
member countries to maintain restrictions on workers from new member states for up to seven 
years and to impose a twelve year period for introducing direct payments to the new member 
states431.  
 
The Balkan countries in south-east Europe, to whom EU membership was promised, are: 
- Albania, with a population of 3.6 million; 
- Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a population of 4.5 million; 
- Croatia, with a population of 4.5 million; 
- Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, with a population of 2.1 million; 
- Montenegro, with a population of 0.7 million; 
- Serbia (including Kosovo), with a population of 10.2 million. 
These countries, with a total population of about 25 million people, are trying to implement 
the necessary political and economic reforms in order to be able to join the EU. The problems 
consist in ethnic and religious conflicts that led to civil war in the 1990s. The main problems 
are the fact that Montenegro is newly separated from Serbia, the question of independence for 
Kosovo and Bosnia’s external tutelage. Governance problems, corruption and criminality 
exist while EU membership requires autonomy and a functioning democracy. The situations 
of these countries concerning their EU membership requests are different: 
- in 2005 Croatia opened accession negotiations; 
- in 2006 Macedonia was accepted as a candidate; 
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- Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro and Albania have started the Stability and Association 
Program (SAP) which implies trade concessions, financial aid, contractual relations 
and helps on the way to applying for membership432. 
 
Between the Community and Turkey there exists the Association Agreement of 1964, the 
application for EU membership from 1987 and the opening of accession negotiations in 2005. 
In spite of these very important steps, Turkey’s EU membership is not assured. Its population 
represented 72 million in 2007 and is expected to grow. The country has a high geo-strategic 
importance in relation to the Middle East and the Black Sea region. It is also a NATO 
member. Other advantages can be the growing economy and the young labor force. Turkey 
has been a secular state since the 1930s with a majority of Islamic population. The country is 
making progress concerning the political and economic reforms in order to meet the 
Copenhagen criteria. Additional steps have to be taken with respect to the Kurdish minority, 
the freedom of expression and the political role of the military. Another problematic aspect is 
that with Turkey’s membership the frontiers of the EU would be to Azerbaijan, Armenia, Iran, 
Iraq and Syria, which represent regions of instability. Some also consider that Turkey is not 
part of Europe from a geographical or cultural point of view and that it would determine a 
significant migration of workers in the situation of membership. Another problem concerns 
Cyprus. In 1974, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has been separated from the south, 
but it was not recognized by the international community. In 2003 the Greek Cypriots in the 
south did not accept a UN plan for reunification of the island. Turkey’s EU membership 
would be an important signal that the EU accepts Islam. It will be, however, in Turkey’s 
interest to continue the modernization even if the country does not become an EU member, 
but the process will probably be less effective under such a circumstance433. 
 
5.7. EU External Relations 
 
The relations between the EU and other states, especially European countries, will be 
described in this section, including the possibility of membership to the EU and thus also to 
the EMU.  The aspect is important from the perspective of the OCA theory because the 
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optimality of a currency area increases with its size. If we take into consideration this theory, 
the EU and EMU enlargement are desirable when the new candidate countries fulfill the 
imposed criteria. 
 
5.7.1. European Economic Area (EEA) 
 
The European Economic Area (EEA) refers to an agreement that entered into force on 1 
January 1994 and permits States belonging to the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) to 
participate in the Internal Market without joining the EU434. 
 
Developed countries that have applied for EU membership are Norway and Switzerland. 
Norway signed two Accession Treaties, but its people said “no” in two referenda. The country 
is an EEA member and has access to the common market. Other EEA members are Iceland 
and Liechtenstein. The population of Switzerland voted “no” in a referendum to the EEA. Its 
interests are pursued through bilateral agreements with the EU435. 
 
5.7.2. European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) 
 
The European Neighborhood Policy involves sixteen countries: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, 
Libya, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Palestine Authority, Lebanon, Syria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. There are Action Plans with each country, which 
involve political dialogue, economic and social reform, trade, cooperation in justice and 
security affairs, transport, energy, environment, education etc. The neighbors are required to 
take on European regulation and important parts of the acquis. The purpose is to avoid future 
barriers to neighbor countries. Russia rejected the EU’s offer of Neighborhood Policy. 
Belarus is not included in the ENP because of the undemocratic regime436.  
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5.7.3. EU Limits 
 
The EU was not designed to be a world system of government, but an ‘ever-closer union’ of 
European peoples. Frontiers are not so important in the context of globalization, but they still 
are significant in order to define the territory where laws apply. A possibility is to have 
different frontiers for different policies (e.g. for the euro and Schengen).  
 
According to the 1957 Treaty of Rome “any European state may apply to become a 
member”437. In the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam there is a reference to common values that 
have to be respected by EU members. According to the European Commission (1992), “the 
term ‘European’ has not been officially defined. It combines geographical, historical and 
cultural elements which all contribute to the European identity. The shared experience of 
proximity, ideas, values and historical interaction cannot be condensed into a single formula, 
and is subject to review by each succeeding generation. It is neither possible nor opportune to 
establish now the frontiers of the European Union, whose contours will be shaped over many 
years to come438.” 
 
5.7.4. Italy and Great Britain 
 
There are, however, countries where the possibility of leaving the euro zone has been 
expressed (e.g. Italy) or which do not want to join EMU (e.g. Great Britain). 
 
In Germany and Italy there has been slower growth than in the rest of the euro zone with the 
common currency. The most important reason consists in the rigidities of labor market 
reforms. Italy is characterized by increasing production costs and little progress regarding the 
labor market. In June 2005 an Italian minister expressed the opinion that the country should 
leave the euro zone and the lira should be re-established. Economists who did not share the 
same view argued that in Italy there have been stable prices and low interest rates after the 
introduction of the euro. The public debt is high in Italy and the country would be confronted 
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with increasing debt service costs because of the higher interest rates if the country left the 
euro zone. The reduction of employment remains a problem with the euro. 
 
In 1997 Gordon Brown was appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer. He awarded himself a 
right of veto regarding the decision about British euro area membership. He made public the 
five economic tests on which he would make his verdict: 
- “Convergence. Are business cycles and economic structures compatible so that we 
and others could live comfortably with euro interest rates on a permanent basis? 
- Flexibility. If problems emerge, is there sufficient flexibility to deal with them? 
- Investment. Would joining the EMU create better conditions for firms making long-
term decisions to invest in the UK? 
- Financial services. What impact would entry into the EMU have on the competitive 
position of the UK’s financial services industry, particularly the City’s wholesale 
markets? 
- Growth, stability and employment. In summary will joining the EMU promote higher 
growth, stability and a lasting increase in jobs?”439   
 
5.8. The Possibility of Euro Area Breakup 
 
According to the OCA theory EMU becomes more optimal when it increases in size (after 
candidate countries fulfill the Maastricht criteria). However, the opinion that countries should 
leave the monetary union has been expressed before (ex ante) and after (ex post) the adoption 
of the euro. According to Eichengreen (2007) the probability of reintroducing a national 
currency decreases the longer the euro survives, for example because of increasing costs and 
the adaptation of markets and expectations to the single currency. Knowing possible reasons, 
advantages and disadvantages for leaving the euro area is important for convincing people 
about the prevailing positive aspects of EMU membership, in order to prevent the breakup of 
the currency area, and to be able to take measures for maintaining a stable and strong 
monetary union. Knowing the motives that can lead to the breakup is significant for taking 
measures in order to strengthen EMU and transform it into an OCA. 
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The opinion that the euro area is possible to break up was expressed even before the existence 
of the single currency (ex ante point of view).  The appreciation of the euro against the dollar 
and the slow growth in some euro area member states, have been reasons why various 
politicians blamed the ECB (ex post point of view). The possibility that one or more 
participants to EMU could leave the currency area was discussed by highly-placed officials 
before and after EMU came into being. According to Eichengreen (2007) “it is unlikely that 
one or more members of the euro area will leave in the next ten years and that the total 
disintegration of the euro area is more unlikely still”440. The reasons consist in technical 
difficulties should the reintroduction of the national currency take place441, and in the fact that 
even if immediate economic benefits could occur, longer-term economic costs and serious 
political costs can not be excluded. Cohen (2000) affirms, however, that “in a world of 
sovereign states… nothing can be regarded as truly irreversible”442. 
 
Although the technical and legal obstacles in a country that unilaterally reintroduces its 
national currency can be overcome, the potential difficulties could be serious. Some problems 
(like the redenomination of contracts) could be solved more easily than others (e.g. rewriting 
of computer code; reprogramming automatic teller machines; advance planning; lengthy 
political debate as well as the necessity of a bill passed by a national parliament of legislature; 
the threat of a banking and financial-market collapse because of agents leaving domestic 
banks and giving up financial assets in anticipation of a depreciation of their claims into the 
national currency, in the context of expecting the redenomination). As a conclusion, the 
change from old to new money is more difficult today than in the 1920s in Germany and in 
the 1990s in the former Soviet Union443.  
 
Possible economic obstacles refer to the debt servicing costs, interest rate spreads and 
interest-rate-sensitive forms of economic activity after not being an EMU member anymore. 
An opinion is that as a result of the departure from EMU a significant rise in spreads and 
debt-servicing costs would take place. Eichengreen (2007) considers that consequences will 
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be dependent on the reason why the country leaves (e. g. because of a politicization of the 
ECB policy and inflation bias) as well as on the adoption of credible alternatives to the ECB 
and the Stability Pact at national level (e.g. a strengthening of bank independence and credible 
fiscal reforms in the situation of the reintroduction and depreciation of the exchange rate). 
 
The political costs for countries leaving EMU would probably be very serious. They could 
consist in: 
- raising doubts about the future of EMU and as a result negative reactions in other 
states towards the leaving countries; 
- precipitating a shift out of euro-denominated assets, a situation that could be viewed as 
negative by remaining members; 
- damaging the balance sheet of banks in other EMU member countries that invested in 
the country that departs; 
- diplomatic tension and political acrimony; 
- suffering cooperation on non-monetary issues;  
- less important influence in intra-European discussions of non monetary issues;  
- some opposition from persons favoring the European integration444. 
 
Reasons for countries to intend to leave EMU could occur because nation states have different 
preferences over monetary policy due to differences in national history and identity. As a 
consequence, the monetary union is characterized by compromises and tradeoffs445. It is 
possible that in the situation of some nations the common policy is not optimum. Countries 
that decide to be EMU members trade off the costs of a monetary policy that is suboptimal 
against other benefits. A country confronted with an asymmetric shock could consider 
policies agreed upon by the majority of member states prohibitive. Another situation when a 
country may see the common policy prohibitive could be if less inflation-averse central 
bankers were appointed to the ECB board446.  
 
Eichengreen (2007) states that “the high value that member states attach to the larger 
European project would prevent them from exiting from the monetary union except under the 
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most extreme circumstances”447. The question that arises is whether the defection of one 
country could determine the euro area to disintegrate. Eichengreen (2007) considers that “it 
depends” and that it might determine a stronger incentive for other countries facing the same 
economic problem to follow. However, if the economic problems of the country leaving the 
euro area were the converse of the other member states, EMU could become more cohesive. 
This effect becomes more important when the country is larger. The euro area is also likely to 
become more cohesive if the leaving country has different preferences because policy 
agreements become easier to accomplish. This consequence is independent of the country size 
if ECB policy is decided by the principle of one country one vote448.   
 
Analyzing scenarios about horizons longer than ten years, Eichengreen (2007) concluded that 
“the longer the euro survives, the less likely it would seem that a participating country would 
see reintroducing its national currency as a logical treatment for its economic ills. Markets 
adapt to the single currency, rendering attempts to tamper with it correspondingly more 
costly. Expectations adapt to its existence: having no first-hand experience with alternatives, 
residents take the existence of a European currency as the normal state of affairs and come to 
regard the reintroduction of a national currency as beyond the pale”449. 
 
Other aspects that could increase the probability of a break-up of EMU are: 
- diplomatic and political falling out over foreign policy; 
- an asymmetric shock in the context of bombs and terrorist cells that determine a 
significant necessity for a real depreciation450. 
 
However, the euro is least popular in low-income euro area member states (e.g. Greece and 
Portugal), in economies with slow growth (e.g. Italy and Portugal) and in countries concerned 
about inflation (e.g. the Netherlands)451. 
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5.9. Language 
 
A problematic aspect for the optimality of the euro area consists in the high number of 
languages used. At this time EU legislation has to be written in all official languages of the 
EU. There are twenty-seven members and twenty-two official languages452.  
 
The most used languages in the EU are German with about 95 million speakers, French with 
56, English and Italian with 54 million each, Spanish with 40 and Polish with 38 million 
speakers453. Today, English gains more and more importance because there are 375 million 
people who use it as their mother language, 375 million people live in countries where 
English is the second language and about 750 million people speak English as a foreign 
language454. A significant advantage of the English language is also the high number of 
words: it has 600,000 words (while German has only 300,000 words) and is used by 
specialists working in the most different fields like scientists for example455. 
 
The goals that should be met by linguistic practices of a supranational legal regime are 
equality, fidelity and efficiency. The first goal is achieved, because all EU members are 
treated equally as each version of an EU law is viewed as an authoritative original, 
independent from the language in which it is written. However, there are three working 
languages in the EU: English, French and German456. The second goal, which consists in 
faithfulness to the intention of the drafter, is more difficult to be achieved when laws are 
written in different languages, because each version reflects at least to some extent the 
nuances of many legal cultures. Concerning the third goal, efficiency, today a costly burden 
on EU members can be observed. The Directorate-General for Translation (DGT) of the 
European Commission employs about 2,200 people at an annual cost of EUR 541 million. 
Tens of thousands of pages of documents have to be translated into the language of new EU 
member states457.  
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As a conclusion, the large number of official languages determines significant financial and 
legal costs and is an impediment for an effective communication. A possible intermediate 
solution is considered to be a regime with six official languages, but even this suggested 
measure is unlikely to gain sufficient support at present458. However, especially young people 
learn foreign languages at present, so that measures regarding the languages are more 
probable in the future. 
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6. The Impact of the Crisis 2008 
 
A financial system includes the money market, the corporate bond market, the bank credit 
market, the equity market and the government bond market. The financial market integration 
is an OCA criterion, as it can improve the functioning of these markets and lead to better risk 
sharing, diversification, capital allocation and higher growth. However, during financial crises 
disturbances in these markets take place. The uncertainty increases, the possibilities of proper 
resource allocation decrease and savings are more difficult to be mobilized. The demand for 
stocks and bonds can decrease significantly, especially for those of financial institutions and 
companies which are confronted with problems (e.g. because of loan defaults or decreasing 
demand for their products and lower profits). Financing can become more difficult for 
households and businesses as interest rates required by banks for loans increase and 
conditions become more severe because the value of assets that can be used as collaterals 
decreases and firms are confronted with lower demand.  
 
The danger in the situation of a financial crisis is that opponents to EMU could express the 
preference for national currencies and flexible exchange rates. These would permit 
devaluation, and thus increase the demand for national products which could become cheaper. 
The value of domestic debt could also be reduced under such circumstances. However, the 
negative consequences of leaving the currency area would probably be higher than the 
advantages in most cases. Thus, the challenge during financial crises is to maintain a stable 
and strong EMU by taking common measures against the crises and by showing the 
advantages and progresses of the common currency euro (for example the lower foreign debt 
burden because of lower interest rates). 
 
This chapter starts with the presentation of various definitions for financial crises. “The major 
difficulty is that crises tend to have different features each time and in each place: i. e. have 
strong historical peculiarities”459. Second, an overview of the financial crisis 2008 will be 
given. It shows that even strong currency areas like the US and EMU could lose importance 
because of mistakes regarding financial market regulation. Other countries, especially China, 
whose financial system is not so exposed to crises, could gain influence. Third, reasons and 
developments of the financial crisis that occurred so far are described. Because of 
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globalization and the high degree of financial market integration, the crisis spread through 
contagion around the world and is the most severe in 75 years.  Credit, debt, liquidity, 
currency as well as banking problems are significant. Fourth, it will be shown that the OCA 
criteria as well as the criteria of the SGP are more difficult to be fulfilled under the conditions 
of financial crises, especially as opposition is expressed regarding debt and deficit restrictions. 
Countries that intend to become EU and EMU members could also be confronted with 
increasing problems in fulfilling the Maastricht criteria. Opposition towards EMU as well as 
towards possible new members of the currency area could increase as a result of financial 
crises, especially if coordinated proper measures are not taken. Fifth, the role of EMU 
institutions and thus of political integration, which represents an OCA criterion, is discussed.  
 
Finally, it is shown that taking measures by politicians against the crisis is essential in order to 
maintain the stability of the currency area and to avoid a breakup. Critical areas of the 
economy must be identified and receive support. Bailing out banks and some industry areas 
like the motor industry is very important460. It has been argued that in order to work, policy 
measures have to be coordinated between the US and the EU as well as with those of BRICs 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China). However, some politicians have been against 
extended bailout measures since the beginning of the crisis. In Germany a certain aversion to 
spending its way out of recession has been expressed. “When the credit crunch began to bite 
Chancellor Angela Merkel said Germany was ‘strong enough’ to withstand the crisis and 
would not take part in a ‘pointless race to spend billions’ “461. Others call for tax cuts and 
economic stimulus in Germany462. The financial crisis 2008 has shown so far that EMU and 
EU institutions have been essential in taking coordinated measures against the crisis, 
measures that could also increase the financial market integration as well as the political 
integration, which are OCA criteria. The acceptance of EMU and the Lisbon Treaty could 
become higher. A possibility to overcome crises is thus by adopting measures that address the 
problem, but also those that restore and increase the optimality of OCA.   
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6.1. General Definitions of Crises 
 
Some important definitions of financial crises are: 
- A financial crisis “is the culmination of a period of expansion and leads to 
downturn”463.  
- Goldsmiths’ definition of financial crisis is that it represents “a sharp, brief, ultra 
cyclical deterioration of all or most of a group of financial indicators – short-term 
interest rates, asset (stock, real estate, land) prices, commercial insolvencies and 
failures of financial institutions”464. 
- According to Hubbard (1991), financial crises can be defined “as episodes of break-
downs in financial trade. ‘Financial trade’ refers to the way in which financial 
contracts, institutions, and markets channel funds from ultimate savers to ultimate 
investors in the economy, allocate risk, and provide information about and incentives 
for borrowers’ performance”465.  
 
According to Summers (2000) “every financial crisis is different and involves its own 
distinctive elements”466. He considers that “an international financial crisis is a situation 
where the international dimension substantially worsens a crisis in ways that would not occur 
in a closed economy”467. Elements that are common to some financial crises are “a dramatic 
swing in the current account, a large real depreciation, and a significant decline in real 
output”468. Three elements of crises are: 
(1) Investors choose to reduce their stock of assets because of concerns regarding the 
viability of the exchange-rate regime, fiscal deficits, current-account deficits, 
financial-sector weaknesses (e.g. because of insufficient capitalization and supervision 
of banks, as well as excessive leverage and guarantees) and because of directed 
lending (e.g. resulting from the necessity determined by economic problems faced by 
banks and firms).  
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(2) Investors then also evaluate the behavior of other investors and decide that they do not 
intend to be the last ones in the context of bank-runs. Rumors regarding capital 
controls and panic can occur. 
(3) Withdrawals of capital and a swing of the exchange rate can take place. Real exchange 
rate depreciation determines lower real incomes and spending. Foreign-currency 
liabilities increase in value and the lower creditworthiness of domestic borrowers leads 
to less lending469. 
 
 
6.2. The Emergence of the Financial Crisis of 2008  
 
This overview shows that the international importance of a currency area (like the US) could 
decrease because of financial crises. Other countries, which are less confronted with the 
problems causing the crisis (especially China), could improve their significance. This 
situation is likely to occur even by taking appropriate measures against the crisis. 
 
 
The global financial crisis was preceded by the US housing market bubble and a rise in 
foreclosures470. Other significant causes for the crisis were the very low interest rates 
combined with unprecedented levels of liquidity. The excess liquidity resulted according to 
Bernanke from “the global savings glut”, which refers to the financial surpluses of oil-
producing countries. Another important reason for the crisis was the huge amount of capital 
that went into the subprime mortgage sector and toward weak borrowers in the US, in Europe 
and to a lesser extent in other regions around the world. The principle regarding loans is that 
the stronger the borrower, the lower the yield and vice versa. Thus, losses are significant in 
the situation of subprime mortgages471. US home equity had a value of $13 trillion in 2006, 
only $8.8 trillion by mid-2008 and was still falling in late 2008. Retirement assets decreased 
by 22 percent (from $10.3 trillion in 2006 to $8 trillion in mid-2008). Losses also occurred 
regarding savings and investment assets (i.e. their value decreased by $1.2 trillion)472.   
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An important number of banks, investment houses and insurance companies declared 
bankruptcy or had to be rescued. Credit flows decreased significantly, lender confidence 
dropped and recession occurred in countries around the world. The crisis continues even with 
the easing of monetary policy and with interventions of trillions of dollars by the IMF and 
governments473. The S&P 500 decreased by 45 percent between its 2007 high and November 
2008. The Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index recorded in September 2008 the 
biggest monthly drop ever. US consumers reduced spending on discretionary items and 
expressed concerns for their bank deposits474.  
 
Needing liquidity, some have to sell financial assets which leads to decreasing asset values. 
The lower value of assets discourages spending and lending under most circumstances. 
Approaches of easing monetary policy are expected to have a limited impact, because interest 
rates in the US as well as in Europe are already low and large amounts of liquidity have 
already been injected into credit markets. The discussed fiscal stimulus of $300 billion in the 
US could also be viewed as not sufficient if the $15 trillion economy is taken into 
consideration. The loan losses of global financial institutions are expected to rise at $1.5 
trillion475. The US and the EU governments committed $1.5 trillion to direct equity 
investment in their local financial institutions. The amount injected by central banks in the 
credit markets reached $2.5 trillion, which is the most significant in history. However, it is 
expected that Western financial institutions will have to withdraw credit from the world for at 
least three or four years. Changes in regulation are needed in order to avoid future similar 
crises476.   
 
Governments as well as European leaders will have to concentrate especially on domestic 
recovery and on the demands of its own citizens when using national resources. Major 
international initiatives will have to be postponed because of unprecedented deficits and 
financial difficulties477. The credibility of the West has also been undermined to some 
extent478. 
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The financial crisis initially began in industrialized countries, but then it spread to emerging 
markets and other economies. The values of stocks and domestic currencies became lower 
around the world, as investors took capital even from countries with low risk levels. Exports 
and commodity prices decreased and the economy went towards a world wide recession479. 
Countries like Hungary, Latvia and Ukraine, which have high debt and deficits, are especially 
hit by the crisis. Oil-exporting countries like Russia, Iran and Venezuela also are confronted 
with severe problems480.  
 
In the US, the financial crisis has negative consequences on stability, relations with other 
states and the possibilities of providing a financial infrastructure that can contribute to a 
smooth functioning of the world economy. The financial problems have an impact upon 
exports and imports, growth rates, unemployment and government revenues and expenditures, 
which also affects the goods-and-services-producing.  
 
The financial crisis shows that the US is a major financial center of the world. When a crisis 
occurs there it has significant consequences for the rest of the world. This happens because 
the US are the most important guarantor of the international financial system and US dollars 
are used to a large extent as currency reserves and as an international medium of exchange. A 
high amount of financial capital is invested in the US and other economies like those of 
emerging markets cannot be de-coupled from the US economy481. 
 
The crisis could be used as an opportunity to strengthen and reshape the IMF (e.g. by 
increasing its capital base), to increase the significance of the G-20 (19 of the worlds largest 
economies plus the EU) and to revise the Basel II guidelines regarding bank capitalization482. 
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6.3. Reasons and Developments 
 
The multiple reasons for the crisis 2008 suggest important problems in financial market 
regulation. They also show that if additional measures towards a more optimal currency area 
were taken, like an EMU wide supervision of the banking sector, maybe the current crisis 
would not be so severe. Problems in the banking sector would, however, have been easier 
identified. The crisis 2008 actually started mainly in the US, and shows that severe crises can 
occur even in currency areas that are considered developed. 
 
Reasons that determine crises and are also significant for the current situation include 
“overshooting of markets, excessive leveraging of debt, credit booms, miscalculations of risk, 
rapid outflows of capital from a country, mismatches between asset types (e.g., short-term 
dollar debt used to fund long-term local currency loans), unsustainable macroeconomic 
policies, off-balance sheet operations by banks, inexperience with new financial instruments, 
and deregulation without sufficient market monitoring and oversight”483. 
 
A reason for the current crisis consists in the accumulation of dollars, Euros, pounds and yen 
in record amounts by different countries. Such countries feared insufficient foreign exchange 
reserves following the 1997-98 Asian financial crises when Thailand, Indonesia and South 
Korea had to borrow from the IMF to be able to pay the short-term foreign debt when the 
value of their currencies decreased significantly. The dollar accumulation was also 
determined by the US trade current account deficit. Currency reserves had reached $4.4 
trillion by mid-2008 ($2 trillion in China, nearly $1 trillion in Japan, $500 billion in Russia 
and more than $200 billion in India, South Korea and Brazil). Investments had been made in 
high yielding US Treasury and other government securities.  
 
Another significant economic problem occurred in 2000, when the equities of a large number 
of high-technology companies collapsed. After these developments, money started to flow 
especially into housing markets in the US and in other countries484. China invested a high 
amount into US Treasury Bills and other US securities. US interest rates could thus be 
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maintained at low levels. Mortgage interest rates were also low and thus very attractive for 
home buyers. At the same time, the popularity of securitization of assets increased, especially 
of mortgage debt (including subprime mortgages) into collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). 
Mortgage finance companies were often the mortgage originators. Their most important 
purpose was to write mortgages using funds that were provided by banks and other financial 
institutions or borrowed. They had no responsibility for loans gone bad, but were paid for 
each mortgage originated. It was in their interest to maximize the number of loans485.  
 
“Essentially, securitization is a transaction structure in which loans (such as loans secured by 
residential real estate – i.e. mortgages) are pooled together (‘repackaged’) as collateral 
underlying the issuance of securities, predominantly debt securities. Securitization allows 
originators (such as banks) of assets (such as residential mortgages) to transform a future 
stream of revenue (i.e. loan repayments) into a present value pool of capital, which can then 
be used to support further lending. In order to be effective, this process requires investors 
willing to purchase the resulting securities. In the typical transaction structure, the collateral is 
transferred to a separate legal entity – a special purpose vehicle (SPV) – which in turn issues 
the securities purchased by investors and uses the proceeds from the sale of securities to 
purchase the pool of collateral from the originator. This is the most common structure used in 
the United States and in other Common Law countries around the world. In Civil Law 
countries (especially in Continental Europe) the norm has been for the bank to issue the 
securities directly with the backing of a legally isolated pool of collateral – ‘covered 
bonds’”486. 
 
A possibility to cover the default risk on mortgages, especially subprime mortgages, was to 
purchase credit default swaps (CDSs) by holders of CDOs. “These are a type of insurance 
contract (a financial derivative) that lenders purchase against the possibility of credit event (a 
default on a debt obligation, bankruptcy, restructuring, or credit rating downgrade) associated 
with debt, a borrowing institution, or other referenced entity. The purchaser of CDS does not 
have to have a financial interest in the referenced entity, so CDSs quickly became more of a 
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speculative asset than an insurance policy”487. Without significant defaults, the issuers of 
CDSs could earn a high amount of fees. Technically, this was not considered as insurance, so 
that they did not need to have sufficient capital in order to cover the claims. Sellers of CDSs 
often bought themselves CDSs for the situation of default. The costs rose, however, as the risk 
of defaults increased. “Investors, therefore, could arbitrage between the lower and higher risk 
CDSs and generate large income streams with what was perceived to be minimal risk”488. 
 
The notional value (face value of underlying assets) of credit default swaps reached $62 
trillion in 2007, while at the same time the gross domestic product of the world represented 
$54 trillion. The actual amount at risk was only a fraction of that sum. The notional value of 
CDSs became, however, lower in July 2008 ($54.6 trillion) and by October 2008 it fell to 
$46.95 trillion. Because the number of defaults became large, bankruptcies rose. The 
exposures became too great for firms like AIG by October 2008489. 
 
Thus, aspects that increased the risk of financial markets were: 
- the originate-to-distribute model for mortgages. Originators of mortgages were not 
penalized for not taking the measures to ensure that the borrower was qualified for the 
loan, while investors depended especially on ratings by credit agencies and had little 
information about the underlying quality of loans. “The originator of mortgages 
passed them on to provider of funds or to bundler who then securitized them and sold 
the collateralized debt obligation to investors”490. 
- increasing perverse incentives and complexity for credit rating agencies. “Credit rating 
firms received fees to rate securities based on information provided by the issuing firm 
using their models for determining risk”491. Such models had not been, however, 
tested under crisis conditions. 
- the differences between traditional insurers and issuers of credit default swaps. 
Contracts that were actually insurance contracts were written without insurance 
regulation and requirements for capital adequacy492.   
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To sum up, the reasons for the current financial crisis include: 
- the housing bubble; 
- the subprime mortgage crisis in the US; 
- high amounts of leveraged debt by banks, investment houses and consumers; 
- large deficits in international trade and current accounts in some countries, especially 
in the US; 
- the accumulation of large reserves of foreign exchange; 
- the search for higher rates of return by investors, deploying “hot money”; 
- the significant reduction of commodity prices; 
- higher interest rates against inflation; 
- a slowdown of the world economic growth rates; 
- globalization and thus a herd instinct; 
- greater uncertainty in a world economy after half a decade of relative stability493. 
 
Some regulatory, market and political failures that contributed to the 2008 US financial crisis 
were: the lack of normal bank supervisory power regarding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; 
encouraging home ownership by permitting lower bank mortgage standards; moral hazard and 
conflicts of interest between banks, mortgage brokers, securitizers, credit rating agencies and 
asset managers. The consequences of financial deregulation show that regulatory reforms are 
necessary494. 
 
Stock market value reductions indicated the speed and spread of the financial crisis. The stock 
indices for the US, UK, Japan and Russia reached by mid-October 2008 half of the levels 
from October 1, 2007495. A new rule requires financial institutions to value stock according to 
market values (mark-to-market). Thus, the capital base of banks became lower and reduced 
their ability to make more loans and also maintain the required capital-asset ratios. Some 
equities became valueless in short time (e.g. Freddie Mac from $63 on October 8, 2007 to 
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$0.88 on October 28, 2008)496. In September 2008 the rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
was decided. 
 
Fanny Mae, Federal National Mortgage Association, FNMA, was founded by Roosevelt in 
1938, in order to add liquidity to the home mortgage market and facilitate housing sales. It 
purchased mortgage from banks and provided mortgage insurance, so that banks could create 
more mortgage cheaper. Freddie Mac, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, FHLMC, 
was founded with the purpose to make loans and loan guarantees. It pooled the purchased 
mortgages and sold mortgage backed securities to investors. Banks were encouraged to make 
more loans for housing. Fannie Mae was privatized in 1968497. Fannie and Freddie were also 
encouraged to purchase affordable mortgages from banks after 1992, these being mortgages 
that did not pass the usual tests for loans, as it was previously demanded by banks that 
originated mortgages. Thus, sub-prime, i.e. sub-standard, mortgages and mortgage-backed 
securities were created. Problems occurred because insufficient reserves were put aside, 
taking into consideration the issued and insured securities. Insured mortgage-backed securities 
mean that guarantees exist for the payment of principal and interest, regardless whether the 
persons continue their mortgage payments or not498. Between 1998 and 2006 a housing boom 
could be achieved in the US and much of the world, especially because of the sub-prime 
loans. The values of houses increased and thus speculators joined the market and bought 
houses whose value was expected to increase. In the US home ownership was 69.2 percent in 
2004 and then prices began to fall; in 2008 home ownership represented 67.8 percent499. In 
the context of crisis, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and AIG were taken over by the government, 
while Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual failed500. 
 
Insurance companies and even hedge funds lost value during this crisis. The bleak prospects 
determined credit markets practically to freeze. The confidence in financial markets became 
also low. In October 2008 the Libor (the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate, which is used by 
banks for short-term loans to each other) doubled from 2.5 to 5.1% and for a few days much 
                                                 
496
 See Nanto et al (2008), p. 13. 
497
 See Congleton (2009), p. 1. 
498
 See Congleton (2009), p. 2. 
499
 See Congleton (2009), p. 3. 
500
 See Ivashina (2008), p. 1. 
The Impact of the Crisis 2008                                                                     142 
 
 
inter-bank lending practically stopped. However, US monetary authorities decreased interest 
rates; this was intended to have a positive impact on lending. After the crisis broke out, 
investors usually fled stocks and debt instruments and often preferred US Treasury and other 
government securities501.  
 
Two phases of the financial crisis can be differentiated so far: 
1. Phase I.: the “subprime crisis” between mid-September 2007 (and the bank run on 
Northern Rock) and mid-September 2008 (and the Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing of 
Lehman Brothers). Six individual rescue packages for banks, which were largely 
exposed to the US subprime crisis and dependent on mortgage securitization, were 
authorized by the Commission. These aspects have been considered mainly 
“individual problems” needing “tailor-made remedies”502. 
2. Phase II.: starting with mid-September 2008. It is a crisis of confidence. Following the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers an unprecedented freeze in interbank lending was the 
consequence. “At that point, the crisis took a systematic turn and started affecting 
‘even fundamentally sound financial institutions,’ a situation that prompted the 
Commission to recognize the likelihood of bank failures leading to ‘a serious 
disturbance in the economy of (Member States)’. As a result, the Commission resorted 
to a rarely-used and more lenient provision to authorize national recovery plans and 
individual rescue measures, namely Article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty (‘EC’)”503.  
 
Because of contagion the present financial crisis has spread around the world. Countries are 
confronted with various problems. First, countries face significant credit problems. In the US 
for example the average loss per property was roughly $124.000, most of it due to unpaid 
interest. Firms (like the major investment banks, Bear Stearns, Lehman Bros, Merril Lynch, 
Goldman and Sachs, Morgan Stanley etc.) that maintain and issue prime and sub-prime 
mortgages and mortgage-backed securities and that have high leverage and count on ‘rolling 
over’ loans are confronted with negative crisis effects. Their access to credit was reduced 
because of the decreasing value of assets that they could use to secure loans. Thus, some firms 
became bankrupt without enough assets. Banks (e.g. Washington Mutual and partially 
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Wachovia) that hold mortgages in regions with extreme housing bubble and that have a large 
amount of sub-prime mortgages were confronted with increasing risk because of the inability 
of some people to pay their debt and falling housing prices. A second problem refers to 
liquidities. Significant liquidity amounts were assured through policy measures for example in 
the US, UK, China and India. Third, some countries (e.g. Hungary, Ukraine, Bulgaria, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania) are also confronted with debt 
problems. The reasons include the high total debt amount in the economy, the size of the 
current account deficits, dependence on foreign investment and the level of indebtedness in 
the domestic banking sector. Forth, several countries, like Mexico and Brazil, face currency 
problems. The peso in Mexico fell by 40% between August 2008 and October 2008 resulting 
from lower commodity prices and the exposure to US mortgage-backed securities. Brazil, like 
Mexico, sold billions of dollars in order to fight its currency depreciation which fell by over 
35% from August 2008. Fifth, bank failures occurred in different countries (e.g. in Iceland, 
but also in Russia, UK and Asia: Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, 
Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia). Questions regarding bank supervision and crisis 
management in Europe and the US were raised. 
 
6.4. The Effects on Maastricht Requirements 
 
The analysis of the Maastricht criteria suggests that under the premises of crisis it will be 
more difficult for countries to become EMU members. The fulfillment of the Maastricht 
criteria becomes more difficult for EMU candidate countries. EMU countries are also more 
preoccupied with their internal problems, so they could postpone the admission of new 
member states until problems have been solved and the crisis overcome. 
  
No danger of EMU breakup is given at the moment, according to the ECB president. The 
creditworthiness of countries like Ireland, Greece, Spain and Italy could, however, represent a 
burden for the Euro according to some experts. 
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EMU countries are confronted with the danger of increasing budget deficits504. Traditional 
fiscal policy like tax cuts and spending increases will be adopted, but also bailouts of lenders, 
investors and financial institutions as well as of borrowers505. The expected public deficit is of 
11 percent of GDP in Ireland. Up to two-third of the EU-27 will probably have a public 
deficit of over 3 percent in 2009. The economic situation could, however, improve because of 
lower prices of raw materials.  
 
In some countries the inflation could be negative for a certain period, while some economists 
fear even a deflation. Thus, a long-term price reduction could be the consequence. 
Households and businesses could postpone investments and consumption, because they will 
expect even lower prices. The recession could thus become even deeper and longer. The ECB 
intends to keep a price increase of just under 2 percent506. With decreasing prices and lower 
demand, firms in EMU could be confronted with problems when they have to pay loans 
because of lower profits. A decreasing value of their assets could also determine access to 
lower amounts of loans as the value of potential collateral would be reduced.  
 
A common measure taken by the US, the Euro zone, the UK, Canada, Sweden and 
Switzerland consisted in an interest rate reduction on October 8, 2008. The provision of 
guarantees and capital are also important measures. 
 
The cash amount euro zone banks park at the ECB dropped because overnight market rates 
became lower. On January 22 2009 bank deposits were 111.4 bn, lower with 72.7 bn, 
resulting from a rate of interest reduction of 100 basis points to 1 percent. Deposits decreased 
by 171.5 bn euro during the previous two days from 315.3 bn euro. A measure to be adopted 
by the ECB is to widen the corridor (meaning “the difference between the rate it pays on 
deposits from banks and what it receives on lending”). Two strategies could be pursued by the 
ECB: one regarding public inflation expectations through the policy rate or ordinary interest 
rate and another one concerning the private inter-bank lending markets. It should become less 
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economical for banks to hold cash with the ECB instead of lending it into the money market. 
The overnight interest rates were reduced to 1.498 percent, halfway between the policy rate of 
2 percent and the deposit rate of 1 percent on the 22nd January507. The incentives of banks to 
lend money to firms and households in order to increase the economic activity and permit 
economic growth are thus intended to be improved by reducing interest rates. 
 
With interest rates close to zero, the economies could face the following problems: a liquidity 
trap, a deflation trap and debt deflation. A liquidity trap means that banks cannot stimulate the 
economy as their interest rates cannot be set below zero. Because of the deflation trap 
consumption and investment become lower, while falling prices also imply relatively high 
real interest rates. The demand will be reduced even further with lower incomes and less jobs. 
The debt deflation represents a rise in the real value of nominal debt because prices have 
fallen508.  
 
Regarding exchange rates, Bernanke, “one of the main economic historians of the financial 
crises of the 1930s” considered that “countries which then depreciated their currency really 
came out better than those who guarded the value of their currency, which actually is not at all 
surprising because depreciation is a ‘beggar my neighbour’ policy. This implies that Bernanke 
will do nothing against dollar depreciation now and, in effect, is a proponent of exploiting 
China (the main US creditor) and also Euroland”509. Thus, in countries with currency 
depreciation, the demand for exports will increase. The result will be improved economic 
activity and an easier and faster overcoming of the crisis.   
 
6.5. The Role of EMU Institutions  
 
EU institutions are significant in dealing with the crisis 2008. The requirements for further 
developments (e.g. an increasing importance of the ECB regarding the EMU wide supervision 
of the banking sector) and for deeper cooperation with international institutions have been 
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expressed. Thus, the political integration, which is an OCA criterion, could be further 
improved.  
 
The solution to the financial crisis in Europe implies taking into consideration competition 
law and state aid. Competition law does not impede solutions against the financial crisis. Thus 
on October 2 2008 the approval of a €35 billion aid package was announced in order to rescue 
Hypo Real Estate Holding AG in Germany. The holding was confronted with problems 
resulting from its involvement in the national and international mortgage business and the 
adopted short-term refinancing strategy510. 
 
The economic and financial policy are especially the competence of the 27 Member States in 
the EU, as no EU Treasury, centralized EU economic policy institutions or common EU 
financial services regulator exist. Some coordination results from the SGP. The bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers in mid-September contributed to the spread of the crisis to the whole 
financial system; credit institutions in Europe were also affected. The EU member states 
wanted urgent recovery measures. On October 7, the ECOFIN met and the member states 
decided upon common principles against the crisis. The Eurogroup turned the principles into a 
concerted plan on October 10 2008511. The Commission played a significant role in assuring 
the markets that rescue measures adopted by the member states were “not going to be 
jeopardized by EU rules”512.  
 
The Commission was aware that it had to shorten the decision-making process regarding the 
authorization of rescue packages including State aids. Therefore it got involved in the design 
of such measures and made sure that they were State aid compatible. Commissioner Kroes, 
President Barroso, Commissioners Almunia (Economic and Monetary Affairs) and McCreevy 
(Internal Market) were given the responsibility to authorize “emergency rescue measures” for 
three month. Thus, the Commission could take decisions “if necessary within hours” and “at 
any moment in time in particular over the weekend, during the evening or at night and also on 
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bank holidays”. Over 20 positive State aid decisions were taken within 8 weeks after the 
empowerment513.  
 
The Commission acted as a stabilizing force during the crisis and showed that the legal 
framework is flexible enough even for the situation of exceptional and country-specific 
circumstances. Measures were decided in order to permit rescuing and restructuring banks and 
companies in difficulty514. 
 
It is important that the national measures do not simply export problems to other Member 
States515. First, all credit institutions with systematic relevance to the economy must have 
access to guarantees and recapitalization plans, even if they have subsidiaries and branches 
headquartered abroad. “Second, the Commission has insisted that State guarantees be granted 
with adequate remuneration from individual financial institutions and/or the financial sector 
as a whole; fees being set according to the degree of risk and the beneficiaries’ respective 
credit profiles and needs. Likewise, capital injections must be provided against property value 
and remunerated securities, ideally carrying corresponding rights. Third and most important, 
guarantee and recapitalization schemes must be tied to duly monitored behavioral constraints 
preventing aggressive commercial conduct on the part of beneficiaries, e.g., by introducing 
GDP-related, market share, or balance sheet growth ceilings, potentially combined with other 
safeguards aimed to address more diffuse moral hazard issues”516. 
 
Through the involvement in the design of financial recovery plans and in individual rescue 
measures at national level the Commission has an important role in economic policy 
coordination, even though the economic and financial policy is primarily the competence of 
Member States517.  
 
Some of the most important measures regard the part-nationalization and recapitalization of 
the banking system. Changes in the regulatory practices and management incentive structures 
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that characterize banks are expected. Questions about risk management practices also arise518. 
Another significant issue regards the evaluation of the system of investor protection as global 
bank losses exceed the 1 trillion mark519. 
 
These developments show that EMU and EU posses strong institutions and are capable of 
reacting promptly and effective under crises premises. However, improvements are 
recommended especially on institutional level (for example regarding financial legislation) in 
order to have the possibility to recognize problems sooner and thus to prevent crisis. 
 
6.6. Measures for Overcoming the Crisis 
 
Financial crises are historically common and can have not only economic but also political 
effects. They could lead to very nationalistic governments and increase the danger of a 
currency area breakup. Without taking adequate measures, governments can lose popularity 
and the acceptance for a currency area can decrease. Thus, knowing the measures that can be 
adopted against crises (preventive measures and specific measures for the different phases of 
the crisis) becomes very important. Acting in coordinated ways and helping companies that 
make businesses in other regions or countries (outside EMU and EU) can improve the public 
perception about decision taking institutions and also help overcome the crisis sooner. 
  
Policymakers in countries usually have the following reactions: 
- they deny that a crisis could take place; 
- anger, blame on speculators and other outside forces; often a change in government 
can take place; 
- bargaining; 
- despair and calling for example the IMF; 
- finally acceptance and the agreement of a credible plan. 
Confidence that proper measures regarding the financial crisis will be adopted is central in 
such situations.520 
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“Crises feed uncertainty”521. The last has effects upon portfolio decisions, as a shift from risky 
to riskless assets take place. It also affects consumption and investment decisions. A 
significant reduction of demand occurs because consumers have lost part of their wealth and 
they save more. Thus, it is essential that policymakers reduce uncertainty (for example by 
providing fiscal stimulus), undo the effects of uncertainty on the portfolio side (for example 
through recapitalization) and also undo the consequences of the wait-and-see attitudes of 
consumers on the demand side (which means to increase the incentives to spend for example 
through temporary subsidies to consumers who turn in an older car and buy a new car, a 
measure adopted for example in France)522. 
 
The current crisis shows that EU and EMU are very important for maintaining the stability of 
the euro and of the currency area. Cooperation with international institutions represents also a 
priority. Suggestions for improvements regarding international financial cooperation and 
economic institutions are presented in this chapter. Appropriate measures could also 
determine an improvement of the OCA criteria, especially regarding financial market 
integration. Political integration will probably also be pushed further, as the competences of 
the ECB and other EU and EMU institutions will increase. Additional countries could express 
interest in joining the EU and EMU and also accept the Lisbon Treaty.  
 
6.6.1. Regulatory Design 
 
A proper financial regulatory design should assure: ”first, a robust financial infrastructure 
(especially payment and settlement systems); second, well managed financial institutions with 
effective corporate governance and risk management systems; third, disclosure requirements 
sufficient to support market discipline; fourth, regulatory systems designed to reinforce 
management and market discipline as well as limiting and monitoring potential risks across all 
financial institutions; fifth, a lender of last resort to provide liquidity to financial institutions; 
                                                 
521
 See The Economist (January 31st-February 6th 2009), p. 76. 
522
 See Blanchard in The Economist (January 31st-February 6th 2009), p. 76. 
The Impact of the Crisis 2008                                                                     150 
 
 
sixth, mechanisms for resolving problem institutions; and seventh, mechanisms to protect 
financial services consumers in the event of financial institution failure”523. 
 
Measures that were especially supported by different countries include: 
1. “Recapitalization: governments promised to provide funds to banks that might be 
struggling to raise capital and pledged to pursue wide-ranging restructuring of the 
leadership of those banks that are turning to the government for capital. 
2. State ownership: governments indicated that they will buy shares in the banks that are 
seeking recapitalization. 
3. Government debt guarantees: guarantees offered for any new debts, including inter-
bank loans, issued by the banks in the Euro zone area. 
4. Improved regulations: the governments agreed to encourage regulations to permit 
assets to be valued on their risk of default instead of their current market price”524. 
 
6.6.2. European Reactions 
 
On October 16, 2008, EU leaders agreed on monthly meetings in order to improve the 
financial oversight. José Manuel Durão Barroso, President of the European Commission, 
stressed the need for a “fully integrated solution” to deal with the global financial crisis. The 
European Council expressed the necessity of an EU-wide supervision of the European 
financial sector525.  
 
The opinion was expressed that the IMF should have a more important role in preventing 
future financial crises. It could have a larger role in financial market regulation, for example 
by becoming a global supervisor of regulators. The IMF could also be “the pivot of a renewed 
international system”526, working with other bodies. The World Bank could also have a more 
important role in taking measures against future crises. 
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Agreements between the US Federal Reserve and the ECB were expanded. They agreed for 
example about joint lending operations.  
 
Germany was the first country that implemented a rescue package that could consist in up to 
$750 billion ($600 billion for bank guarantees and $150 billion in state funds: $120 billion for 
recapitalization and $30 billion a provision for bank guarantees). In France the rescue package 
could cost up to $500 billion ($480 billion in guarantees for inter-bank lending issued before 
December 31, 2009 and valid for five years; $60 billion to recapitalize struggling companies 
by permitting the government to buy equity stake). The funds will be provided by two state 
agencies in France. Italy announced measures including Treasury guarantees for new bonds 
issued by banks until December 31, 2009 and valid for five years. The approval of the Bank 
of Italy will be necessary and the guarantees refer to market prices527. 
 
A “European Framework for Action” was decided by the European Commission on October 
29, 2008. The three parts refer to: 
1. New financial market architecture at EU level. The ECB and other central banks 
should thus continuously support the financial system. Additionally, rapid and 
consistent bank rescue plans should be adopted by member states and measures should 
be taken to limit the spread of the crisis. 
2. Dealing with the impact on the real economy. Measures against unemployment and 
towards growth should be taken by member states. The EU will invest in R&D, 
innovation and education, to equip people for specific jobs, to help building markets at 
home and internationally and to enhance competitiveness by green technology and 
environmental goals. 
3. A global response to the financial crisis. International regulatory standards, 
international coordination among financial supervisors, measures to monitor and 
coordinate macroeconomic policies should be strengthened and the capacity to address 
financial crises at national and multinational levels should be developed. Efficiency, 
transparency, accountability and the inclusion of representation of key emerging 
economies should be pursued528.  
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6.6.3. Fiscal and Financial Support 
 
The fiscal and financial support in G7 and BRIC countries as a percentage of GDP is 
presented in the following table529. 
 
Overview of recent fiscal and financial support in G7 and BRIC countries, % of GDP 
 
Brazil Britain Canada China France Germany India Italy Japan Russia 
United 
States 
Fiscal stimulus* 0.2 1.1 2.0 15.0 1.5 3.1 1.3 4.3 2.0 1.1 5.8 
Likely stimulus** 0.2 1.1 2.0 6.0 0.4 2.4 1.3 0.5 2.0 1.1 5.8 
Nature of stimulus            
  Infrastructure 
 
      
   
 
  Tax cuts            
  Non-bank bail-outs 
 
          
Financial support            
  Liquidity provision            
  Loan guarantees 
 
  
 
  
 
    
  Capital injection 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
  Asset purchases 
 
  
 
  
  
   
  Nationalisations*** 
 
 
        
 
For an interactive version of this table, see: www.economist.com/stimulus 
Sources: The Economist; IMF 
*Announced  **Estimated actual effect
***Conservatorship in the US
Table 6: Overview of fiscal and financial support in G7 and BRIC countries 
 
The most adverse effects of the financial crisis occurred in the banking sector. EU banks have 
booked so far write-downs of more than $200 billion. Some banks have been rescued by 
governments and have been partly or fully nationalized. Certain banks require recapitalization 
and have to sell assets. National deposit insurance schemes were decided530. 43% of banks in 
the Euro area tightened lending standards. Interest rates charged for new loans also 
increased531.  
 
The construction sector is also confronted with problems. Housing investment decreased in 
2008 especially in Spain, Germany, Italy and Denmark. House prices are considered to be 
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overvalued (in Ireland and the UK at about 20-30% and about 10-20% in Spain, France, Italy 
and the Netherlands532). 
 
The crisis also had a negative impact on the car industry. The European Investment Bank will 
probably have a credit program of 400 million euro for Peugeot and 400 million euro for 
Renault. Low interest rate loans and guarantees for the car industry are planned, for example, 
in France533. The French government decided to introduce a rescue plan consisting of up to 6 
billion euro for its car industry, which is nowadays confronted with reduced demand, credit 
crunch and lower competitiveness. 
 
A problem of some major European companies is given by the high debt. Corporate debt in 
the Euro zone is $11 trillion, 95% of the region’s annual output. Problems can arise because 
the risky corporate loans were repackaged and sold to investors. Another problem companies 
are confronted with is the 40% reduction of bank lending in the Euro zone. Europeans have to 
issue bonds, but the yields have almost tripled. The Anglo-Swiss mining group Xstrata had to 
issue new shares to be able to pay down debt; however, it had to offer discounts to be 
attractive for investors. Moody’s downgraded 249 Western European companies last year. 
Thomson, a French provider of video equipment and services, breached agreements with 
lenders on some debt. It intends to sell off businesses such as Grass Valley in order to 
increase its cash amount. Companies accumulated high debts also because they extended their 
businesses. Paris-based Lafarge, the world’s largest cement maker, has a high amount of debt 
because it decided to extend business in Egypt. Edscha, which was a $1.4 billion German 
auto-parts maker, declared bankruptcy on Feb. 2.  S&P estimations are that 150 European 
companies could default in loans, which amount to $65 billion, over the next two years534.  
 
Companies that do business in Eastern Europe also face some risks. “First that bad debts rise 
as local customers default, particularly those that have borrowed in foreign currencies that 
have since risen relative to their own. Second that foreign-exchange mismatches mean the 
assets of local banking subsidiaries shrink relative to liabilities, eating up capital. And finally 
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that subsidiaries face deposit runs or are unable to borrow. In any of these situations the 
western parent would have to step in with precious capital and liquidity”535. Important banks 
that do business in Eastern Europe, including Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, and which are 
confronted with challenges because of the financial crisis, include Raiffeisen, Erste Bank , 
Swedbank, KBC, UniCredit Group and Societe Generale.   
 
6.6.4. Measures to Enhance EU Financial Market Integration 
 
The integration, openness, competitiveness and efficiency of the EU can be increased by the 
following steps: 
• “Implementing, enforcing, and evaluating existing legislation, and ensuring that future 
initiatives are based on rigorous impact assessment and thorough consultation; 
• Removing any remaining barriers to the free provision of financial services and 
circulation of capital, eliminating unnecessary costs and delivering high levels of 
financial stability and consumer protection and benefits; 
• Enhancing supervisory cooperation in the EU, deepening relations with other financial 
market-places internationally, and strengthening Europe’s global influence”536. 
 
The ECB reacted quickly to the problems of the US sub-prime mortgage market in 2007 and 
provided additional liquidity to the EU financial system. The “Ecofin Roadmap”, which was 
decided in October 2007 in the EU, includes measures for dealing with weaknesses of the 
financial system. The purpose of the Roadmap is to: 
• “Improve financial transparency in the market by requesting that financial institutions 
reveal all areas where they are exposed to risk, provide basic statistics on these 
markets, and furnish investors with more and better information; 
• Enhance financial reporting and valuation of financial products to give investors more 
detailed information on individual deals; 
• Ensure proper valuation of assets, focusing on consistent application of international 
accounting standards vis-à-vis all financial intermediaries; 
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• Strengthen the prudential rules for banks in the context of managing liquidity risk, 
concentration risk, and off-balance sheet exposures; 
• Investigate structural market issues, including the role played by credit rating agencies 
and their potential failures in the context of financial turmoil”537. 
 
The Single Euro Payment Area (SEPA) will permit the banking industry to shift to an 
integrated euro payment system from the 31 national payment systems by November 2009. 
Technical, legal and commercial barriers will be eliminated and cashless cross-border 
payments will become easier. 
 
The Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), in force since November 2007, gives 
exchanges, multilateral trading facilities and investment firms in Member States a “single 
passport”. This allows them to be operational throughout the EU if they have authorization in 
their home country. 
 
The EU directive regarding deposit guarantees will be revised. The minimum level of deposit 
guarantees throughout the EU will increase from Euro 20,000 to Euro 50,000 in the first year 
and to Euro 100,000 thereafter. The payout period will be three days and not three month 
anymore in the situation of bank failure. 
 
Proposed changes regard capital requirements for banks538. Banks will be encouraged to use 
increased capital reserves to meet regulatory requirements, but also to make loans to 
businesses539. However, limits on loans to any one party are also recommended in order to 
reduce risk exposure. The supervision of banks operating in more than one EU country should 
also be increased. 
 
Suggestions are made to change accounting standards, so that assets should be valued 
according to their intrinsic value over time and not only based on the current market price.  
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For the Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs), legally binding registration should be imposed as 
well as the supervision of the policies and procedures followed. This should take place 
through European regulators540. 
 
Regarding banking refinancing, the ECB tightens the conditions. Beginning with March 1 
2009 it will accept asset backed securities only if they have AAA rates. ABS can also no 
longer be used as collateral for an ABS paper. By using ABS banks could get liquidity from 
the ECB in a repo transaction541. 
 
Two further measures which are also very important in order to increase the optimality of 
OCA have been discussed: the introduction of Euro bonds and an EMU wide supervision of 
the banking sector by the ECB. 
 
The possibility of the introduction of Euro bonds was discussed, but Germany rejected it 
because of differences of risk premium between EMU countries (the risk premium is lower in 
Germany than in Spain, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Italy because of the public deficit and 
competitiveness). Countries with a high creditworthiness could determine lower interest rates 
for other countries. According to Germany, the SGP provision of 3 percent deficit should be 
held. Paris does not share this view in the context of crisis and affirms that the risk premium 
becomes more important542.  
 
The ECB president said that he “stood ready” to take European bank supervision 
responsibilities. According to his statement it would not be very difficult to grant the ECB the 
necessary legal powers. This could be essential for preventing financial market crises in the 
future. In Brussels a meeting took place with the purpose of making proposals for a European 
financial supervisory system543. 
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6.6.5. Economic and Financial Cooperation between the EU and the 
US 
 
Even though the EU and the US are different currency areas, cooperation between the two is 
very important especially because of the challenges imposed by globalization. The crisis that 
began mainly in the US shows that the linkages between countries increased during the last 
years significantly, so the crisis spread globally, leading to the need of stronger economic and 
financial cooperation. 
 
The EU-US transatlantic economy is worth $4 trillion and represents the most integrated 
economic relationship in the world. The EU and the US are essential for influencing growth, 
trade and prosperity. 12 percent of the world population lives in the EU and US and the two 
regions account for close to 40 percent of global trade and nearly 60 percent of world GDP.  
 
Cooperation is essential for promoting trade and investment and to eliminate unnecessary 
regulatory burdens. Annual presidential summits have been organized since 1990 between the 
EU and the US in order to clarify aspects of bilateral relationship. At the 2007 summit “The 
Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration” was signed. The purpose was 
increasing economic integration and growth. Decisions regarding regulatory cooperation, 
capital market integration, investment, innovation, protection of intellectual property rights 
and secure trade were adopted.  
 
The EU-US Financial Market Dialogue was established in 2002. The scope was to achieve 
common goals like the international equivalence and convergence of accounting standards, 
open and efficient markets as well as further integration. The Dialogue can help to take 
decisions about regulations. It involves the European Commission, the US Treasury 
Department, the US Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Reserve Board of the US 
and representatives of EC’s internal market.  
 
A significant role for the EU-US integration is played by the Transatlantic Economic Council 
(TEC) which was established at the 2007 EU-US summit544.  
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All these possibilities of cooperation are very important in order to take decisions and to deal 
with the crisis and to improve the optimality of the currency areas.  
 
6.6.6. G-20 Measures 
 
At the G-20 summit measures to stabilize the world financial system and to improve the 
international regulatory framework were discussed. The following action plan was decided 
“to (1) address weaknesses in accounting and disclosure standards for off-balance sheet 
vehicles; (2) ensure that credit rating agencies meet the highest standards and avoid conflicts 
of interest, provide greater disclosure to investors, and differentiate ratings for complex 
products; (3) ensure that firms maintain adequate capital, and set out strengthened capital 
requirements for banks’ structured credit and securitization activities; (4) develop enhanced 
guidance to strengthen banks’ risk management practices, and ensure that firms develop 
processes that look at whether they are accumulating too much risk; (5) establish processes 
whereby national supervisors who oversee globally active financial institutions meet together 
and share information; and (6) expand the Financial Stability Forum to include a broader 
membership of emerging economies”545. 
 
6.6.7. Purposes of Measures 
 
The measures aim at: 
- restoring confidence. The measures taken include interest rate cuts, in some cases 
unprecedented measures to rescue financial institutions that are viewed as “too big” to 
fail, injections of capital, government takeovers of important financial institutions, 
guarantees of bank deposits and money market funds by governments and easing of 
mergers and acquisitions. 
- increasing economic activity and coping with flight of capital from regions affected by 
the crisis. Financial packages have been provided by the IMF and others for Iceland 
($2.1 billion), Ukraine ($16.5 billion), Hungary ($25.1 billion) and Pakistan ($7.6 
The Impact of the Crisis 2008                                                                     159 
 
 
billion). Some other countries confronted with major economic problems in the 
context of crisis are Belarus and other countries of the Former Soviet Union, Mexico, 
Argentina, South Korea, Indonesia, Spain and Italy546. 
- changes in the financial system to reduce risk and prevent future crises. Long-term 
solutions against financial crises are searched. Thus, meetings as the Bretton Woods 
II. and the G-20 leaders Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy on 
November 15 2008, in Washington DC took place. In the US, some problematic 
aspects that have been identified and against which measures are planned include: 
“weaknesses in fundamental underwriting principles; the build-up of massive risk 
concentrations in firms; the originate-to-distribute model of mortgage lending; 
insufficient bank liquidity and capital buffers; no overall regulatory structure for 
banks, brokerages, insurance, and futures; lack of regulatory ties between 
macroeconomic variables and prudential oversight, and how financial rescue packages 
should be structured”547. Questions that occurred were, for example, whether countries 
should agree to cede authority to an “international watchdog” and regulatory agency, 
as well as whether more “Europeanized” (i.e. in accord with Europe’s practices) 
financial markets should exist548. 
- dealing with political and social effects of the financial turmoil. The financial crisis 
shows that along with the US, major European leaders play an instrumental role in 
handling the crises and the importance of non-industrialized nations in dealing with 
global issues is also increasing549. 
 
Apart from the aforementioned aspects, the financial crisis poses additional effects that need 
to be considered. The financial crisis occurs in the context of global food shortages. In 
developing countries the economic situation worsens and it is expected that the demand for 
economic and humanitarian assistance will increase further. However, the ability of the US to 
provide funding for aid and other programs decreases because of lower government revenues 
and the extremely high costs for rescue packages. Thus, the US will also lose some of its 
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influence regarding the requests for human and labor rights, product safety as well as other 
issues towards some countries. Russia, Mexico, Venezuela and other oil exporting countries 
will have less financing possibilities because of decreasing oil prices. Prices for commodities 
(e.g. beef, rice, coffee, tea) of exporters from Africa, Latin America and Asia also decrease550. 
Security problems in countries like Yemen and Pakistan could also increase in the context of 
economic problems and with lower funds available to deal with these issues551.  
 
6.7. Expectations of Further Developments 
 
Many bubbles exist and have only begun to burst. Vulnerabilities of financial markets 
include: a credit crunch that will get worse, deleveraging because hedge funds for example 
have to sell assets into illiquid and distressed markets thus determining falls in asset prices 
and margin calls, as well as the financial crisis in emerging-market economies. It is probable 
that the US contraction will last about 24 month. The stagnation in the US could be even 
longer, similar the one experienced by Japan in the 1990s. A recession of the entire global 
economy can be expected as a result of the US economy shrinkage. In Europe, Canada and 
Japan as well as in emerging markets that are connected through trade in goods, finance and 
currency with the developed countries, the crisis will be severe552. In these circumstances, the 
annual growth in China could even fall from 12 to 6 percent per year and in Brazil and South 
Korea the growth could drop below 3 percent per year. Ecuador, Hungary, Latvia, Pakistan 
and Ukraine are the most vulnerable countries and they need significant external financing.  
 
The credit excesses that determined the crisis were global. Bubbles that exist in different 
countries regard not only housing but also commercial real estate mortgages and loans, credit 
cards, auto loans and student loans. Securitized products converted such loans into 
problematic financial instruments. Bubbles also occurred in local government borrowing, 
leveraged buyouts, hedge funds, commercial and industrial loans, corporate bonds, 
commodities and credit-default swaps, leading to “a dangerous unregulated market wherein 
up to $60 trillion of nominal protection was sold against an outstanding stock of corporate 
                                                 
550
 See Nanto et al (2008), p. 5. 
551
 See Nanto et al (2008), p. 6. 
552
 See Roubini (2009), p. 63. 
The Impact of the Crisis 2008                                                                     161 
 
 
bonds of just $6 trillion”553. It is the biggest asset and credit bubble that occurred in human 
history. Credit losses could be $2 trillion554.  
 
2009 could become the first truly global recession in modern economy. The US asset-
dependent growth resulted especially from homebuilding activity and personal consumption. 
Both sectors accounted for nearly 80 percent of US GDP.  Asian economies were driven by 
export bubbles and had an influence upon the consumption bubble in the US. Countries such 
as China wanted to maintain cheap currencies and thus kept significant amounts of dollar-
based assets. As a consequence, the interest rates in the US could be maintained low and 
credit bubbles occurred. In countries such as states in the oil-dependent Middle East, 
Australia, Canada, Brazil, Russia and Africa, bubble-distorted commodity prices exist. A 
reason for the world wide spread of the crisis is thus given by globalization which increased 
during the last years in the form of trade, information and labor flows555. 
 
Another important reason for financial problems is given by Europe’s exposure to risky, 
emerging-market trade debt, which is six times larger than its exposure to US subprime 
mortgages. In Britain for example the exposure dwarfs the country’s GDP. The problem in 
developing economies is that they are very much export dependent and have built excess 
savings. However, during crises, the demand for those products decreases. In Austria the 
emerging market financial exposure of banks is over $290 billion, while the GDP of the 
country is $370 billion556.  
 
Leading international banks that operate in Central and Eastern Europe try to convince 
governments, the EU and the ECB to adopt anti-crisis policies in the region. Measures to ease 
liquidity shortages and assistance in reviving lending are necessary. The Group of these 
leading international banks considers that support should be assured not only to new member 
states like Poland, but also to Serbia, Bosnia and even Ukraine. The group was brought to life 
by the chief executive of the Austrian bank Raiffeisen International. 
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The economic outlook is darkening in EU states as well as in countries that are not EU 
members. According to a forecast of the European Commission, EU economic output is 
expected to decline by 1.8 percent in 2009.  
 
The EU and the IMF already played a significant role regarding emergency financial packages 
in Eastern Europe. The ECB gave extended support to Hungary and Poland and the EU plays 
a significant role in Latvia’s bailout557.  
 
Home prices could remain low for a few years before they increase again. In the US, housing 
prices are nearly back down to the 1990s levels in some cities558.  
 
Another bubble is the dollar bubble. Since the late 1990s the dollar has been significantly 
overvalued and led to a US trade deficit of almost 6 percent of the GDP in 2006. Eventually, 
the dollar could be forced to fall to levels that permit trade close to balance. However, 
because of the crisis there is a higher demand for dollars that are considered safe and thus the 
currency value increases, so trade deficit will probably rise during the recession. Higher 
import prices and a reduced standard of living as well as higher interest rates in order to avoid 
inflation could occur in the US. Defaults on prime loans, car loans, credit card debt and other 
forms of consumer debt can be expected as people posses less money559 
 
6.8. Conclusions 
 
The financial and economic crash that occurred in 2008 was the worst in 75 years. “This 
damage has put the American model of free-market capitalism under a cloud. The financial 
system is seen as having collapsed; and the regulatory framework, as having spectacularly 
failed to curb wide-spread abuses and corruption. Now, searching for stability, the US 
government and some European governments have nationalized their financial sectors to a 
degree that contradicts the tenets of modern capitalism”560. “For decades, much of he United 
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States’ influence and soft power reflected the intellectual strength of the Anglo-Saxon brand 
of market-based capitalism”561, but in the context of the present crisis the role of the state will 
increase and that of the private sector will become smaller562. 
 
The international influence of China could increase because of the crisis. The country is the 
strongest regarding liquidities, with foreign exchange reserves of about $2 trillion. Its 
financial system is not exposed and the country’s growth rate is strong even though 
diminished because of the crisis. Its shareholding position in the IMF could also increase563.  
 
Regarding European countries, the impact of the 2008 financial crisis would have been 
significantly more negative without the EU and EMU.  Because of the euro, economic 
stability in countries belonging to EMU could be increased. The average inflation was two 
percent per year and the average nominal interest rate nine percent during the first EMU 
decade. Since 1999, 16 million jobs have been created in EMU. In 2008, the unemployment 
rate represented about seven percent, which was the lowest rate in 15 years. The situation of 
public finances improved significantly. The average public budget deficit was 0.6 percent of 
GDP in 2007. The economic and financial integration increased. Internal EU trade accounts 
for one-third of GDP. Private and public investment is 22 percent of EMU GDP. Transaction 
costs were eliminated because of the adoption of the euro. The common currency euro is the 
second most important world currency and has overtaken the US dollar in the international 
bond market.   
 
With its strong economic situation, the EU had the possibility to respond to the current global 
financial crisis rapidly. A rescue plan was decided which permits governments to guarantee 
interbank lending, provide short-term liquidity and buy into banks in order to increase their 
liquidity. Measures were taken to restore confidence and increase stability. Other significant 
measures regard the improvement of regulation, as recommended through the 2007 Economic 
and Financial Roadmap. New regulatory and supervisory rules for financial markets (banks, 
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other lenders, hedge funds, private equity) are expected. Economic reforms in order to 
increase the optimality of the EMU will continue564. 
 
Aspects that hindered even more negative consequences of the crisis for EMU were the 
monetary policy of the ECB, the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs and the Stability and 
Growth Pact565. 
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7. Opinions 
 
In this chapter different opinions are presented regarding the question whether EMU is an 
optimum currency area. The aim is to illustrate different views regarding the question 
analyzed in this paper, which shows that there is no real consensus concerning the matter.  
 
J. E. Meade (1957) supported the view according to which flexible exchange rates would be 
more effective than a common currency in Europe because of the lack of labor mobility566.  
 
Scitovsky (1958) thought that a common currency should be supported because it would lead 
to a greater degree of capital mobility. Further steps are, however, necessary in order to 
achieve higher labor mobility567. 
 
De Grauwe writes that, “…from an economic point of view, a monetary union involving all 
EC member countries is a bad idea. The economic costs of a monetary union are likely to be 
larger than the benefits for a significant number of countries”568. His argument is that the 
EMU countries cannot use the exchange rates as instruments of stabilization policies. 
Opinions against this point of view are that the exchange rate policies do not help against real 
monetary shocks, and the fact that the flexibility of prices and wages will increase within the 
EMU569.   
 
The reason for taking the risk and setting up EMU, through the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, 
was politics. According to Martin Feldstein, who is a critic of the single currency, “political 
leaders in Europe seem to be prepared to ignore these adverse consequences because they see 
EMU as a way of furthering the political agenda of a federalist European political union… 
The adverse economic effects of EMU and the broader political disagreements will 
nevertheless induce some countries to ask whether they have made a mistake in joining. 
Although a sovereign country could in principle withdraw from the EMU, the potential trade 
sanctions and other pressures on such a country are likely to make membership in EMU 
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irreversible unless there is widespread economic dislocation in Europe or, more generally, a 
collapse of peaceful coexistence within Europe570.” According to this point of view, EMU is 
not justified from an economic perspective. In order to be able to survive, major steps towards 
a federal Europe are required, e.g. a common defense and common foreign policies, the 
harmonization of taxation and labor market regulations. 
 
Another important view on this issue is expressed by Baldwin and Wyplosz: “We have 
reached two important conclusions. First, Europe is not exactly an optimum currency area; it 
does well on some but not all of the criteria. Second it is not just labor mobility that is 
insufficient but, more generally, the labor markets that display significant rigidity, especially 
in the large countries. In these countries, the monetary union may worsen an already painful 
situation of high unemployment571.” 
 
According to Baldwin and Wyplosz the main reason for EMU was to bring wars in Europe to 
an end and to strengthen peace572. The negotiators of the Maastricht Treaty did not 
concentrate on OCA theory. They intended to preserve the exchange rate stability in the 
context of full capital movement liberalization, to have a strong new currency, and an 
independent central bank. Now, the authorities rediscover more and more the importance of 
OCA theory573. The following question can be put: “Does the existence of the monetary union 
make Europe increasingly an optimum currency area? One view is that the OCA criteria are 
endogenous, that they will be increasingly fulfilled over time as citizens and governments 
learn to live with a common currency.” However, the integration in Europe is significantly 
lower than in the USA574. 
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8. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
The main question analyzed in this thesis is whether the EMU is an optimum currency area.  
A currency area can be described “as a domain within which exchange rates are fixed”575. 
According to Mundell, who won the Nobel Prize in part for having created the OCA theory 
and whose views are presented in detail, a monetary union is optimal when the factors of 
production, capital and labor are fully mobile. An optimum currency area means that giving 
up the exchange rates between participating member states is justified576. 
 
In order to answer the question regarding the optimality of EMU, the following aspects have 
been presented in detail: Firstly, a description has been given regarding the current and the 
historical situation in EMU. Secondly, the OCA theory has been presented and depicted 
graphically, especially the views of Mundell, Krugman/Obstfeld and Baldwin/Wyplosz. 
Thirdly, the OCA criteria have been described as well as their fulfillment in the EMU. The 
relevant OCA properties analyzed in this paper include labor and capital mobility, price and 
wage flexibility, financial market integration, product diversification, economic openness, 
similarities of inflation rates, fiscal and political integration and homogeneous preferences. 
Fourthly, the Maastricht criteria, which are necessary premises for the EMU accession, have 
been presented, as well as the question whether it is optimal to impose these conditions for 
euro zone membership. At the end, significant opinions of economists have been shown 
regarding the question whether the adoption of the common currency euro is optimal.  
 
It can be observed that significant positive aspects of the EMU consist in the permanent steps 
that are taken in order to increase the economic and monetary cooperation between EMU 
member countries as well as to improve the fulfillment of the OCA criteria in this currency 
area. Some relevant measures are aimed at increasing freedom of payment and capital 
movements, the removal of capital controls as well as the reduction of monetary 
independence. Problematic facts can, however, derive from the high number of EMU member 
countries and from the differences between them, determining for example a longer period for 
decision taking. Especially rigidities in the labor markets represent a problem in EMU.  
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The OCA theory has been the subject of studies performed by important economists, 
including Kruman/Obstfeld and Mundell. A very important conclusion of the description of 
the OCA theory, made by Krugman/Obstfel, is that a currency area is optimal when the output 
and employment instability after joining is lower than the efficiency gain577. In another 
renowned analysis of OCA theory, Mundell concludes that the EMU fulfills some of the 
criteria of the OCA theory (e.g. capital mobility) more than others (e.g. labor mobility)578.   
 
The analysis of the OCA criteria mentioned in this paper shows that some of them are 
fulfilled in EMU (e.g. capital mobility, financial market integration, product diversification, 
trade openness, similarities of inflation rates), others are only partly satisfied (e.g. 
homogeneity of preferences) and others are rather not fulfilled (e.g. labor mobility, price and 
wage flexibility, fiscal transfers, political integration). The conclusion of the analysis is that 
although there is significant progress necessary in order to increase the optimality of the 
currency area (e.g. regarding the labor market) the adoption of the euro had positive effect and 
made for a higher degree of fulfillment of the OCA criteria. Some of the possible measures 
that could be recommended, in order to a have a more optimal euro zone, are: a common 
European stock market579 to increase the financial market integration and an EMU wide 
supervision of the banking sector580; measures towards a more efficient communication (e.g. 
dealing with the challenges imposed by the numerous different languages in the currency 
union); institutional improvements to determine a higher political integration581; a further and 
increasing economic and monetary cooperation between present participants and also with 
future EMU members.  
 
Regarding the adoption of convergence criteria, some advantages are that: low inflation 
determines fiscal discipline, higher credibility of the disinflation goals of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) and a strong currency; a lower interest rate leads to higher investments 
and imports and to an economic recovery; a stable exchange rate is connected to price 
stability; the deficit and debt criteria should for example increase the capacity of EMU 
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countries to react to adverse shocks. Disadvantages regard especially the fact that the 
convergence criteria are very strict and the restrictive fiscal policy can be very expensive. The 
analysis of the convergence between EMU member states shows that convergence is stronger 
between countries that joined the ERM from the beginning582. In the new EU member 
countries there is a tendency towards increasing convergence583.  
 
The specific situation in some EU members (Romania and Bulgaria) as well as in candidate 
countries (Croatia and Turkey) has been also presented. The goals of these countries during 
the transition period include: “stabilization of inflation, control over budget deficit, price 
liberalization, adoption of a single exchange rate, current account convertibility, opening to 
trade and capital movements, building up banking and financial systems, establishing property 
rights, ending soft-budget constraints, setting up market-based welfare systems”584. The 
following common developments could be observed in these countries, also as a result of their 
intention to become EU and then EMU members: high economic growth because of 
investments and privatization; increasing wages and social transfers; a strong credit growth; 
higher consumer and economic confidence; increasing competitiveness; increasing discipline 
regarding the fulfillment of economic criteria like price stability; increasing optimality 
(significant steps that can lead to a higher fulfillment of the OCA properties are taken, for 
example by satisfying the Maastricht convergence criteria)585. 
 
There are two important economic views regarding the issue whether it is optimal to impose 
the Maastricht convergence criteria as conditions for the accession to EMU: the 
representatives of the traditional Keynesian macro economy and of the OCA theory consider 
that the convergence criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact are too strict and very 
expensive, while representatives of economic policy and public choice share the opinion 
according to which the convergence criteria are significant in order to increase the credibility 
and to reduce the spill-over effects between different EMU countries586. The fact that 
countries do have to satisfy the Maastricht criteria before joining the EMU determines the 
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fulfillment of the OCA criterion of similarity of inflation rates even before the states become 
part of the currency union. The political conditions that must be achieved in order to become 
an EU member are essential and lead to an increased attainment of the OCA criterion of 
political integration. However, opinions regarding an EMU and EU breakup must also be 
considered. Eichengreen (2007) believes that “it is unlikely that one or more members of the 
euro area will leave in the next ten years and that the total disintegration of the euro area is 
more unlikely still”587.  
 
The impact of the crisis 2008 on EMU represents another significant aspect. The financial 
crisis can pose challenges for currency areas like the US and EMU for example because of 
mistakes in financial market regulation. Other countries, especially China, whose financial 
sector is not so exposed to the present crisis, could increase in significance. Knowing the 
reasons and developments of the financial crisis can help to take measures in order to 
overcome its negative consequences as well as adequate preventive measures in the future. 
The crisis could lead to an improved design of the financial system in currency areas. 
Financial crises are also significant because they make Maastricht criteria more difficult to 
fulfill and can theoretically increase the danger of EMU breakup or weaken the currency area 
if adequate and coordinated measures are not adopted. The role of EMU institutions is 
therefore essential. It shows how important political integration is and how this OCA criterion 
can be improved despite the crisis (e.g. through increasing competences of EMU institutions 
in order to deal more efficiently with the crisis). Taking adequate measures is very important 
from different points of view: from a political (for example by increasing the optimality of the 
currency area through a higher acceptance by different states) but also from an economic 
perspective. This crisis could become even worse, for example because of the high amount of 
consumer loans that have to be paid by the population (i.e. possible defaults could occur in the 
context of increasing unemployment) as well as because of further bubbles (like the dollar 
bubble). However, the crisis should be seen as an opportunity to improve and strengthen 
EMU and EU and not to increase the possibility of a breakup of the currency area. 
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The economic views regarding the question whether EMU is an OCA differ significantly. 
Some economists, e.g. J. E. Meade588, De Grauwe589 and M. Feldstein590 favor flexible 
exchange rates and not the euro because the OCA criteria are not fully fulfilled in EMU. 
Baldwin and Wyplosz591 share the opinion that the EMU fulfills some of the OCA criteria, 
like trade openness and product diversification, while other factors like labor mobility and 
fiscal transfers are not fulfilled. According to these authors, the homogeneity of preferences is 
only partly fulfilled. Scitovski592 supports a common European currency, for example because 
of higher capital mobility.  
 
The conclusion is that although there still are important steps to be taken in order to increase 
the optimality of EMU, there are significant benefits from a common currency area that 
justify the adoption of the euro and the sustained efforts to improve the economic and 
monetary situation in EMU member countries. 
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Abstract 
 
In this thesis aspects of the European Economic and Monetary Union are presented, especially 
from the perspective of the theory of optimum currency areas. Conflicting opinions regarding 
the criteria that have to be fulfilled in order to meet the requirements of an OCA as well as 
regarding the question whether EMU is an OCA are described. According to Mundell some of 
the criteria of the OCA theory (e.g. capital mobility) are fulfilled by EMU more than others 
(e.g. labor mobility). Eichengreen (2007) considered, however, that the total disintegration of 
the euro area is unlikely. 
 
It also will be shown that the adoption of the euro contributed to a higher degree of fulfillment 
of the Optimum Currency Area criteria. The purpose of low inflation rates has been generally 
reached, in some cases even before the countries became members of the currency union 
given the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty. It is also shown that the convergence is 
strongest between countries that introduced the Exchange Rate Mechanism earlier.   
 
Regarding the political conditions for EU membership, they are important from the 
perspective of the OCA theory because they contribute to an increased achievement of the 
OCA criterion of political integration. Finally, the impact of the crisis of 2008 is discussed. 
The conclusion is that the crisis should lead to measures that increase the optimality of EMU 
and EU and not determine a higher possibility of breakup of the currency area. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
In dieser Arbeit werden Aspekte über die Europäische Währungsunion presentiert, vor allem 
aus der Perspektive der Theorie Optimaler Währungsräume. Gegensätzliche Standpunkte über 
die Kriterien, welche erfüllt werden müssen, um die Anforderungen Optimaler 
Währungsräume zu erfüllen, sowie bezüglich der Frage ob die Europäische Währungsunion 
einen optimalen Währungsraum darstellt, werden beschrieben. Mundells Meinung ist, dass 
einige der Kriterien der Theorie Optimaler Währungsräume (wie zum Beispiel die 
Kapitalmobilität) mehr als andere (wie zum Beipiel die Arbeitsmobilität) erfüllt werden. 
Eichengreen (2007) schlußfolgert, dass die totale Desintegration der Eurozone 
unwahrscheinlich ist. 
 
Es wird gezeigt, dass die Einführung des Euro zu einem höheren Grad der Erfüllung der 
Kriterien optimaler Währungsräume beigetragen hat. Das Ziel der Inflationsreduzierung 
wurde im allgemeinen erreicht, teilweise sogar vor dem Beitritt zur Währungsunion, aufgrund 
der Bestimmungen des Vertrages von Maastricht. Es wird ausserdem gezeigt, dass die 
Konvergenz am stärksten ist zwischen Ländern welche früher den Wechselkursmechanismus 
eingeführt haben. 
 
Die politischen Bedingungen für eine EU Mitgliedschaft sind wichtig aus der Perspektive der 
Theorie optimaler Währungsräume, weil sie zu einer verbesserten Erfüllung des Kriteriums 
optimaler Währungsräume führt bezüglich der politischen Integration. Schließlich wird der 
Impakt der Krise 2008 diskutiert. Die Schlussfolgerung ist, dass die Krise zu Maßnahmen 
führen sollte, um die Optimalität der Europäischen Währungsunion und der EU zu steigern 
und nicht um eine höhere Wahrscheinlichkeit der Desintegration der Währungsunion zu 
bewirken.  
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